**IMISCOE Research Series**

# Joëlle Moret

# European Somalis' Post-Migration Movements

Mobility Capital and the Transnationalisation of Resources

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Joëlle Moret

# European Somalis' Post-Migration Movements

Mobility Capital and the Transnationalisation of Resources

Joëlle Moret Laboratory for Study of Social Processes University of Neuchâtel Neuchâtel, Switzerland

ISSN 2364-4087 ISSN 2364-4095 (electronic) IMISCOE Research Series ISBN 978-3-319-95659-6 ISBN 978-3-319-95660-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95660-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018949917

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### **Acknowledgements**

This book is the result of a long-haul enterprise that would not have been possible without the support of many people.

During my fieldwork in both Switzerland and Britain, I met women and men who trusted me enough to share parts of their lives and some of their opinions with me, and who sometimes pointed me towards other potential respondents. I can never thank them enough, and I hope that they will recognise themselves in my analyses.

I am very grateful to Janine Dahinden, my dissertation supervisor, for her continual support from the very start. I have enjoyed every academic discussion and glass of wine with her.

The members of my Dissertation Committee, Boris Nieswand, Louise Ryan and Camille Schmoll, read earlier versions of this book: I owe a tighter final argument to their critical yet constructive comments. Two anonymous reviewers also contributed to improving this book.

I have also been fortunate to write this book in a thoroughly stimulating environment, the Laboratory for the Study of Social Processes, and to spend time with amazing colleagues there. In particular, I want to thank Christine Achermann, Nolwenn Buehler, Giada de Coulon, Kerstin Duemmler, Aylin Eriksen, Carolin Fischer, Anne Lavanchy, Joanna Menet, Yvonne Riaño and Marc Tadorian. I have benefited from their numerous suggestions when struggling with theoretical, methodological, strategic and practical problems – but also, and importantly, from their friendship.

I would also like to thank Steven Vertovec and the administrative and academic staff at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity for their warm welcome during my time there in 2011 and 2012.

I am grateful to the institutions that have contributed financially to this study and its publication: the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Equal Opportunities Office and the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Neuchâtel, as well the nccr – on the move, also at the University of Neuchâtel. I take the opportunity to thank Daniel Moure for his respectful and precise editing work.

Finally, I want to express my deepest gratitude to my family and close friends for their encouragement, support and love, in particular my parents and their partners, my mother-in-law and of course my partner David and the wonderful Olivia and Nine, who have survived the journey.

# **Contents**



#### Contents


# **Chapter 1 Introduction**

This book is about the cross-border movements of a specific group of people at a particular moment in their lives and trajectories. It is about migrants who left their country of origin, Somalia, settled in Europe and have since elaborated complex mobility patterns in order to improve their living conditions. Their lives have been shaped by a first, important move across national borders: the one that brought them to Europe, in most cases through asylum channels and following the collapse of their state of origin. This move has led them to being labelled "migrants" or "refugees" and treated accordingly. They are part of large waves of migration that European states have mostly tried to avoid. However, because of the international conventions these states have signed, among other reasons, they have accepted these newcomers.

Many studies about migrants from poorer countries focus on this particular cross-border movement (the "migration") and its consequences for settlement and incorporation in the new country. The present research takes a step further: it explores other types of movements, those that Somali migrants may undertake once they have settled in their new country of residence. These "post-migration mobility practices", as I refer to them, have not raised much attention among migration scholars or policymakers, largely because they do not fit into the common sedentarist narratives about migrants from less economically developed parts of the world to Europe or other powerful regions.

These cross-border movements might appear to be rather banal practices at first sight. It is indeed very common to cross borders, especially for people who live in in Europe, where countries are small and close to their neighbours. From the beginning of this study, however, I was persuaded that something more than just "travelling" or "moving around" was going on. Near the beginning of my fieldwork, I met with Awa, a Somali-Dutch woman based in London whose astute comments opened my eyes more than once and challenged me to think harder. We were discussing my research questions when she contested my initial assumption that she might be a "mobile woman". When I asked her why, she suggested that Somalis' tendency to cross borders frequently was sometimes treated too casually:

People move for reasons, right? And sometimes you hear, "Oh Somalis are nomadic, they just like to move around". Like we have nothing else to do than move around; our ultimate aim is to move around [laughs]. Just to move. And you think: hello, I'm not moving around for the sake of moving around, you know! […] Nomads, they don't move around because they just move around, but because the grass is not green anymore. They have reasons to move; it's not exercise [laughs again]!

While I remain cautious regarding interpretations of mobility as a reproduction of nomadic habits, I believe that this quotation indicates the purpose of my research quite clearly. This study explores how, why and with what effects some settled migrants "move around", or, in my terms, develop sophisticated "cross-border mobility practices". If mobility is not the "ultimate aim", then it is a means, a resource people use to gain access to certain advantages. This study assesses the varied cross-border mobility patterns that some settled Somali migrants develop, the conditions under which they are (or are not) able to develop them and the concrete processes that allow them to turn their mobility into an asset and obtain higher social positions within particular hierarchies.

Based on the qualitative data collected in this study, I have elaborated a novel typology of the various cross-border mobility practices migrants may develop. Starshaped mobility, pendular mobility, secondary migration, temporary visits to the place of origin, definitive return and immobility are the six ideal types of the ways the people in this study may cross borders. The typology refers to – sometimes onetime but more often regular – movements that are significant enough to induce some changes in the lives of the people who undertake them. The typology is explained in detail in Chap. 2, which describes and analyses the ways in which the individuals I met cross borders, the frequency and regularly of their moves, the activities they undertake while on the move and the different places they link together through these activities and movements.

Taking migrants' cross-border movements as a starting point further challenges transnational scholars' tendency to assume that transnational ties connect migrants only to their country of origin and/or to people with a similar national or ethnic background. The findings set the ground for an empirically grounded argument that expands our understanding of transnational processes as potentially including places other than the country of origin and the country of settlement, as well networks other than those based on family and ethnic ties. However, I want to avoid the epistemological trap that those who adopt a transnational lens or focus on mobility sometimes find themselves in – that of over-emphasising fluidity and "deterritorialised" experiences and practices (see for instance Mitchell 1997; Adey 2006; Franquesa 2011). Strong attention is paid to migrants' local contexts, the "localities" (Guarnizo and Smith 1998) that constitute specific hierarchies, create differentiated access to resources and shape the constraints and opportunities people face. This focus makes it possible to include relations and social inequalities at both the local and the transnational levels in the analysis of migrants' lives and cross-border mobility practices.

This research builds not only on debates in migration and transnational studies, but also on academic discussions in the more recent field of mobilities studies (Sheller and Urry 2006; Kaufmann 2009). While studies on international migration have recently started to address, mostly cautiously and even critically, the idea of mobility, mobilities scholars have showed little interest in migration (Hui 2016). One of the most promising aspects of mobilities studies lies in the theorisation of mobility as an element of social differentiation involved in the production of power relations and inequalities. Some prominent scholars have defined this perspective as the "politics of mobility" (Cresswell 2010b; Massey 1994). This study builds on this perspective, arguing that mobility is an unequally distributed resource that can, under certain conditions, be mobilised and transformed into social and economic advantages. This central argument is developed primarily in Chap. 3. Illuminating the politics of mobility helps uncover how Somali migrants, as social actors with particular social positions, are able to develop a kind of "mobility capital" and convert it into further advantages.

The idea that cross-border mobility may constitute an important resource for some people is also central to a strand of the literature interested in "circulation" (see for instance Tarrius 1993, 2000; Tarrius et al. 2013; Morokvasic 2003; Morokvasic-Müller 1999; Dahinden 2010a; Schmoll 2005; Schmoll and Semi 2013). People engage in specific economic activities, such as (underground) trade, sex work or diverse types of odd jobs while being constantly on the move. They specifically opt for these practices as an alternative to more traditional forms of settlement migration, yet I demonstrate that settled migrants may develop similar strategies when they possess the ability to cross borders regularly.

This study challenges a (sometimes overly static) sociology of social inequalities because it examines the ways in which social actors' social positions may differ depending on the places and hierarchies involved. It builds from recent research that analyses how wealth differences between different countries may inform migrants' practices (see among others Nieswand 2011; Nowicka 2013; Kelly and Lusis 2006). The status inconsistencies these differences produce may pose constraints, but they may also create opportunities for those who are able to navigate in a transnational social field. In fact, while most of the respondents in this study encounter obstacles to their ability to valorise their assets in dominant social fields in their country of residence, they also find opportunities to mobilise their resources in other places and hierarchies. This study argues, empirically and theoretically, that capital is transnationalised through cross-border mobility practices, thus demonstrating that social inequalities need to be examined at the transnational level as well as at the level of the nation-state. Chapter 4 investigates these complex processes on the basis of the detailed life stories of three respondents who have developed different types of post-migration mobility practices over the years.

This focus on a neglected aspect of some migrants' practices, i.e. their crossborder movements, opens new avenues for thinking about their lives and experiences. It makes it possible to explore the agency of people often considered helpless due to their situation as "refugees," the protracted civil unrest in their country of origin or supposed problematic activities and practices there (female genital mutilation, religious fundamentalism or links with terrorism). While paying close attention to the local contexts (in plural) to which these migrants are connected, and to the specific constraints and opportunities that characterise them, I focus my analysis on the projects and activities these migrants develop thanks to their ability to cross borders.

The findings further challenge those dichotomies that usually consider mobility as the prerogative of a global, cosmopolitan, highly-skilled elite for whom borders have lost their meaning, while migrants are supposedly stuck in a sedentary stasis. Save their initial move (the migration), labour migrants and refugees are often considered, by both policymakers in immigration countries and many researchers, through the perspective of sedentarity and local incorporation and with the expectation of loyalty towards their new country of residence. While the transnational perspective has opened new ways of thinking about migrants' multiple anchorages, this study provides empirical evidence of the concrete ways in which migrants may develop initiatives to build on connections with other places and improve their living conditions thanks to the specific activities they perform across borders. These alternative forms of "integration", outside of the frames set by nation-states – or rather mostly in parallel to them – remain underestimated. Yet they can prove beneficial for migrants, and possibly for their countries of residence, as is discussed in Chap. 5 in particular.

While the mobility practices of highly qualified, circulating migrants are generally regarded positively in the academic literature, those of less privileged migrants have been of less interest. The study demonstrates that, under certain conditions, migrants who are not global elites may also benefit from the sophisticated and diverse mobility practices they have mastered.

#### **1.1 Theorising Mobility Practices in Unequal Transnational Social Fields**

#### *1.1.1 Categories, Hierarchies and the (Re)production of Social Inequalities*

The politics of research involves the theoretical premises that guide the design and the conduct of the research process. In order to make those premises explicit, questions related to the nature of reality (ontology) and the relationship between this reality and the researcher (epistemology) need to be answered (Denzin and Lincoln 2005; Guba and Lincoln 1994). Those premises can also be considered "belief systems" or "worldviews" that guide the research process (Guba and Lincoln 1994).

In contrast to positivist thinking, this qualitative study begins from the view that reality is not something "out there" to be discovered by an objective or neutral researcher, but instead socially constructed, and that the main goal of the research process is to understand how, by whom and in what contexts. The focus is on the perspective that people have on their activities and environments, the discourses they construct about them and the subjective meaning they give to them. I have adopted an interpretive, constructivist perspective to understand how some migrants travel, cross borders and develop transnational activities and social fields. The object of the study – what I call post-migration mobility practices – has thus emerged from understanding the meanings that respondents give to their own movements and/or sedentarity, and to those of others, at a particular moment in their biography, in particular countries of residence and from specific social locations.

According to this perspective, the "world of lived reality and situation-specific meanings that constitute the general object of investigation is thought to be constructed by social actors. That is, particular actors, in particular places, at particular times, fashion meaning out of events and phenomena through prolonged, complex processes of social interaction involving history, language, and action" (Schwandt 1998). The goal of research, therefore, is not to find causalities between events or to "explain" how the world functions, but rather to "understand" social phenomena from the point of view of those who live it. The term "understanding" is translated from Weber's concept of *Verstehen* (Weber 1965): for Weber, social phenomena can only be understood by grasping the meanings that social actors attach to what they do (see also Aron 1967).

One of the aims of this research is thus to understand the meanings that the Somali migrants I met give to their situation. How do they see the country in which they currently reside? Are there other places that are meaningful to them, and in what ways? How do they manage to link those different places, and what do those links bring them? How do they relate to significant others located in different geographical places, but also in different social positions, in terms of gender, lifecycle, social class, ethnicity, level of education or legal status? And above all, how do cross-border movements play out in these women's and men's lives?

The organisation of society along various axes of differentiation – in particular gender, social class and ethnicity/race – partially shapes the distribution of resources among the population (see Scott 1986; Jenkins 1994; Bourdieu 1987). More specifically, the differentiated allocation of resources is related to the social and symbolic evaluation of those who possess those resources, depending on their social positioning along various axes of differences. In other words, individuals' social location in ethnic, gendered and classed boundaries and hierarchies influences their access to resources, but also the value of the resources they possess.

Categories of social difference are representations and normative ideas that structure and organise social life. These organising principles and references are not neutral: they are allocated specific contents (for instance, women do certain things better than men, or ethnic groups have specific, bounded "cultures") that are valorised unevenly. Women's reproductive tasks related to the domestic sphere obtain less recognition (in symbolic as much as in monetary terms) than men's activities in the labour market. Similarly, some migrants' cultures are considered "backward" and implicitly inferior to the "modern", European societies in which they live. The social construction of differences thus occurs through the hierarchisation of social categories (their relational valuation) and the related unequal allocation of economic and cultural resources (Anthias 1998b). Through these mechanisms, women come to be seen as different from men, migrants as different from nationals and refugees as a different category of migrants than expatriates: specific social meaning is given to each of these constructed categories. In turn, access to education, the labour market or specific social networks differs depending on who you are and how you come to be categorised in dominant discourses. What you are comes to legitimise how the resources you possess are evaluated, and therefore the ways in which you can convert them (Bourdieu 1986) into other resources and accumulate privileges and advantages.

Furthermore, social differences are rendered "natural", which itself is a sign of the unequal distribution of resources (Anthias 1998b). Processes of naturalisation concern the content of the categories as much as the categories themselves, as well as the boundaries that are assumed to separate them from one another. Social order comes to be perceived as "an accommodation to the natural order" (West and Fenstermaker 1995). More importantly, naturalisation processes simultaneously justify the social hierarchies that constitute this taken-for-granted social organisation of differences. The (re)production of representations about the world takes place through "the subtle imposition of systems of meaning that legitimise and thus solidify structures of inequality" (Wacquant 2008). Hidden processes that tend to reify boundaries and hierarchies thus take attention away from the inequalities that they imply, even for those who are directly concerned. These processes participate in the (re)production of collectively shared representations that influence what people do and the meaning they give to their experiences and those of others.

To sum up, concurrent perspectives on social differences are not just a matter of different worldviews. They involve issues of power and have strong political implications in that they are involved in creating, maintaining and reproducing social inequalities. In this book, gender, social class and ethnicity/race, but also religion, age, stage in the lifecycle and legal status are considered to be not only outcomes of relational and dynamic social constructions, but also hidden dimensions of power relations. Social categories and their hierarchisation may differ depending on the socio-historical context in question. When it comes to mobile people, more than one context may be relevant simultaneously. Many of the people I have met navigate in different social and geographical environments: I have employed a transnational perspective that makes it possible to take into account the sometimes conflicting yet related contexts that influence these individuals' lives.

#### *1.1.2 A Transnational Perspective*

Migration studies underwent a serious renewal during the 1990s with the development and subsequent refinement of scholarship on transnationalism. While the processes that were being studied, related to international migration, were not new, the perspective was, with scholars focusing on the sustained linkages that some migrants maintained with their country of origin after having migrated (see in particular Glick Schiller et al. 1992, 1995; Vertovec 1999; Faist 2000; Portes et al. 1999 for earlier definitions of transnationalism). This new approach modified researchers' understanding of processes of migration and migrants' lives in different ways, in particular because it challenged a number of assumptions that had guided studies on migration – as well as government policies – until then.

First, the new transnational lens challenged early assimilationist theories, which viewed migration as a process that would eventually and definitely lead migrants to abandon any kind of relationship with their country of origin, conform to the rules of their new country of residence and "melt" into it (R. E. Park 1928). Even though assimilation was understood in less normative terms by the 1990s, there remained a widespread view of migration as a rupture with previous identifications, loyalties and social networks. While it had earlier been considered natural for migrants to have to choose "between here and there", it now became clear that some migrants had developed desires and abilities to live "here and there" at the same time (Tarrius 2002). Migrants' economic, political, social and religious participation did not stop at the borders of their countries of immigration, but extended to other places, in particular their place of origin (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Vertovec 2009; Khagram and Levitt 2008).

A second and related assumption that these scholars worked to deconstruct was the idea (often found in social science research) that the borders of the nation-state constitute the natural delimiting container of society, what Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) have called "methodological nationalism". Nation-states were created, in a specific historical context in the nineteenth century, as the units that delimit and separate territories from one another, based on the view that the people who live in those territories are nationals of the states in question (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). This idealised vision of the world was soon challenged by migrants, i.e. people who settled in nation-states of which they were not citizens. Some scholars, in particular those interested in international migration, started to challenge this naturalised view of borders, which causes migrants to be seen as an anomaly that disturbs this taken-for-granted "national order of things" (Malkki 1995). Transnational scholarship has made it possible to go beyond the idea that migrants have to change their loyalties and identifications to fit this view of a unity between the state and the population located in its territory. It has opened the possibility of alternative perspectives on space and boundaries, in particular those of migrants themselves.

The literature on transnationalism flourished at a time of growing concerns about and academic interest in globalisation. Broader theoretical discussions acknowledged and analysed the increasing disconnections between space and time: while Beck was arguing for a "cosmopolitan turn" in the social sciences (see for instance Beck and Sznaider 2006), others analysed how flows, and in particular human mobility, had become fundamental dimensions of the globalised, postmodern world (Appadurai 2001; Bauman 2000).

A transnational lens also challenges the belief that the migration process is linear, a point that is central in this book. Empirical studies have made it clear that migration often does not involve only a single move from a point of departure to a point of arrival. The linkages that migrants strive to keep alive and further build on often coincide with different kinds of movements across borders. Migrants regularly move back and forth between their country of origin and their country of residence, go back to visit their families and friends who have not migrated, circulate between different locations and envisage and undergo temporary or definitive returns to their place of origin (Jeffery and Murison 2011). While it is true that transnational identities and practices do not require cross-border mobility, the transnational perspective has allowed researchers to analyse how the initial move and settlement in a new country is, for some migrants, intimately related to further types of movements.

I understand the transnational perspective as a lens rather than a new theory. Transnationalism does not explain things, actions or events. It is a way of looking at social reality without remaining trapped within taken-for-granted assumptions. Adopting such a lens makes it possible for a variety of practices to emerge from the data and, even more importantly, for the meanings that are given to those practices by respondents to be taken seriously. It is a vision that departs from the possibility of a transnational reality without assuming either its non-existence (as in assimilationist perspectives) or its necessary relevance for all migrants, as in some celebratory accounts of transnationalism.

However, when considering the transnational processes at stake, I have been careful not to privilege similarities based on a common origin at the expense of other types of differences that cross "ethnic groups", such as those pertaining to gender and social class (Anthias 1998a). I have strived to avoid "groupist" (Brubaker 2004) perspectives on migrants' transnational practices and identifications, and to get away from the "ethnic lens" (Glick Schiller et al. 2006; Anthias 1998a; Brubaker 2005; Dahinden 2012, 2009). Migrants' enduring connections with their country of origin do not necessarily translate into identities and solidarities revolving around their ethno-national background. For all these reasons, I do not refer to Somali migrants as a diaspora. The history of the word "diaspora" and its social analyses is long and complex, and nuanced understandings of the concept are now widely accepted (Cohen and Fischer 2018; Dufoix 2003). For evident epistemological reasons, this book is not interested in determining whether Somali migrants should be defined as a diaspora or not. Emic rather than etic definitions of the term, however, would fit better with my constructivist perspective: such an approach seeks to illuminate how and under what conditions some social actors may define themselves as part of a diaspora. Diaspora becomes, in this view, a "claim" and a "category of practice" rather than an imposed definition of a predefined group (Brubaker 2005). Kleist (2008a, b), for instance, convincingly argues that identification with a diaspora among some Somali migrants – especially men – represents an important resource in their struggle for recognition. Horst (2013) similarly argues that European relief and development institutions work with such self-defined diaspora groups but have the effect of depoliticising their claims rather than empowering them (see also Sinatti and Horst 2015). The concept of diaspora is closely connected to ideas related to transnationalism (see for instance Faist 2010 for a discussion). I have opted to use the latter term because of its broader scope and because it makes possible the inclusion of cross-border activities and networks that have nothing to do with either the ethnic group of origin or the country of origin.

Scholars have used different concepts to refer to sustained cross-border linkages: "transnational social space" (Faist 2000; Pries 2001), "social formations" (Dahinden 2010b; Luis Eduardo Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Vertovec 2003) and "communities" (Goldring 1998; Kivisto 2001). Like others (for instance Goldring 1998; Nieswand 2011; Pessar and Mahler 2003; Portes et al. 1999; Vertovec 1999), I feel most comfortable with the concept "transnational social fields", which was first developed and later elaborated by Nina Glick Schiller and other scholars (see in particular Basch et al. 1994; Glick Schiller 2010; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). This concept emphasises first the interconnections between people and institutions located in different places that might influence, even indirectly, migrants' lives and practices. Transnational social fields are "networks of networks that link individuals directly or indirectly to institutions located in more than one nation-state" (Glick Schiller 2010). Second, although this concept should not be conflated with Bourdieu's concept of "discrete fields of power" (Glick Schiller 2010), it allows for an empirical and theoretical acknowledgment of the multiple and interlocking contexts that shape the constraints and opportunities that migrants face. Social fields have no geographic materiality or coercive power, yet they are durable influential entities that affect the lives of both migrants and nonmigrants (Nieswand 2011).

The concept of transnational social fields underlines the fact that "the transnational" stems from people's practices and does not exist per se, in contrast to nationstates, their institutions and legal apparatuses. At the same time, however, it is constituted by interlocking networks and institutions that do exist materially and exert an influence on people. Moreover, social actors are socially located within those institutions and networks: they are gendered, ethnicised/racialised and classed, sometimes in conflicting ways. The transnational social fields and the local or national social fields and other hierarchies in which the migrants in this study are embedded interact to shape the frameworks of constraints and opportunities in which they move.

However, the "nation" remains meaningful and pertinent in transnational studies (Dahinden 2017; Glick Schiller 2015). Migrants' practices, networks and identifications are not free from constraints, and most empirical studies show how much not only states, but also power relations between them, influence migrants' lives. For a start, being able to cross borders depends on states' issuing the necessary documents and their authorisation to cross their borders and enter their territories. Moreover, power relations between states exert a strong influence on who is and is not considered a migrant (Glick Schiller 2010).

Migrants who are transnationally connected are also locally anchored, and bringing those anchorages back into perspective is a way to investigate issues of social positions, inequalities and power relations. Guarnizo and Smith (1998) argue that transnational practices connect people across borders, but "are embodied in specific social relations established between specific people, situated in unequivocal localities, at historically determined times" (11). Migrants embedded in transnational social fields are always also geographically and socially located social actors. The concept of "locality" refers to the multiple specific contexts in which migrants are socially, economically and politically rooted and which constitute the constraints and opportunities they must square with (Dahinden 2010b; Guarnizo and Smith 1998).

The concept of locality – or rather its plural form, "localities" – makes it possible to include different geographic orders in the same analytical framework. While nation-states should not be left out of the analysis, they are not the only unit that matters in understanding transnational processes. Social actors are located in specific countries, regions, cities or villages and neighbourhoods at the same time, and they all participate in shaping the contexts in which they live. Legislation and policies in the place of residence, socio-economic and political contexts, local networks and opportunities to meet with other people and exclusion and inclusion processes all interact to create specific opportunities and constraints for migrants to become simultaneously locally anchored and transnationally involved.

The concept further makes it possible to understand that transnational practices and identifications do not stand in opposition to mooring, anchorage and incorporation into possibly multiple localities: rather, both types of processes interact with each other. Since the beginning of the 2000s, there have been discussions about the link between them, with a (sometimes normative) concern regarding the impact of transnational practices and identifications on migrants' incorporation into their country of residence (see Bivand Erdal and Oeppen 2013 for a detailed discussion). In this book, "incorporation" refers to migrants' "processes of adaptation" (Bivand Erdal and Oeppen 2013) to their new place of residence. These processes include migrants' inclusion in the labour market or the educational field as much as their connections to local institutions and people (associations, neighbours, other parents, friends and so on). In contrast to the idea of "integration", it does not make normative assumptions about local or national policies aimed at regulating migrants' adaptation.

Most of the literature agrees that transnationality and incorporation combine in different constellations rather than compete with each other (Morawska 2003; Levitt 2003; Bivand Erdal and Oeppen 2013), and that high levels of transnational involvement do not directly translate into low levels of local incorporation (see for instance Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005; Snel et al. 2006). A closer look at the different empirical studies at hand, however, reveals a nuanced picture in which social position at the local and transnational levels is an important differentiating element. Various studies concur that migrants with a high level of qualification and a good socioeconomic position in their country of residence are the most likely to develop transnational networks and activities (Portes et al. 2002; Levitt 2003, 2009). Others demonstrate that migrants who are the most marginalised and suffer the most from exclusion and discrimination also maintain more transnational links than others (Dahinden 2009; Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005). Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo (2005) refer to the first form of transnationalism, which involves a high degree of incorporation made possible by the investment of sufficient capital at both the local and transnational levels, as "resource-dependant transnationalism", and to the second, which develops in response to exclusion, as "reactive transnationalism". In both cases, the conditions encountered in both the country of residence and other places, including the place of origin, intervene in encouraging or hindering transnational practices. Furthermore, there are linkages between the two processes, as the biographies developed in the coming chapters will demonstrate. For people whose lives take place in transnational social fields, different localities interact to constitute complex social realities that may benefit social actors – a central argument of this book – but which may also cause them anxiety, discomfort and suffering.

#### *1.1.3 Bringing "Mobilities" into Migration Studies*

The term "mobility" is employed in different academic domains (from biology to tourism studies), various policy fields (from urban planning to migration management) and everyday conversations (from "mobile" phones – before they became smart – to ethical personal choices of "soft mobility"). As a result, one can question the usefulness of such a widespread and fuzzy term for understanding any social phenomenon. Nonetheless, for the reasons outlined below, I find mobility relevant and useful in examining, empirically and theoretically, the movements that migrants undertake after they have settled in their country of residence. However, while European migration scholars have recently started to show a critical interest in issues and conceptualisations of mobility (Favell 2007; Favell and Recchi 2011; Faist 2013; Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013; Pellerin 2011; Amelina and Vasilache 2014), this new preoccupation is often closely linked to political concerns and categorisations.

I will first discuss the concept as it has been understood in migration studies, generally based on legal and political distinctions and contrasted with "migration". This understanding is not the one I endorse in this book, but it must be acknowledged because of its recent prevalence. My own definition of mobility is inspired by mobilities scholars, and will be discussed further down.

#### **1.1.3.1 Mobility Versus Migration: Legal and Political Distinctions**

In recent years, mobility has been studied in the context of the new modalities of cross-border movements, border control by states and globalised economic contexts and power relations. In Europe, mobility has been contrasted with migration based on a political and legal distinction: the movements of people from third countries entering Europe (migration) are opposed to the free movements of European Union citizens moving within Europe (mobility) (Bauböck 2012). The EU actively promotes the mobility of its citizens: contrary to other types of human mobility, this specific type of movement is thought of as a cornerstone of European integration and European citizenship (Favell and Recchi 2011). This political project has led European policymakers to value mobility positively and promote the movement of people within Europe. In parallel to this new logic, border controls have increased vis-à-vis migrants from outside Europe. "The freedom of mobility for some (citizens, tourists, business people) could only be made possible through the organized exclusion of others forced to move around as illegal 'aliens', migrants, or refugees" (Verstraete 2003). Policy distinctions go together with legal categorisations, which are built on and further produce social differentiations between different types of people, based on nationality, ethnicity/race, gender and social class.

A second understanding of mobility has gained increasing acceptance in both policy and academic circles in recent years. According to this understanding, mobility is a short-term, temporary form of economic migration: workers cross borders for limited periods of time with no intention to settle (contrary to "traditional", permanent, forms of migration), returning to their place of origin once the contract is over (Pellerin 2011). This kind of movement is also often called "circulation" or "circular migration", because the people involved might move back and forth on a regular basis. While such temporary migration schemes are not new, they are regularly reintroduced as a way to respond to the changing economic needs of both countries of destination and countries of origin (The Gobal Commission on International Migration 2005; Castles 2006; McLoughlin and Münz 2011; Vertovec 2009). While the circulation of highly skilled migrants generally does not create significant concerns for states, the mobility of less qualified workers is the object of political debates and policies aimed at preventing the settlement and ensuring the return of these workers to their country of origin (Doomernik 2013).

Some scholars have argued for the need to analyse the discourses and social categories related to this recent dichotomisation of people's movements into longterm, mostly state-controlled, migration, on the one hand, and short-term, freer and economy-led mobility, on the other (Pellerin 2011; Faist 2013; Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013). Different forms of mobility and migration are evaluated differently and are subject to very different legal and political treatment. As Faist (2013) argues, "the movement of persons is dichotomized in public debate into mobility and migration, with mobility connoting euphemistic expectations of gain for individuals and states, and migration calling for social integration, control and the maintenance of national identity" (1640). Sedentary migration is increasingly perceived negatively, as being problematic because of its impact on the receiving society's collective goods, while mobility – either as short-term migration or the circulation of highly skilled specialists – is presented as a solution from which everyone benefits. However, the distinction between the two types of movements is shaped by unequal power relations, and it further reproduces global inequalities. A perspective that examines the "geopolitics of mobility" (Verstraete 2003) or the "regimes of mobility" (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013) is necessary if we are to understand the relationships between different types of movements and the ways in which they are promoted or limited by states within global power hierarchies.

#### **1.1.3.2 A Definition Derived from Mobility Studies**

My conceptualisation of mobility is not based on legal or political distinctions, unlike those presented above. It builds on radically different epistemological and theoretical foundations and draws on developments in the field of mobility studies. This strand of scholarship "call[s] attention to the myriad ways in which people become part, in highly unequal ways, of multiple translocal networks and linkages" (Salazar 2016).

Mobility studies emerged from the observation that the concept of (spatial) mobility was applied in a variety of disciplines in the social sciences to describe and analyse very diverse phenomena at different scales: from daily mobility in the urban space to transportation systems, from residential mobility to transnational migration trajectories. In this light, mobility scholars have notably called for a broader multidisciplinary approach to mobility, and for a deeper theorisation of the concept itself (Kaufmann 2009; Söderström and Crot 2010). The so-called "new mobilities paradigm", or "mobility turn", is the clearest attempt to bring together different types of movements into a single analysis, and to challenge the tendency of the social sciences to treat stability as normal and mobility as problematic (Sheller and Urry 2006; Urry 2007). One of the most promising aspects of this recent literature on mobility lies in theoretical developments focusing on the conceptualisation of mobility as an element of social differentiation. The "politics of mobility" (Massey 1994; Cresswell 2006, 2010b) emphasises how mobilities participate in the (re) production of unequal relations of power alongside other markers of differentiation.

The mobility turn is constituted by a three-pronged agenda (Söderström and Crot 2010; Söderström et al. 2013). First, it draws new epistemological foundations by challenging the sedentarist premises that pervade the social sciences in general. It views mobility as a fundamental fact of social life and gives it the analytical credit that it has often lacked. This perspective coincides with critiques of methodological nationalism: the mobility turn undermines perspectives that emphasise bounded and rooted notions of place, regions and nations as the fundamental basis of identity (Cresswell 2010a). Second, the agenda aims at an ontological reconceptualisation of mobility that includes in the same analytical framework a vast array of interconnected forms of mobility. Third, the mobility turn calls for the development of appropriate methods of inquiry that do justice to the mobile social realities that researchers want to understand. These mobile methods include conducting (participant) observation of movement, exploring people's imaginative or virtual mobilities (by analysing blogs, websites or email exchanges, for instance), creating mobile ethnographies, examining transfer points (airports and train stations, for example) and undertaking multi-sited ethnography (Sheller and Urry 2006; Urry 2007). While I did not move myself (except between the different places where respondents reside), the different types of interviews that I conducted focused on people's past, present and possible future mobilities and their relevance in some migrants' lives.

A critique that has been made of this change of paradigm is that treating mobility as pervading every aspect of social life undermines the theoretical and analytical power of the concept itself (Söderström et al. 2013). As Adey (2006) states in the title of an article, "If Mobility is Everything then it is Nothing". A second, related critique, is that this emphasis on movement and change might result in a celebratory vision of mobility (Faist 2013). Just as some transnational scholars have been overly enthusiastic, treating this newly appearing reality as necessarily empowering to migrants, mobility studies may tend to praise movement and conceive of it as intrinsically good.

Against those two criticisms, a significant strand of recent scholarship has analysed how mobility and power relations are related (Söderström et al. 2013) and addressed the complexity of the experiences of (im)mobility (Van Hear 2014). Analysing mobility in these terms also makes it possible to go beyond preconceived ideas of mobility as positive and its association with freedom and emancipation (Franquesa 2011) and acknowledge the pressures and constraints that often go with being mobile. "De-romanticising" mobility further means attending to spatial dynamics and frictions (Schapendonk et al. 2018). These aspects are particularly relevant for the arguments I will develop in this book.

Mobility scholars are interested in the meanings of movements, their representations and valuations within specific contexts, and their embeddedness in power relations. "Understanding mobility thus means understanding observable physical movements, the meanings that such movements are encoded with, the experience of practicing these movements and the potential for undertaking these movements" (Cresswell and Uteng 2008). Mobility can be distinguished from simple movement because it is a catalyst for change in the lives of the people who undertake it, their identity or their social position (Kaufmann 2009). The social effects of mobility are its fundamental theoretical characteristic. Naturally, people do not move free from constraints: the political categorisations discussed above participate in shaping the types of mobility practices that social actors are able to develop.

In line with this perspective, I do not consider mobility a specific type of movement (contrasted with other types of movements defined *a priori*) undertaken by specific categories of people, but instead use a constructivist stance that views mobilities as historically constructed through social interactions in specific sociohistoric contexts. The movements I am interested in exert an influence on people's biographies, which is why it is necessary to let them emerge from the empirical data. I thus include any type of geographic movement significant enough to be acknowledged as having created some kind of change in the respondents' lives. These empirical considerations allow me to build a typology of the various crossborder mobility practices undertaken by respondents in this study.

I will go further and argue that international migration can be considered one mobility practice among others, or – more interestingly – related to others (Favell 2007; Amelina and Vasilache 2014). What I describe as international migration involves a cross-border movement followed by long-term settlement in the new country, i.e. the action of taking residence.1 Its specificity comes from the social and

<sup>1</sup> In this sense, "country of residence" is here treated as synonymous with "country of settlement".

legal consequences of such a move, since those who undertake it are considered – by the state they have entered as well as by others – "migrants".

However, my interest is limited in three ways. First, I only consider those movements that were performed after people had migrated to Europe and were settled for many years, what I call "post-migration" movements. Second, my focus is on crossborder mobility, which excludes all types of movements within nation-states. This focus could be considered to be in contradiction with one of the foci of mobilities studies, which is to include varied types of movements without *a priori* delimitations. Studies that focus only on international movements have been critiqued for their pervasive methodological nationalism on the grounds that they reproduce states' categories and interests (Favell 2007; Kalir 2013). However, my limitation is not a theoretical one: I do not pretend that cross-border movements are more or less relevant to people's lives than internal ones, or that they are essentially of a different kind. This methodological choice stems from my interest in the relationship between migrants and states. While transnational scholars have emphasised the need to go beyond a naturalised understanding of the nation-state, they have also shown that states shape migrants' lives in important ways, especially when it comes to crossing national borders. As Hui argues, "migrants do not exist a priori" (Hui 2016): they become migrants because of states' regulations and border control. Third, I have not totally endorsed the "mobility turn", as I focus on people's physical cross-border movements more than on virtual forms of mobility (Urry 2007). While I describe post-migration mobility practices as closely interlinked with the circulation of objects, knowledge and ideas, the mobility of these other entities cannot be explored in detail within the framework of this study.

Despite these limitations, I see many advantages that justify the use of the concept of mobility to examine the cross-border movements of Somali migrants from their country of residence. First, the concept of mobility makes it possible to bring different types of spatial movements that are often considered separately into a common analytical framework. By acknowledging the diversity of the forms of cross-border movements that people may undertake, the concept makes it possible to challenge linear visions of migration as a unique and unidirectional movement followed by settlement in the new country of residence. It also includes in the picture ways of moving other than permanent migration.

The second advantage of using the concept of mobility is that it makes it possible to look at migrants' biographies and life trajectories in the long term. It adds temporality to spatiality. Initial migration is often considered the only relevant movement in migrants' lives, a border crossing between two moments of sedentariness. But mobility in its multiple forms may remain an important aspect of some people's lives over the years. It is also subject to changes, depending on what has been experienced, the resources that have been accumulated, the obstacles that have been encountered and the opportunities that have arisen in different places. A certain type of mobility may be developed at some point in someone's life, dropped later, replaced by another type of mobility practice, followed by a period of sedentariness and so on. As Schapendonk and Steel (2014) argue, "by providing in-depth insights into how these trajectories evolve (i.e., how they are produced, facilitated, slowed down, and blocked) and how they are experienced in differentiated ways, the mobilities perspective helps us to move away from bipolar and frictionless conceptualisations of transnational migration" (263). Studies concerned with individuals' mobility trajectories highlight these different phases in a life course, often emphasising how the lifecycle determines what kind of mobility is possible and potentially profitable at what moment in a life trajectory (Van Liempt 2011a; Engebrigtsen 2011; Walker 2011; Ley and Kobayashi 2005; Schapendonk and Steel 2014; Kalir 2013). Mobility practices, in this light, appear as fundamental aspects of strategies that migrants develop after their initial migration. If mobility is – in some cases – strategic, that means it can become a resource for some people.

This leads me to the third advantage of the concept: while "movement" remains a descriptive term, "mobility" implies more than just the physical move because it is also infused with meanings and power relations (Cresswell 2010b). As the coming chapters will show, people move in different ways, with different aims and different consequences. Their mobility is constrained or facilitated by the other types of assets they possess and the ways these assets are valued in different contexts. The idea of mobility as an unevenly distributed resource reveals processes of social differentiation in which the potential to be mobile as well as the actual fact of moving play a part (Kaufmann et al. 2004). This perspective brings power relations into the analysis of migrants' (im)mobile lives. On the one hand, it illuminates how for some people to be able to deploy specific strategies of transnational mobility, there need to be others who are less mobile, not mobile at all or mobile differently. On the other hand, it emphasises that mobility and immobility are strongly shaped by social actors' relationship with nation-states, based on processes of gendering, ethnicising/racialising and classing.

#### **1.2 Methodology and Methods**

A qualitative, interpretive and constructivist approach has guided the methodological choices in this study, which has no ambition to measure or quantify the processes under study, or to generalise findings to all migrants, or even to all Somali migrants. On the contrary, the goal here is to get sufficiently close to the research partners to grasp the meanings they give to their experiences and practices. Lengthy fieldwork, a significant number of qualitative and narrative interviews, a few informal conversations or other communication opportunities and (limited) observations have enabled me to create an "intimate relationship" (Denzin and Lincoln 2005) with the respondents, and to understand the processes I am interested in.

#### *1.2.1 Methodological Transnationalism*

This study is interested in the cross-border movements of migrants, and in the ways in which respondents interpret the potentially multiple meaningful places that are interconnected in their lives. The transnational lens that has been adopted in this study has methodological implications, in particular the need to attend to the multiscale and multi-sited contexts in which respondents might physically, virtually or emotionally move. "Methodological transnationalism" (Nieswand 2011; Khagram and Levitt 2008; Amelina and Faist 2012; Amelina et al. 2012) avoids the traps of methodological nationalism and its inherent methodological flaws. It makes it possible to conceptualise the physical and social space in which migrants evolve as not bounded by the national boundaries of their current country of residence (see also Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). In other words, methodological transnationalism is "a methodological programme that aims to enable the study of transnational mobilities and transnational formations by avoiding a nation-state centred methodology" (Amelina and Faist 2012).

My research has been designed and adapted in the course of the study to take into account the transnational practices and identifications that respondents may develop. Interviews emphasised the possibility of transnationalism, the multiple and sometimes contradictory contexts that shape people's lives. Although the interviews took place in a single national setting, they were designed to include the transnational aspects of the migrants' identities, beliefs and activities (Khagram and Levitt 2008; Salazar et al. 2017; Barglowski et al. 2015).2 To better understand the (potential) transnational dimension of the research participants' lives and experiences, I also included, at a later and experimental stage of the research, some visual methods to grasp more comprehensively the places they come to see as relevant, and the meaning they give to each of them. The analysis also includes the connections between those places.

Since data are always located and situated, methodological transnationalism constitutes a real challenge for researchers, because it multiplies the backgrounds against which data must be interpreted and understood. This study is interested in the multiple contradictory social locations, in terms of gender, ethnicity/race and social class, that migrants might experience depending on the context in which their resources are evaluated. It analyses their mobility practices as strategic responses to these differentiated experiences. At the methodological level, this focus requires an "analytical framework allowing for the description and analysis of multiple and simultaneous forms of inclusion of migrants and non-migrants in different sociospatial contexts and institutions within a global society without prejudging the primacy of one of them" (Nieswand 2011). Even when people do not actually move to other places, they may be involved in transnational social fields that might strongly influence their experiences, practices and identities (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). In the end, methodological transnationalism is what offers the researcher a reminder

<sup>2</sup>As an exception, I met one respondent in both Switzerland and Britain.

to open her eyes and ears to things that might happen or have meaning in a place other than that of the fieldwork.

#### *1.2.2 Reflexivity: On the Researcher's Positionality in the Field*

A crucial aspect of the research interaction is that the researcher is personally involved in the relationship and thus in the production of knowledge. Such a stance requires reflexivity regarding the context from which the empirical data emerge. The research encounter in itself is an unequal relationship that develops upon the request of the researcher, who has had to convince (sometimes with the help of others) respondents to participate. The researcher thus initiates the encounter and sets the basic rules (Bourdieu 1993), in particular regarding the topic of the discussion and the goals of the research. However, each of the people involved has different explicit or implicit expectations when entering the relationship that might shape the direction the interview takes. Respondents might also have suspicions about the "real" aim of the interview, for instance with migrants who have had or are still in contact with the authorities regarding their legal status (Carling et al. 2014; Bloch 1999). A few respondents were in the process of obtaining the citizenship of their country of residence: I was particularly careful, when analysing their data, to include the possibility that they had constructed a discourse able to fit both types of encounters, one with an independent researcher and one with an (undercover) representative of the national authorities.

The last example demonstrates that the basic asymmetry pertaining to the research encounter is strongly shaped by the social positioning of those who enter the relationship, along the lines of nationality, ethnicity or race, gender, age, level of education, religion and so on. I entered the field as a white female researcher with a Swiss name, an academic background and a university affiliation. The people I was interested in meeting and talking with were all first-generation Muslim Somali migrants. Their national origin and their migration history has obliged them to deal with external categorisations in European contexts, focusing in particular on their colour, religion and history of migration. In the British context, Somalis have come to occupy the status of a "suspect community", increasing the need for reflexivity (Ryan 2011; Ryan et al. 2011).

Several migration scholars (see for instance Carling et al. 2014; Thapar-Björkert and Henry 2004; Ryan et al. 2011; Baser and Toivanen 2017) have discussed lines of differentiation other than ethnicity or religion that constitute the background for (sometimes conflicting) commonalities and differences between researchers and research participants: gender, age, socio-professional status, migration experience and so on. The politics of research involves the ways in which researchers introduce themselves and their study when entering the field, but also the ways in which research participants actively take part in shaping the encounter, based on their own representations and assumptions about research and researchers in general, and this researcher in particular (see also Ryan et al. 2011). I introduced myself both

professionally and personally. At the professional level, I presented myself as a researcher based at a Swiss university but also, when asked or when I felt it was appropriate, as a doctoral student and/or as an anthropologist. I also emphasised that my interest in Somalis had been a long-term one, since I had chosen my research topic after having participated in previous research on Somali refugees, demonstrating what Carling et al. (2014) have referred to as a "sustained commitment". This long-term commitment could also be perceived from the duration of the fieldwork, my regular return to places where I had done interviews (in both Switzerland and Britain), and my requests for supplementary meetings with those I had already met and for new contacts.

I also introduced myself on a more personal level. Personal characteristics definitely shape the research relationship, although it is often difficult to assess in what manner (England 1994; Sanghera and Thapar-Björkert 2008). Being a female in my 30s, for example, allowed me to participate in a quite informal discussion with three women about my age that touched upon intimate topics, including sexuality. However, accessing women, in particular those who were not involved in some kind of visible associational activity, proved difficult, demonstrating that being female is not a sufficient commonality to create trust and interest. I did find, however, that disclosing that I am a parent and, at one stage of the fieldwork, that I was pregnant, had an effect on some women, who suddenly became more open towards me, building on this commonality, since we were all mothers (see also Carling et al. 2014).

Feminist scholars have been critical of researchers who try to enter the world of more marginalised people and the neo-colonial implications inherent in social scientists' appropriation of the voices of these marginalised "others" (England 1994; Reay 1996). Similarly to England (1994), I do not feel totally comfortable with being a member of a "dominant" group of society who wants to capture the experiences of more marginalised and stigmatised others: England was a straight woman studying lesbian women in the early 1990s, while I am a privileged white Swiss national interested in Black Muslim Somali migrants who mostly belong to the lower or lower-middle class. Even though reflexivity does not remove the power differentials that inform the research relationship (England 1994; Sanghera and Thapar-Björkert 2008), it renders the researcher visible and requires them to acknowledge where their analysis comes from.

In the empirical chapters that follow, I have opted for an account of social reality that gives a great deal of space to the research participants, through either their stories (as reconstructed by me) or selected quotations related to a particular argument (or both). The extensive use and valorisation of my empirical data renders explicit the processes through which empirical data are transformed into research conclusions. Those data "reflect the empirical fieldwork, guarantee its validity, and enable its critique" (Olivier de Sardan 1995). In turn, this use of the empirical material allows, at least partially, for a clearer distinction between what respondents say about their stories and what belongs to my interpretations of the social reality I have been given to see and hear. To be sure, I would not dare to claim that I speak on behalf of the research participants: even though my analysis is based on the ways in which they perceive their lives and environments and I give them a voice by

including excerpts of our discussions and partial accounts of their lives and experiences in this book, I am solely responsible for my theoretical statements and conclusions.

#### *1.2.3 Delineating the Field: Conceptual Issues Related to the Population Under Study*

The terminology used to describe the population under study is far from neutral or unequivocal. The "Somali migrants" I have decided to study are women and men who lived in Somalia, left it at some stage in their lives and are currently residents of a European country. Some of them migrated directly to Europe, while others lived in other places in between. The national borders of Somalia are contentious, and I have opted here to use "Somalia" to denote the territory that has been recognised by the international community to belong to the country since its independence in 1960. People in this study thus originate from different parts of the now officially named "Federal Republic of Somalia", including Somaliland and Puntland. My decision should be understood a methodological choice rather than a political stance. Accordingly, the term "Somali" does not preclude the possibility that respondents may have alternative identifications with their place of origin.

Contrary to other studies on Somalis who live outside their country of origin, I refer to my respondents as migrants rather than refugees. Although "migrants" can also carry implicit associations, I use it in a descriptive manner to define people who have moved from one place to another, have crossed at least one international border and have settled in a new place. A significant number of Somali international migrants in general, and of the respondents in this study in particular, have, at some stage during their migration trajectory, entered asylum systems and been legally recognised as refugees. However, this legal category should not, in my view, be confused with an analytical category, as it does not adequately take into account the nuanced identification processes that are at stake (Malkki 1992, 1995; Crawley and Skleparis 2017). That I do not emphasise the refugee aspect of the identity of my respondents – except when it emerges as relevant in their own discourses – does not mean that the context in which their migration has occurred has no impact on their lives and practices.

Another important issue arises from the fact that this study takes as the unit of analysis persons defined by their country of origin, Somalia. Nationality becomes the common marker of the respondents I have included in my fieldwork. However, I follow the trend in the field of migration studies to "de-ethnicise" research designs (Wimmer 2007; Fox and Jones 2013), avoid "groupist" interpretations of social processes (Brubaker 2004) and avoid the assumption that nation-states are the natural framework of analysis (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Amelina and Faist 2012). Therefore, the ethnic background of my respondents does not constitute an explanatory framework for their practices and identifications: it is rather one possible outcome of interactions in particular contexts and within particular power relations. The analysis focuses as much on what may differentiate people with the same ethnic or national origin (for instance, along the lines of gender or class) as on what may lead them to identify with a (constructed and contextual version of the) "ethnic group".

#### *1.2.4 An Ethnographic Approach Based on Interviews*

I met respondents in different cities in Switzerland, as well as in varied neighbourhoods in Greater London. These countries were chosen as sites of the study because they constitute two very different contexts regarding, on the one hand, the characteristics of the Somali migration and, on the other, national and local legislation, settlement conditions and employment opportunities (see further in this chapter).

National contexts constitute important historical and social settings, as they help determine the constraints and opportunities that migrants face. However, my aim is not to produce a systematic comparison between Britain and Switzerland. National regulations have an impact on the circulation of people (policies regarding immigration, asylum or naturalisation in particular), but also on the circulation of objects (trade regulation). However, migrants' practices are affected by a wide array of national regulations and policies that do not directly relate to border crossing, but to educational landscapes, family policies or access to the independent labour market. Other geographic scales may also be relevant in the lives and experiences of the people under study. In this sense, Britain and Switzerland should be understood as a geographic delineation for my study rather than national contexts to be compared.

The fieldwork took place in different stages between May 2009 and December 2011, a strategy that proved to be advantageous. Coming back to respondents after some time was a way for me to prove my interest in their lives and experiences, and to build trust. Carrying out "multiple sequential interviews"(Charmaz 2001) over an extended period of time also allowed me to explore and address changes that had occurred in respondents' lives since our last encounter. People got married, had children, moved, changed jobs, started new activities and reinforced or diminished their transnational relationships, involvements and identifications. Meeting on more than one occasion constituted an opportunity for both me and the respondents to see things from a different angle, since time had passed and things had changed. Coming back to respondents also helped me follow up on issues that had not been fully explored in the first interview (Olivier de Sardan 1995), ask new questions that had arisen through preliminary coding (Charmaz 2001) or carry out a new type of interview.

I conducted different types of interviews. With most research participants, I conducted semi-structured interviews. Later in the fieldwork, I started conducting biographical interviews as well as spatial interviews, using visual material. A few group interviews were also carried out, while my data also consist of limited moments of observation as well as more informal communication that took place during the research. Details on the different interview techniques, as well as a map of all interviews indicating the number of encounters and type(s) of interview conducted with each respondent are included in the Appendix to this chapter.

In line with my methodological stance, the sample was not constructed *a priori*, but was developed and refined over the course of fieldwork. As basic criteria, I had decided to include in my study first-generation migrants from different parts of Somalia whose main country of residence was, at the time of the interview, Switzerland or Britain. Since having secured a stable legal status constitutes a condition for the development of cross-border mobility, I also created a sample primarily constituted of people who had resided in Europe for a relatively long time (at least a decade).

Needless to say, I have not aimed for a statistically representative sample in any way. I have opted instead for a theoretical sampling strategy constructed during the course of the fieldwork (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz 2006). For instance, I started to hear about businesswomen who would regularly undertake cross-border movements in the frame of their informal (and thus hidden) activities, which led me to look for this kind of persons to include in my sample. This sampling strategy is based on categories that are not constructed according to demographic criteria (for instance gender, legal status and so on), but on the relative positioning of those actors in terms of hierarchies or functions (Bertaux 2005). In short, I developed my sample by including, gradually and alongside early coding and analysis, people who had developed different types of relationships to mobility (or immobility). I have looked for people who move, or move in different ways, and who do not move in order to understand the circumstances that led them to develop those various practices related to mobility or immobility.

To access potential respondents, I multiplied and diversified the "entry points" – the contact persons or organisations – as much as possible, as well as, to a lesser extent, "spontaneous meeting places"3 (see also Dahinden and Efionayi-Mäder 2009). I used personal contacts as well as gatekeepers active in diverse types of associations in both Switzerland and Britain. I also used (transnational) snowball techniques, asking research participants to refer me to other potential respondents (see Fig. 1.1 in the Appendix).

A pitfall that researchers in migration studies in particular need to avoid when constructing their sample is that of including only respondents for whom their national, ethnic or religious background is a central identification category. In order to avoid this pitfall, I adopted a sampling strategy that "resist[ed] the temptation to (only) go looking for (and finding) ethnicity's most visible manifestations amongst those migrants (perhaps a small minority) who are predisposed to displaying and performing their putative ethnicity, often in rarefied (and reified) forms*"* (Fox and

<sup>3</sup>These include, in London, a restaurant owned by a Somali man as well as a small shopping mall where most shops are owned by Somalis. Spontaneous encounters also occurred when research participants took the initiative to include other people in the interview, which happened on a number of occasions.

Jones 2013). Even though my sample was based on the national origin of research participants, I took care to also include people Wimmer (2007) refers to as "lost to the group": for instance men and women who have no contacts with ethnic associations or NGOs, do not live in areas with a large Somali population (in London) or are married to people with a different national, ethnic or religious background.

Despite this precaution, the criteria according to which the sample was constructed (early arrival in Europe, possession of a stable legal status and – for most respondents – experiences of mobility) create a bias. While my interest in crossborder mobility practices justifies these criteria, I am aware that the people I met certainly have more economic, cultural and social capital than most Somali migrants who live in Europe.

An ethnographic approach based on different types of interviews has thus guided the research process and has aimed to create respectful and, when possible, ongoing relationships with research participants, allowing for exchanges of views and for meanings to appear (Sherman Heyl 2007; Kvale 1996). In my attempt to ensure respondents' comfort during the interviews, I mostly let them choose the moment and the place of the encounter, suggesting meeting in a public place (cafés and restaurants, for example), at their homes or anywhere they chose. A majority of interviews were carried out in various cafés, restaurants, cafeterias, McDonald's, pubs and hotel bars. Some also took place in the interviewee's home or in other private places such as a friend's home (either the respondent's friend or mine). I met a few respondents at their workplace (office or shop) and, on two occasions, while on the move: one female respondent in London took me on a walking/bus tourist tour for a few hours before we went to have dinner together, while a man had unexpected business at the time of the meeting and offered me to join him in his car and carry out the interview while he was driving to the various places where he had to pick up or drop off things. This freedom I gave research participants sometimes resulted in their deciding to include other people in the encounters, which turned into group interviews. I never opposed these additional presences and adapted the interview to the new conditions.

Most interviews were recorded, but some were not because a few respondents did not feel comfortable with being recorded. All recordings (or notes) were fully transcribed. Participation in my research was voluntary, of course, but not financially rewarded. In most cases, however, I resolved issues of reciprocity through small acts that indicated my gratitude to the respondents for their time (see also Ryen 2007): I generally paid for the coffees or drinks that we consumed in public places and brought a small gift to people's homes (a box of chocolates or a gift for a new-born baby, for instance).

While I met the majority of respondents only once, I conducted "multiple sequential interviews" (Charmaz 2001) with a selected number of them. The data gathered with respondents I met more than once are particularly rich: through those multiple encounters (from two to five, see Fig. 1.1), I could achieve a wider and deeper understanding of their trajectories and experiences as well as the meanings they accord them. I could enter their worlds at different times, sometimes in different places, and in different ways (the different types of interviews). I selected the people with whom I met more than once for a number of reasons that are not mutually exclusive: my scholarly interest in their situation, experiences and (im)mobility practices; their willingness and motivation to participate in the research; and practical reasons such as, in the case of London, their physical presence in the country when I was there myself.

In total, 24 interviews were carried out in Switzerland with respondents who live in Geneva, Zurich, Lausanne, Neuchâtel and Sion. The Swiss sample is made up of 18 people, half women and half men. On three occasions, the interview turned into a group interview, for at least part of the time, as another person joined the discussion.

In Britain, I conducted 17 individual interviews and four group interviews – two rather long discussions with three women each, one with three men and another one with a man and a woman. Except for three respondents I met in Bradford (a city 2 h north of London), all research partners live in different parts of central and suburban London. The British sample includes a total of 19 people, of whom 12 were women and 7 were men.

All interviews have been included in the analysis and thus inform the results. However, the empirical chapters consciously focus on some people more than others. These more prominent respondents have been chosen because of the richness of "their" data (for instance, because of multiple encounters) and because their stories reflect other respondents' practices particularly well. Since the temporal dimension of respondents' lives constitutes an important element of my analysis, this detailed attention to particular stories allows for a fuller account of a few trajectories rather than a superficial glimpse of many.

#### *1.2.5 Data-Analysis Methods*

Data were analysed during the research process. Empirical data were analysed through two main methods: one, inspired by grounded theory, involved coding and memo writing and aimed to let categories emerge from the data at hand; the other, inspired by biographical case reconstruction, aimed to regain sight of individual life stories that transversal coding largely neglects. Relatedly, Bilge (2009) developed a "two-step hybrid approach" that combines inductive thematic analysis and a more deductive approach to her empirical data, in her case in order to reconcile grounded theory methods with an analysis of intersectionality.

The first step was inductive and based on *theoretical coding*. I felt it necessary to let my empirical data "speak for themselves", and opted for an inductive type of analysis inspired by grounded theory methods (Charmaz 2001, 2006; Strauss and Corbin 2008; Glaser and Strauss 1967). The concept of "post-migration mobility practices" has been constructed through multiple phases of coding and discussing categories. Furthermore, at some stage I was able to build a typology of the mobility practices that the women and men in this study were undertaking, as well as of the activities that were taking place simultaneously. I was also able to trace relationships between mobility practices and, on the one hand, transnational engagement and, on the other, the processes of local incorporation in which people were involved. Finally, I could grasp the complex relationships between different types of mobility, and between mobility and sedentarity, at the level of the individuals themselves, but also at the collective level, i.e. between people who are (im)mobile in different ways. All this caused me to develop the idea that mobility amounts to a sort of capital in the lives of some respondents, and that it is necessarily related to other types of resources that respondents do or do not have access to. These results brought me to the need to engage with the data through a second method.

The second step of data analysis is thus a more deductive, *theory-driven biographical reconstruction*. There were two shortcomings of the initial, data-driven method that I needed to deal with. The first was that this transversal analysis had made me lose sight of my respondents' individual trajectories and biographies as coherent wholes. The second was that the focus on people's accounts of their lives left too little room for the ways in which they were related to broader social contexts and inserted in relations of power (see also Bilge 2009).

I thus engaged in a second reading of my empirical data that aimed to understand and analyse each respondent's biography and illuminate the larger contextual and relational aspects of these coherent "stories". To do so, I separated my material into "cases" and organised the information I had on the life of each respondent chronologically in order to obtain a (necessarily partial) biography, following a biographical case reconstruction method (Rosenthal 2004; Bertaux 2005). By doing so, I could analyse people's "life stories" by focusing on processes of mobility/sedentarity and local anchorage that could be observed, in light of the varied resources that people could mobilise at different times in their lives. Furthermore, as other scholars have discussed (Erel 2007; Apitzsch and Siouti 2007), biographical analyses are particularly suited to attempts to understand the transnational dimension of (some) migrants' lives. In this study, biographical analyses allowed me to delve more deeply into one of the problematic aspects I had encountered when trying to understand the practices of the people I had met: the fact that their resources were not valued equally depending on where they had acquired them or where they were mobilising them. Only through their personal accounts of their individual trajectories in general, and their mobility practices in particular, could these discrepancies become apparent and be dealt with analytically.

In this second analytical step, I therefore re-embedded my data in their larger social and historical context by reconstructing whole biographies, their evolution over time and their relationship to one another.

#### **1.3 On Somalia and Somali Migrants: A Contextual Introduction**

#### *1.3.1 Recent History*

I remember, when I was in Somalia, they used to call Somalia "paradise" at that time. Now it's changed to hell. The Italians used to call it "paradiso", so it was beautiful; especially Mogadishu was a very beautiful city. […] Life was nice, weather is 28 all year, you don't need a jumper, just a t-shirt, that's it, you know. Life was beautiful. […] My only wish is to see Somalia better, because you've never seen a better country in this world. If Somalia were safe, to be honest – because everything is there; all it needs is peace. No peace, no life. You can have millions but if you don't have peace, you stay in your home; you can't go out. What are you going to do with your money? Nothing. […] I remember the blue ocean, and the sun, so beautiful. […] I remember the beach, the beach called Lido. [That's in Mogadishu?] In Mogadishu, yeah. I was born in Eastern Somalia, Puntland, but I grew up in Mogadishu. So the sea – we used to play there every Friday, playing, running, the beach. White, very white, and the blue ocean. You've seen the image anyway. That's a proper holiday place. So we were on holidays, actually, every day. Now the beach is dirty, because of so many Western companies. They come to the beach, that's why the pirates started. You know, in Somalia we've got big problems with pirates. The pirates, they started their things because the ships, they come through the Somalian sea, they dump dirty chemicals, nuclear waste, everything, their unused things, they dump there, and leave, because nobody controls the area; it's open sea. So they don't care. [Biographical interview, recorded]

Shariif, a man in his mid-30s who lives in London, remembers the country he left as a teenager, before the civil war: he draws a sharp contrast between the "holiday place" of his romanticised childhood memories and the "hell" that Somalia has been for the last 20 years. His description introduces many of the contextual dimensions that will be discussed in this section: the colonial past and the various foreign interests or interventions in the country, the collapse of the Somali state and the long and steady destruction of the country, the different regions that comprise Somalia (the centre and the south of the country, where Mogadishu, the capital, is located; Puntland in the northeast; and Somaliland in the northwest) and finally the recent international concerns raised by piracy and links with terrorism. The quotation also reveals the complex and sometimes ambiguous relationship that many of the respondents have kept with a country they had to leave and have sometimes not visited again, and yet with which they have often maintained various links.

The term "Somali" can refer to both the nationality of people currently internationally recognised as nationals of the Federal Republic of Somalia and the ethnicity of people who share a belief in a common Somali ancestry. However, the two definitions do not systematically overlap and are subject to conflicts, as this brief history illustrates. Although Somalis are commonly presented as a culturally homogeneous group of people who share a common language, religion and ancestry (Lewis 1994), this image does not reflect the complexity of the relationships between the different clans, regions, ethnic groups and political projects that constitute Somalia.

The Somali Republic was born in 1960 from the union of two former colonial zones that had belonged and been managed by Britain and Italy. But the Somali region covers a larger territory: in the nineteenth century, colonial powers divided it between Great Britain, Italy, France (which possessed what is now Djibouti) and Abyssinia (now Ethiopia – to which the still disputed region of Ogaden belongs) (Kleist 2004). Decolonisation in the region was intended to eventually reunite the entire Somali-speaking territory into one nation-state, but that never happened.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the new nation-state's government was not strong enough to promote economic development and good political governance. Moreover, the concentration of all institutions in Mogadishu caused discontent in other parts of the country. The government was overthrown in 1969 by a coup that installed General Mohammed Siyad Barre as the new president. Barre, backed by his thenally the USSR, declared "scientific socialism" and prohibited all references to clan and clan-related genealogies, while at the same time promoting people from his own family in all spheres of power (Gundel 2002; Lewis 1994). He did not abandon his nationalist dream of a big Somalia and, in 1977, invaded Ogaden, an Ethiopian Somali-speaking region, which led to a bloody war, large population displacements in the region, a change in allies, with Barre turning to the US for support, and a military defeat a year later. This "marked the beginning of an evolving crisis throughout the 1980s, which involved an economic downward spiral, political marginalisation, repression, migration, and manipulation of external aid" (Gundel 2002). The conflict escalated until, in 1988, armed opposition groups from northern Somalia (currently Somaliland) – and soon joined by southern groups – started attacking the government's forces. Civil war spread throughout the country, but the conflict did not end when Barre was removed from power in early 1991. The opportunity to create a unity government was missed, and the various armed factions started fighting among themselves, leading to a violent conflict (Menkhaus et al. 2010). Around half a million people died during the 2-year period that followed, due to violence and the dramatic famine that struck the region; according to estimates, an additional million people left the country, while two million more were internally displaced by the end of 1992 (Kleist 2004).

While the southern and central regions of Somalia sank into instability and recurrent violence for the next 20 years (see below), Somaliland and Puntland took separate paths. In 1991, the Republic of Somaliland proclaimed its independence, and, although it has not been recognised by the international community, it has been able to create a relatively stable political apparatus and administration (Meyer 2010). Puntland was created in 1998 as a regional autonomous (federal) state: in contrast to Somaliland, it does not have nationalist aims but, because of the absence of a functioning central government, nonetheless acts de facto independently from south-central Somalia (Meyer 2010).

Despite the international intervention aimed at restoring peace between 1993 and 1995, most of Somalia was not able to re-establish a functioning government. What took place instead was the "the rise of 'governance without government', in which informal governance arrangements, involving various combinations of customary law, sharia courts, municipalities, business leaders, neighbourhood watch groups, and civic movements, worked to provide a modicum of law and order and services to communities" (Menkhaus et al. 2010). The collapse of the state nevertheless left the population and institutions of Somalia in a situation in which insecurity and fragility prevailed. Various peace conferences were organised with the support of the international community. In 2004, the formation of a new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) – first based in Kenya and then in Somalia – gave some impetus to hopes for peace and stability. But efforts to establish the new government in Mogadishu failed, and Somalia witnessed the emergence of radical Islamist groups and the intervention of Ethiopian military forces, leading to one of the bloodiest times in Somalia's civil war and new massive population displacements at the end of the 2000s (Meyer 2010; Menkhaus et al. 2010). Since then, political processes have resumed, leading in 2012 to the establishment of the first permanent central government in the country since 1991 (the Federal Government of Somalia). Under the new constitution, the country became a federation, the Federal Republic of Somalia, and a period of fragile reconstruction began.

While the international community has paid limited attention to this region despite the disastrous humanitarian situation caused by war and periods of intense famine, recent links with terrorist groups and piracy seem to have increased its interest.

This short summary does not do justice to the complex history of Somalia, but it suffices as a basis to understand the heterogeneous types of relationships that the respondents in this study have developed with it over the years. Depending on their personal history and that of their families, their position before or at the beginning of the war, their movements and migration trajectories, the regions in which they lived and the clan affiliation they do or do not claim, their relationship to, and perspective on, "Somalia" can take various forms. A particularly important point in this regard is the place of origin within Somalia. While most of the people I met are originally from Mogadishu or other regions in central-south Somalia, a significant number (especially among respondents who live in Britain) are from Somaliland. The distinction is very important to some people in this latter group, who relate to an unrecognised country where economic, social and political development is a reality, and who do not want to be associated with their war-torn neighbours in the south.

#### *1.3.2 Mobility and Migration from Somalia*

Although the internal and international displacement of people fleeing the conflict has been very important over the last 30 years, migration and other types of mobility practices have been common among Somalis for a long time. Nomadic pastoralism and trade, two important livelihoods in Somalia even today, are based on circulation, which has led some authors to emphasise the role of mobility in the discursive construction of "Somaliness" (Horst 2006; Lewis 1994; Kleist 2004). Interestingly, although most of the migrants who left Somalia in the early 1990s were urban and sedentary, many still refer to "the figure of the nomad" as an important part of their identity (see also Fink-Nielsen et al. 2004; Engebrigtsen 2011). Many of the people I met in this study frame their mobility practices (secondary migration, back-andforth movements, regular visits to other countries where they have family members) through an idealised version of nomadism. I repeatedly heard respondents explain their travelling habits through their background as pastoralists.

I do not endorse scholars' explanations of Somali migrants' mobility as being related to a cultural heritage of nomadic practices that are reproduced in the context of migration (see for instance Bang Nielsen 2004; Engebrigtsen 2011 for such explanations). While skills and strategies of risk diversification may have been acquired through past experiences of pastoralism, I opt for a specific theoretical stance that emphasises the political dimensions of mobility rather than their cultural embedding in a (sometimes romanticised) nomadic heritage. I agree with authors who argue that Somali migrants' identification with the figure of the nomad is a way of framing forced exile in positive terms (Fink-Nielsen et al. 2004) and of emphasising "continuity and […] mobilis[ing] images of being adventurous, tough and independent, rather than marginalized, displaced and helpless" (Kleist 2004).

Apart from traditional practices of circulation, Somalis also have a long history of cross-border migration based on colonial and other geopolitical relationships. Seafarers working for British companies in the late nineteenth century started settling in the UK when they obtained sedentary jobs and were joined by their families during the 1950s, (Kleist 2004; Tuck 2011). Higher-class youths went abroad to Italy, Britain, Egypt and other countries that offered good educational opportunities and/or scholarships to Somali students. In the 1970s, the oil boom drew hundreds of thousands of unskilled Somali workers to the Arab Peninsula, while highly skilled Arabic-speaking Somalis could find good employment opportunities in the Gulf states (Kleist 2004).

Jamac, a man in his early fifties whom I met in London, illustrates those kinds of movements: born to a wealthy family in Mogadishu, he received a scholarship from the then European Economic Community to study in Italy. After returning to Somalia, he worked for the government for a couple of years before starting a business that imported Italian pasta to Somalia. Shortly after the war started, he used family connections to settle in one of the Emirati states, where he worked in different international trade jobs for some years. In 2002, he finally moved to Britain, where his wife and children had been living for some years.

Jamac's brief biography indicates that mobility and migration were part of larger strategies before the war in Somalia, often based on links with former colonial powers or other economic and political partners. However, the largest movement of people, comprising several million individuals, has occurred since 1988, the beginning of the civil war. Pérouse de Montclos (2003a, b) estimated that up to four out of five individuals had to flee because of the conflict. It is difficult to know exactly how many people have moved either within Somalia or across borders because of the significant numbers who have never officially registered as refugees, preferring to remain undocumented or to count on other kinds of support than those expressly targeting forced migrants. However, the UNDP estimates that a million Somalis

currently live outside the country (Sheikh and Healy 2009). To give an example of this wide dispersal, Van Hear (2005) states that by the end of the 1990s, Somali refugees had filed asylum applications in more than 60 countries. Events following the intervention of Ethiopian troops in 2006 have prompted more people to leave their place of residence: the UNHCR registered more than a million refugees as well as another million internally displaced persons for 2011–2012, making Somalis the second-largest population under its responsibility for these years (UNHCR 2012).

Most Somalis have settled in Somalia's neighbouring countries, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen, either in refugee camps or in various cities and villages. A second group resides in the Gulf states, often living and working there as undocumented persons, while a third group has settled in industrialised countries, with large numbers of people in Britain, the US, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway (Sheikh and Healy 2009; Pérouse de Montclos 2003b; Hammond et al. 2011).

However, mobility often does not end with settlement elsewhere, contrary to simplistic ideas of a "refugee cycle" (Lindley and Van Hear 2007). Somali migrants' trajectories often include subsequent movements: studies have demonstrated that those who left at the beginning of the war often tried to return, left again (maybe for another place), moved back and forth between cities and refugee camps or left a first country of settlement to find better conditions in another one (Moret et al. 2005; Zimmermann 2009; Horst 2006). Return is another type of movement that shapes the lives of some migrants, particularly those who originally came from the more stable Somaliland. Whether returning from neighbouring countries' refugee camps in the context of UNHCR-led programmes of "voluntary repatriation" or from industrialised countries to settle permanently or for regular visits, the number of "returnees" is significant (Hansen 2007, 2008; Fink-Nielsen et al. 2004; Kleist 2007). Other migrants decide to enjoy the citizenship they have acquired in the European or North American country where they had settled and legally move to a new country where they feel they can benefit from a more advantageous situation: Al-Sharmani (2004, 2006, 2010) has studied families that moved from the US to settle in Cairo and acquire a higher social status, while several authors have observed the secondary moves performed by European Somalis from various Continental European countries to the UK (Van Liempt 2011a, b; Bang Nielsen 2004; Lindley and Van Hear 2007; Ahrens et al. 2014). These different types of movements point to the concrete reality of what I refer to as "post-migration mobility practices": Somali migrants' migration trajectories are complex, often comprising consecutive moves in different directions.

It has become clear now that migration shaped the lives of many Somalis, even before the outbreak of the civil war in the late 1980s, but it has done so in considerably larger numbers since then. However, it should be equally clear that Somali migrants do not constitute a homogenous category of people. Their varying endowments of economic, cultural and social capital have been important in determining when they could leave Somalia and where they could go. As Jamac's example above illustrates, the education he received in Europe and his transnational kin networks

allowed him to leave Somalia when he felt the need to and to find employment and security in the Arabian Peninsula, only to later move to Europe once again.

#### *1.3.3 Political, Legal and Discursive Contexts: Britain and Switzerland*

Although Britain and Italy had previous colonial links with Somalia, it was only in the early 1990s that European states started to witness the arrival of, and to host, large numbers of Somali migrants. Except for those who had arrived before the war as students or workers, the vast majority of Somali migrants arrived in Europe through asylum channels. Over the years, family members joined them through family-reunification schemes, and Somalis now constitute one of the most important groups of recent non-European migrants in Europe.

Different waves of Somali migrants can be distinguished – the first migrants who arrived for different reasons before the war (in Britain more than in other European countries), the wave of refugees who left the country early in the conflict, and people who have arrived more recently (Fangen 2007; Eyer and Schweizer 2010). Most of the respondents in this study belong to the second group. Having arrived in the 1990s, they have obtained a stable legal status, in most cases have been naturalised and have more or less successfully integrated into their country of residence.

Some European countries have attracted more Somali migrants than others over the years. Together with the UK and Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Germany are the main host countries, each hosting more than 10,000 Somali migrants (Hammond et al. 2011 based on unpublished estimates by Carling and his colleagues). According to the same estimates, Switzerland, France and Finland are home to between 1000 and 10,000 Somali migrants each, while smaller numbers are found in other European countries. In the early 2000s, the first reports emerged about Somali migrants being perceived by the local media, policymakers and the population as causing problems and being poorly integrated (Farah 2000; Pérouse de Montclos 2003a, b). Difficulties in entering the labour market, high rates of unemployment and reliance on social welfare and other specific "social problems" such as the consumption of khat (a herbal drug), high divorce rates, youths' low educational achievement, continuing practices of female genital mutilation and – in some places – their appearance in criminality statistics and increasing interest and participation in religious fundamentalist groups, have been noted in more recent reports about this population (Pérouse de Montclos 2003a; Hammond 2013; Eyer and Schweizer 2010; Harris 2004; ICAR 2007; Open Society Foundations 2014).

All of these studies, however, demonstrate that, despite some truth to the claims outlined above, the "Somali population" in Europe is highly diverse and cannot be summarised by reference to a few problematic aspects. Its heterogeneity comes from dimensions related to gender, age, legal status, educational background, history of migration and mobility.

The women and men in this study have settled in either Britain or Switzerland (or, in a couple of cases, in both). Although the region, city, village or neighbourhood in which they reside also greatly influences their lives, this chapter focuses on the national contextual level of their "main country of residence". Britain and Switzerland's historical relationship with the rest of the world and with migrants, their respective construction of "otherness" and their immigration policies and perspectives on citizenship have an impact on respondents' experiences and on the meanings they give to those experiences. The strategies Somali migrants develop, in particular when it comes to (im)mobility, need to be understood against these specific backgrounds.

#### **1.3.3.1 The British Context**

Migration from Somalia to Britain has a long history: seamen from British Somaliland employed by British merchants at the end of the nineteenth century and Somali industrial workers after the Second World War were among the first migrants from the region to settle in the UK, later bringing their families as well. These early links led to the arrival of workers, students and, since the late 1980s, significant numbers of refugees, making Britain the European country with the largest Somali population (Hammond et al. 2011) and Somalis one of the largest ethnic minorities there. Their actual numbers are difficult to estimate, because of the large number of naturalised people and those who have moved from other EU countries to settle in Britain. Estimates range between 95,000 and 250,000 (Hammond 2013). Census figures from a decade ago indicate that almost 90% of them lived in London, but recent refugee-dispersal policies have probably led to a wider dispersion across the country: Bristol, Manchester, Birmingham and Leicester, among other cities, now host large Somali populations (Hammond et al. 2011). Hopkins (2010) estimates that around 60,000 Somalis currently live in London.

Somalis who arrived as asylum seekers since 1988 have generally been granted either full refugee status (with an indefinite leave to remain and access to similar civil rights and duties as UK nationals) or a provisional admission (exceptional leave to remain before 2003, humanitarian protection of discretionary leave since then, with more limited rights, in particular regarding family reunification and travel documents) (Lulling 2007; Harris 2004). It is also difficult to find figures that break down the Somali population by legal status, but statistical evidence (Office for National Statistics 2013) and the comparatively generous naturalisation regime that prevailed until 2005 (Sawyer and Wray 2012) suggest that a majority of all people of Somali origin who live in Britain have become British citizens. Almost all of the people I met in my study who live in Britain arrived there as asylum seekers or through family-reunification schemes and have become British citizens.

Official British figures include Somalilanders among Somalis, despite the recent claim, by some of them, that they constitute a distinct group, as some of my respondents in London told me. Because of the historical connection with what was once British Somaliland, migrants from this region constitute a significant share of the Somali population, yet it is difficult to determine whether they constitute a majority.

More recently, an important wave of secondary migration has occurred that consists of Somali migrants who had settled in Continental European countries – and became citizens of their country of residence – who subsequently moved to Britain: the number of these European citizens enjoying the right to free mobility within the EU is unknown, but various studies indicate that they are far from negligible (Van Liempt 2011a, b; Bang Nielsen 2004; Lindley and Van Hear 2007; Ahrens et al. 2014). These "European Somalis", as they call themselves, are part of my British sample, as I have met women and men who live in different parts of London with Dutch, Danish, French or Norwegian passports.

The imperial and colonial background of Britain's "traditional" migration flows has led to a "racial" perspective on diversity (based on the divide between "whites" and "Blacks"). However, what had appeared as a natural delineation between "races" has become more complicated in recent years, in particular because of the differing socioeconomic paths of the varied populations initially considered "Black" (Alexander 2002), the immense diversity of the migrant population in terms of countries of origin and other characteristics (Vertovec 2007) and the emergence of Muslims as a relevant category of differentiation (Modood and Salt 2013b).

Furthermore, "the gradual recognition that [migrants] were not temporary migrants but settlers and fellow citizens led to their being conceived of as 'ethnic minorities'"(Modood and Salt 2013a), a notion that doesn't exist in Swiss policies, for instance. The accommodation of these "ethnic minorities", i.e. not only the migrants, but also their descendants, in Britain is strongly based on the sociological and political idea of multiculturalism. Policies of multiculturalism aim to foster equality for all individuals by focusing on the rights of ethnic minority groups – conceptualised as "communities" – to maintain their cultures of origin, based on the idea that solidifying bonds based on common ethnicity would then lead to bonds between communities. Since the early 2000s, discourses about the "failure of multiculturalism" have become increasingly prominent (Werbner 2009), and new policies have been designed to overcome the supposedly "problematic integration" of migrants and ethnic minorities. As in Switzerland and most other European countries, in recent years integration policies have increasingly focused on new requirements for migrants to "prove" their desire to belong, in the form of language and country-knowledge requirements in particular (Goodman 2010; Tuck 2011).

Public opinion towards migrants and ethnic minorities in general, and people perceived as "culturally different" in particular, has become more negative (Park et al. 2012). Descendants of migrants as well as recently arrived migrants are increasingly perceived as poorly integrated, self-segregated from the "majority" and a danger to social cohesion and national security (Alexander et al. 2007). Furthermore, like elsewhere in Europe, asylum seekers are increasingly subject to negative stereotyping in Britain. Asylum has become a politicised issue. The local population, which often confuses asylum seekers and refugees, associates both with disguised economic migrants who steal jobs and benefits from them and receive preferential treatment in housing and other public services (Aspinall and Watters 2010). Furthermore, since 9/11 and 7/7, Muslims have increasingly become a heavily stigmatised "suspect community" (Ryan 2011; Ryan et al. 2011). For instance, different polls show that the British population perceives Muslims negatively, with a majority tending to believe that they are a threat and do not make an effort to integrate and create problems, or they associate them with extremism (Moosavi 2012). This negative framing is strongly gendered, since Muslim women, in particular those who wear a headscarf or a hijab, are considered either victims or people who actively refuse to integrate (Ryan 2011).

In this context, Somalis are presented, in the media as well as in public and political discourses, under the rubric of extremist religious practices: terrorism, involvement in Jihad and female genital mutilation are typically associated with the Somali community. They suffer from negative stereotyping on multiple grounds: these perceptions may lead to discrimination, racism and exclusion practices.

#### **1.3.3.2 The Swiss Context**

Switzerland has also experienced the arrival of different waves of Somali migrants, although nowhere nearly as large or diversified as in the UK. Because Switzerland has no colonial links with any part of Somalia, the arrival of migrants from this region is rather recent: very few Somalis lived in Switzerland before the 1990s, and most who reside in the country have arrived since then, mostly as asylum seekers (Eyer and Schweizer 2010; Moret 2006).

More than 10,000 migrants of Somali origin are estimated to be living in Switzerland, and there were 8326 Somali nationals officially registered in the country in 2016. We can add to this number the 1623 Swiss citizens who were born in Somalia. These statistics do not include the naturalised children of migrants, who were born in Switzerland. Among non-naturalised individuals, just under half have an annual (B) or permanent (C) residence permit, while nearly 40% hold a provisional admission (F Permit) and 15% are still in the asylum process (N Permit for asylum seekers).4 Furthermore, while Britain has long attracted Somali migrants and refugees, many women and men who arrived, sometimes by chance or accident, to Switzerland, eventually decided to leave the country and try their luck elsewhere, either legally or through irregular means (Moret 2006).

Although no official numbers exist, my impression is that only a minority of the Somali migrants in Switzerland comes from Somaliland. In my sample, only two people identified as Somalilanders, and I have found no organised group claiming this identity.

<sup>4</sup>All data from the Federal Office for Statistics website, accessed 21 October 2017.

#### 1.3 On Somalia and Somali Migrants: A Contextual Introduction

In contrast to the situation in many European states, in most cases Switzerland has not granted Somali asylum seekers full refugee status: however, having acknowledged their need for international protection, Swiss authorities have given them a subsidiary form of protection called "provisional admission" (F Permit), a permit they must renew every year (Moret 2006; Eyer and Schweizer 2010). Although the policies have changed in recent years, respondents in this study have experienced provisional admission when it was highly restrictive, in particular with regard to access to the labour market and rights to family reunification, social assistance (which is the same as for asylum seekers), choice of place of residence within Switzerland and cross-border mobility (prohibited except in very rare cases) (Moret 2006; Kamm et al. 2003). Provisional admission, despite its name, is often a longterm status, as people may remain subject to it for many years before it is either revoked or transformed into a better status.

Furthermore, in comparison with other European countries, Swiss laws and practices regarding naturalisation are particularly restrictive.5 Based on *jus sanguinis*, the new Swiss Citizenship Act (which entered into force in 2018) states that foreign citizens may apply for Swiss citizenship after 10 years of residence in the country (the years between the ages of 8 and 18 count double), provided that they hold a permanent residence permit and can prove, to the satisfaction of the authorities, that they have become well integrated (Kurt 2017). Under these conditions, for most Somali migrants in Switzerland, acquiring a stable legal status and/or becoming naturalised has been a long and difficult process.

The political accommodation of diversity has been a different story in Switzerland than in Britain. Although it has de facto been a country of immigration for decades, it has been reluctant to admit it. Migrants – usually referred to as "foreigners" – are commonly considered a threat to Swiss identity, resulting in strong boundaries against them (Dahinden et al. 2014). This fear of "over-foreignisation" (*Überfremdung* in German) has influenced Swiss policies regarding the entry and incorporation of those migrants who have settled in the country. Based on the idea of cultural incompatibilities between migrants and the Swiss population, policies were designed with the explicit aim of assimilating those foreigners who stay (ibid). The "assimilation paradigm", which was particularly dominant in the 1960s, gave way to an "integration paradigm" in the 1990s: the host country was perceived as holding part of the responsibility for promoting migrants' integration and was to financially commit to it (Niederberger 2005; Duemmler 2015). However, the ideal of civic-integration policies that has spread throughout Europe (Goodman 2010) has recently reached Switzerland: this ideal focuses on migrants' deficits and requires them to make the effort to integrate fully (through measures such as integration contracts or language and local knowledge tests), thereby reintroducing old assimilationist values (Duemmler 2015).

Switzerland's historical construction of the "threatening others" is thus different from that of Britain. It explicitly builds on nationality rather than race or ethnicity.

<sup>5</sup>See for example https://indicators.nccr-onthemove.ch/how-inclusive-are-swiss-and-europeancitizenship-laws/

Yet, otherness in Switzerland also builds on racial representations, even though they are mostly hidden behind ideas perceived to be more neutral and legitimate, i.e. nationality and cultural difference (Lavanchy 2015; Michel 2015). Studies have also indicated that overt forms of colour-based racism and discrimination target Black people in general, and sub-Saharan Africans in particular (Fröhlicher-Stines and Mennel 2004; Efionayi-Mäder and Ruedin 2017).

As in Britain, religion has also become increasingly important as a marker of difference. Muslims increasingly generate anxiety among the Swiss population, which perceives them as a threat to the state's fundamental values and gender equality (Helbling 2010; Duemmler et al. 2010; Fischer and Dahinden 2016). Populist parties also actively fuel fears of the supposed "Islamisation" of the country by designing initiatives to ban Islamic symbols (such as minarets in 2010, or the burqa in the Canton of Tessin in 2012). Finally, the politicisation of asylum over the last 30 years has strongly influenced how asylum seekers and refugees are perceived and treated: migrants who came to the country as asylum seekers and refugees are increasingly associated with profiteers, bogus refugees and criminals (active, in particular, in drug dealing).

Faysal, a man who has lived in Switzerland for 20 years, feels the deteriorating general climate with regard to attitudes towards foreigners. He volunteers at a nursing home and recalls having recently heard xenophobic comments by some of the residents, who, in his perception, repeat what they hear from others around them. He further relates these comments to recent anti-immigrant initiatives, demonstrating how having a Muslim name and being Black amount to a double difficulty when it comes to exclusionary and discriminatory practices. Like other respondents, he recalls instances of difficult border crossings in European airports, even with a Swiss passport:

I've started feeling those things since September 11. Because my name is [Faysal], the last few times I've travelled I've been checked when I returned […]. "Sir, please step aside". They took my passport, my ID. But there are also Yugoslavs who have Swiss nationality, but they don't look at them; they only look at your name. If you are Mohamed or Ahmed, all that, and then your colour. And we [Somalis], we have both together! […] Anyway, always, always you will be a foreigner, and that is a little difficult. [Semi-structure interview, recorded]

In contrast to Britain, where they are targeted as a "difficult" ethnic or national group, Somalis in Switzerland do not garner much attention from the media, politicians or the wider population (Eyer and Schweizer 2010): probably because of the relatively small size of their population vis-à-vis other migrant groups, they remain relatively invisible. However, despite their rarely being subject to collective stigmatisation based on their nationality, they cumulate other external ascriptions that may be difficult to handle, as Faysal and other respondents expressed.

#### **1.3.3.3 Concluding Remarks: On Somali Migrants Who Live in Britain and Switzerland**

The respondents in this study are not totally representative of the British- or Swissbased Somali population. The women and men I have met mostly arrived in Europe 10–20 years ago: they belong to a privileged subsection of the population that were able to leave Somalia relatively shortly after the conflict started. They or their families belonged to the economic elite (for instance, traders and businesspeople), were members of the government or civil servants in the administration or were other professionals with a high socioeconomic status (professors, chemists, engineers, doctors and so on). As with most refugees, migration has meant the loss of many of their assets (savings, property, sources of income) and of their socioeconomic status through the non-recognition of most of their education and work experience. Despite the decline in their social status after their initial move to Europe, the socioeconomic position that was theirs before they left has influenced their later trajectories of migration and incorporation, as will be made clear later in this book.

Furthermore, because the people I met arrived in Europe in the 1990s or 2000s, they, unlike more recently arrived Somali migrants, have been able to obtain a stable legal status (usually citizenship of a European country) and benefit from less restrictive asylum, integration and naturalisation policies and a climate that was less hostile towards migrants.

In sum, the respondents in this study certainly occupy better legal and socioeconomic positions than the average Somali in their respective country of settlement. Yet they are still relatively unprivileged vis-à-vis the population as a whole, as they have had their access to many resources severely restricted since their arrival in Europe, for different reasons.

At the same time, several studies on Somali migrants in different places in Europe have demonstrated the significant transnational involvement of this population (again as a general trend). In particular, they are known as "exceptional remitters" in comparison to other migrant groups, in terms of both the proportion of migrants who send money and the regularity with which they do so (Carling et al. 2012): they send individual or collective remittances to different parts of Somalia or other places where family members live (see also Horst 2006, 2007; Lindley 2010; Pérouse de Montclos 2003a).

Like other migrants, many European Somalis are also actively committed to political transformation in their country of origin and engage in activities aimed at relief and development there. They create transnational associations, develop and implement projects to improve the situation there or try to get hired by international organisations or NGOs active in their region of origin (Kleist 2008a, 2008b; Hammond 2013; Horst 2017). Many of the people I met in this study emphasised their wish to contribute, participate in the reconstruction of their country and support those who have not have the chance to leave. Some were actively planning such activities, while others were already fully involved in political, humanitarian or development projects in their country of origin.

Migrants' transnational commitment, however, has raised the interest of authorities in their countries of residence, which take a dim view on migrants' focus on their place of origin. Against evidence that transnational commitments can often only be made by those who are solidly incorporated in the country of residence (see Hammond 2013 for the case of Somalis in Britain), there is fear that transnationality comes at the expense of local integration. Somalis' secondary movements within Europe, and general patterns of transnationality and "supermobility" (Tuck 2011) among this group, have recently raised some concerns among policymakers who feel that these practices are not consistent with local incorporation and loyalty to the country of immigration.

#### **Appendix: Interview Methods**

Several types of interviews have been conducted in this study, which are described below. Different types of interviews were sometimes conducted during a single encounter. Figure 1.1 indicates the number of encounters and type(s) of interview conducted with each respondent.

With most research participants, I conducted *semi-structured interviews* (indicated SSI in Fig. 1.1), which Burgess (1984 quoted in Mason 2002) defines as "conversations with a purpose". The topics I explored during these semi-structured interviews were: respondents' individual migration trajectory and details about what has happened since their arrival in Europe; the changes that have taken place since they acquired a stable legal status (when relevant); their current situation (where they live, with whom, their daily paid or unpaid activities and so on); their travelling experiences and future projects (where to, with whom, to do what, for how long, how they deal with their domestic, professional and other activities while they are away and so on); their local and transnational networks (where are their relevant others); their knowledge of, implication in, and/or use of alternative channels of distribution (circulation of objects), money transfer and banking systems (rotating saving groups); and indirect questions about others' mobility practices.

When confronted with unexpected situations where more than one person was present, I conducted *group interviews* (indicated GI in Fig. 1.1), based on the same thematic guidelines as for individual semi-structured interviews.

Later in the fieldwork, I started conducting *biographical interviews* (indicated BI in Fig. 1.1). These were particularly suited to my interests in this research because they emphasise individuals' experiences (instead of only general discourses), the meanings given to these experiences and the overall context in which they take place (Bertaux 2005; Apitzsch and Siouti 2007; Rosenthal 2004). I opted for this kind of interview because it is ideally suited to understanding how post-migration mobility practices are embedded in the whole life story of the respondents.

The core of those interviews is a temporal succession of events, situations, projects and actions that respondents narrated in their own way (Bertaux 2005). As an

"initial question" (Rosenthal 2004), I asked respondents to tell me about their arrival in Europe and what had happened until the present. In a second step, I probed on issues that needed clarification, asking first what Rosenthal (2004) calls "internal narrative questions", related to events or actions that people had raised during their narration, and then "external narrative questions", about topics that had not been discussed yet. Those external questions related to their situation before they left Somalia, the different steps of the migration trajectory (why those places and not others), their travelling practices since they had arrived in Europe (where to, for what reasons, with whom) and their local and transnational connections with different types of people.

Later, I also developed an experimental type of *spatial interview* (indicated SI in Fig. 1.1). Concretely, there were two phases in these interviews based on visual material. I first used Cyrus's (2008) method to grasp respondents' "socio-spatial self-placement": I gave respondents a sheet containing three concentric circles and asked them to write down (or draw) the places they considered important, with the most important ones placed at the centre and the less important ones towards the margin. I then asked them to explain why they had chosen those places, why they had placed them where they had in the concentric circles and whether there were other places they had considered including but had decided not to. In a second step, I adapted the use Richter (2012) makes of geographic maps in her study on Spanish second-generation migrants. I gave respondents a plain map of the world (no political borders, no names written on it) and asked them, with my help when needed, to mark the places they had mentioned in the first part, and to add any places they might have forgotten to mention in the first phase. I also enjoined them to tell me where they would draw themselves on the map. Finally, I asked them specific questions, such as whether there were places they had not mentioned where they had lived or travelled to in the past, where people who were important to them were currently living or where they planned to go in the future or dreamt of going one day. In contrast to Richter, who started by asking about relevant others (i.e. people) and then moved to questions about places, I decided to focus on places first, as a way to let all relevant places emerge from the discussion.

These types of interviews were very fruitful in opening avenues for elements to appear that had not been discussed before: people would often start telling me about experiences (in particular mobility experiences) they had not thought of as relevant or interesting in the context of my study. They also allowed me to take into account the non-transnational character of some sedentary respondents' experiences. Focusing on places and asking people what concretely links them to these places was a particularly effective way to explore the various ways in which migrants are localised, transnationally embedded, and (im)mobile.

Finally, the ethnographic character of the methods chosen gave me the opportunity to spend *limited moments of observation* while meeting with the research participants. In this study, observation was mostly possible because I gave respondents the choice of deciding where we would meet, which sometimes allowed me to enter into parts of their daily lives. While some of the public places where we met were rather anonymous cafes, others, which the respondents had chosen because they

knew them, offered me some insight into the respondents' activities and practices. When interviews took place in respondents' homes, which was mostly the case for women, I could have a feeling of the area and apartment where they lived, and I sometimes had the opportunity to chat with other people who were present, to observe visits or phone calls that took place during the interviews or to assist in private practices such as stopping the interview at prayer time. Meeting respondents at their workplace, or in public places where they are regular customers, probably gave me the best opportunities to observe them in (selected moments in) their daily environment. For instance, I met a male respondent at a classy Swiss hotel bar known for its international business clientele and could witness the well-dressed middle-aged Somali men who regularly came to greet him. Or while undertaking a series of individual and group interviews in a small shopping mall in a suburban area of London, I could see the kind of people who were there, shopping or just stopping by for a chat, and the kinds of interactions between the owners of the shops and cafes. I took extensive notes of these observations soon after they took place, and included them in my corpus of data.

In addition to interviews, informal discussions before and after interviews and observations, the corpus of data includes notes on short encounters and personal exchanges that took place over the phone, by email or on Facebook with a few respondents*. Informal communication* that occurred at times other than the encounters are indicated IC in Fig. 1.1.

#### **References**


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# **Chapter 2 Typologising Cross-Border Movements in Post-Migration Life**

The women and men I met in the course of this study told me extensively about the ways they do or do not move, the places they have been to (or would like to go to), their activities while in those places and, when they are not travelling, the people who are important to them and whether these people live with them or elsewhere. This chapter describes and discusses the varied "post-migration mobility practices" that respondents have allowed me to see. As a reminder, cross-border mobility is defined in this book as all cross-border movements undertaken by settled migrants from their main country of residence that are significant enough to induce changes in their lives.

The main purpose of this chapter is to develop a novel and comprehensive typology of the post-migration cross-border mobility practices by bringing different types of cross-border movements into a single analytical focus. The various types of activities that mobile people undertake while on the move and the (constructed) places that their mobility practices link together are also examined. As a conceptual introduction to these empirical sections, I first review the literature that has dealt with various types of cross-border movements.

#### **2.1 An Overview of the Literature**

The mobility practices explored here are not new, and they have been observed and discussed by social scientists in the past. However, the literature tends to discuss each of these types of movements separately. Two strands of the literature in particular examine cross-border mobility with a perspective similar to the one I adopt. First, scholars interested in transnational practices have studied various kinds of movements that migrants may undertake after they have settled. Second, the idea of mobility is fundamental to many studies about cross-border "circulation". These two strands are discussed separately.

#### *2.1.1 Transnational Studies*

Transnational studies have illuminated various types of movements that migrants might undertake after their initial migration. They emphasise that some migrants maintain connections with places other than their place of residence, moving in transnational social fields (Glick Schiller et al. 1995; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Although transnational practices, networks and identifications are not necessarily grounded in cross-border movements, the reverse is not also true. The mobilities that the respondents develop necessarily build on different kinds of transnational practices and connections.

Scholars have developed several typologies of migration patterns, focusing mostly on migrants' intentions to stay in the destination country and/or on the types of transnational connections that certain forms of migration may lead to (see for instance Engbersen et al. 2013; Düvell and Vogel 2006; Dahinden 2013). In a study on migration patterns between Italy and Australia, for example, Hugo (2013) illuminates the variety of direct or indirect movements that may be followed by settlement or further mobility. While these typologies mostly aim to characterise types of *migrants*, however, mine focuses on the types of *mobility practices* that people on the move may undertake at some point in their lives. Different types of cross-border mobility practices do not characterise migrants per se, but may become a defining element of their lives for a period of time in their biography.

Jeffery and Murison's (2011) introduction to a special issue of *Population, Space and Place* on return and "onward migration" (their term for post-migration mobility) is an exception to the lack of comprehensive analyses of migrants' mobility practices. These authors examine how incorporation into the country of residence may be combined in various ways with diverse forms of return, relocation or circulation. Their welcome conclusions, based on the case studies included in the issue – and not on a single case study, as in this book – show how the transnational perspective illuminates the relevance of mobility in some migrants' lives.

Confusion may emerge because different terms have sometimes been used to describe similar phenomena, and because the same term has sometimes been used to refer to different types of practices. These overlapping conceptualisations indicate that there is a continuum between different types of cross-border movements. In some cases, it is difficult to make clear-cut distinctions between different forms of mobility. This point will be further discussed later in this chapter, when I present my own typology, but first I present an overview of different strands of the literature that focuses on single types of post-migration movements: return (in its different forms), to-and-fro movements (or pendulum-like movements) and secondary migration. All of these movements reveal that migrants are involved in transnational social fields; in other words, that they move between – and connect together – different localities that influence their lives.

#### **2.1.1.1 Return**

Return to the country of origin, in its various forms, is the type of movement that has been of most interest to transnational scholars. Return exists on a continuum between, at one end, visits to the country of origin, for instance during holiday periods, and, at the other, definitive return followed by settlement in the country of origin. Return is a process rather than an event, as in many cases it is made of multiple repeated movements whose nature may evolve over time (Black and King 2004; Stefansson 2004; Oeppen 2013). Return should not be understood as the final step of a migration trajectory, but rather as part of global mobility practices (Jeffery and Murison 2011). In fact, return is often treated in the literature in terms of transnational movements and mobility rather than a specific moment in a biography. As Hansen (2007) has argued, return should not be understood as a "sedentary concept reflecting an understanding of identity that does not capture the mobile practices of today's world transnational flows" (131).

Processes of return have been researched empirically with varied focuses, but most studies reveal that returns are strongly influenced by the social position of those who undertake them. For instance, returning to the place of origin holding a Western passport implies the possibility of moving back to the country of migration if necessary, or of developing to-and-fro movement strategies between the two locations (Fink-Nielsen et al. 2004; Kleist 2007; Ley and Kobayashi 2005). This situation creates a radically different experience than that of rejected asylum seekers or undocumented migrants who are deported, who often return "with nothing but an empty bag" (Kleist 2016); (see also Drotbohm 2015 on the topic of return upon deportation).

Furthermore, return is often linked to specific moments and events in migrants' lives. Ley and Kobayashi (2005) show how middle-class migrants from Hong Kong in Canada strategically design their to-and-fro movements between the two locations depending on their life stages. Each place offers specific opportunities that may be valuable early in one's career, when children are born and raised or after retirement (see also Oeppen 2013 for a similar argument). Recently, scholars have also shown an interest in the movements undertaken by migrants' children to their parents' country of origin (King and Christou 2010; Darieva 2011; Bolognani 2014). Since "return" does not adequately describe such a move, King and Christou (2010) suggest referring to it as "ancestral return" or "counter-diasporic migration". Studies indicate that young adults undertake such a move for different reasons, including the wish to participate in the future development of their ancestors' country (Darieva 2011) and to enhance their social status while downplaying the discrimination they face in the country where they used to live (King and Christou 2010; Bolognani 2014). These young people move to a country where they have never lived but with which they have maintained transnational connections through their biography. Through such mobility practices, they build on diverging social hierarchies and opportunities in two places, challenging ethnicised/racialised identifications and categorisations.

Issues of recognition and achieving a better social status through movements to the country of origin pervade much of the literature on (voluntary) return. Hansen (2007), for instance, demonstrates how male migrants who return to Somaliland attempt – often with little success – to regain the social recognition they have lost and to reconstruct positively valued versions of masculinity. Regular return visits may also become moments where social status in the country of immigration is performed and established through symbols of consumption, gifts and contributions (Salih 2003; Nieswand 2011; Sagmo 2015). However, while return may serve as a display of a comparatively better social status, it might also reveal pressures and anxieties. Against celebratory visions of transnational practices as necessarily emancipatory and mobility as intrinsically good, return is experienced by some migrants as a burden. In a study on Senegalese migrants in Italy, Sinatti (2011) explores how permanent return, although the ultimate aim, is constantly deferred because of the pressure to remit. Mobility in this case becomes an unwanted constraint that forces migrants "into the role of 'mobile transmigrants' in a continuous effort to negotiate between the benefits offered by staying in migration and sustainable permanent return" (ibid: 164).

This last point further demonstrates that the realities of return are also shaped by the transnational relationships that constitute migrants' networks. Carling (2008) argues that relationships between migrants and their non-migrant significant others in their country of origin are shaped by "transnational moralities" based on asymmetries in power. Migrants' economic power goes hand in hand with moral obligations if they want to maintain and enhance their role and social status among their social networks in the place of origin. Other studies have also revealed the tensions and conflicts that arise between "returnees" and those who have never left their country of origin (Dahinden 2005a, b; Bolognani 2014).

This (necessarily selective) overview of the transnational literature on return demonstrates that return, as a mobility practice, is shaped by the social location of those who move, with regard to both the different localities at stake and the significant people to whom the migrants are connected. Return and the specific forms it takes are based on specific assets that make it worthwhile, economically, socially, politically and morally. This book will empirically demonstrate how being able to undertake such a move relies on specific conditions of unequal power relations.

#### **2.1.1.2 Pendular Migration**

Pendular migration, regular movements between two places, can be seen as a specific form of return when one of those two places is the country of origin. Duany (2002) argues that to-and-fro movements are a way for migrants to construct "mobile livelihoods" by extending the means of subsistence across borders when economic opportunities are unequally distributed in space. Work and other economic opportunities, family life and children's education and political involvement constitute important motivations to spend some time in a given place: moving to and fro may be a convenient way to take advantage of the assets localised in those multiple residences (Duany 2002; Ong 2003; Morokvasic 1999). Hammond (2013), for instance, argues that a significant number of elite Somali migrants (businesspeople and politicians in particular) hold multiple passports and divide their lives between their country of migration, where their family resides, and Somalia, where some of their professional activities are based.

To-and-fro movements between two places have been given different names, including "circulation" (Duany 2002), "shuttle migration" (Ong 2003; Morokvasic et al. 2003) and "commuting" (Nowicka 2013; Morokvasic et al. 2003). I opt for the term "pendular migration". "Incomplete migration" has also been used to refer to pendulum-like mobility (Fihel and Grabowska-Lusinska 2014): I do not endorse this terminology because of its normative implications, and because it misses the entire point of the idea of transnationality.

Literature on migrants' retirement also includes pendular mobility patterns: for instance, Bolzman and his colleagues discovered that travelling to and fro between the country of origin and the country of destination was the preferred option for labour migrants from Spain and Italy who had settled in Switzerland (Bolzman et al. 2006). Fokkema and de Haas (2009) also observed the increasing tendency of (predominantly male) retired Moroccan migrants to adopt "pendular migration" strategies between Europe and their country of origin (see also Hunter 2011).

Pendular migration follows an initial phase of sedentary migration and is based on some kind of settlement in the country of migration. People who move between two places spend some time in both places, whether it is with their families or for social, work or other purposes. In other words, they are not "visitors" in those places, but have developed specific relationships with them that allow for some kind of belonging. The notion of "dual residence" (Duany 2002; Hammond 2013), which focuses on the places that are linked rather than the movements between them, demonstrates this idea well.

While the literature reviewed here focuses exclusively on to-and-fro movements that link the place of migration with the place of origin, my own study illuminates the possibility of pendular movements that do not include migrants' country of origin.

#### **2.1.1.3 Secondary Migration**

Another type of post-migration movement that has interested some scholars has been referred to as "secondary migration", "secondary movement" or "onward migration". People who undertake such moves leave the country of residence to which they had first migrated for another place that is not their country of origin, where they also settle. Some scholars describe this phenomenon as "onward movement" in order to emphasise that migration is not necessarily linear (Lindley and Van Hear 2007). Paul (2015), in a study on Filipino migrant domestic workers, analyses their trajectories as "stepwise" migrations, highlighting the intentional character of each planned step towards a final destination.

I choose the term "secondary migration" to indicate that the centre of gravity changes from a first place of immigration to another one following a movement defined as migration (based on the idea of Hägerstrand 1969 on the distinction between migration and mobility).

As has been discussed earlier, European policymakers have promoted the mobility of EU citizens between countries, primarily with highly skilled professionals in mind. What had been less foreseen (or in some cases wished for) is that new European citizens would grasp this opportunity to move to a country where they feel they can find more favourable living conditions. Research shows that significant numbers of migrants of Somali origin have undertaken such moves, mostly to settle in Britain from Continental European countries (Lindley and Van Hear 2007; Bang Nielsen 2004; Van Liempt 2011a, b; Ahrens et al. 2014; Mas Giralt 2017). Somali migrants in North America have made similar moves, either from one state to another within the US, or between the US and Canada (Horst 2007).

While onward migration in these examples is based on international agreements and legal rights by European or North American citizens to settle in another nationstate, secondary movements can also be undertaken irregularly, i.e. in ways that are unauthorised by states. So-called "irregular secondary movements" have attracted the attention of policymakers, who are concerned that refugees are circumventing international agreements requiring refugees to stay in the country where they first arrived (Legomsky 2003; Moret et al. 2006; Zimmermann 2009).

"Reverse migration", a term coined by Al-Sharmani (2010), constitutes a specific type of secondary movement: it takes place when migrants relocate to a country that is not their country of origin but which they perceive as culturally, economically and geographically closer to "home". In this sense, the processes involved are quite similar to those related to return. In Al-Sharmani's study (2004, 2006), Somali migrants move from industrialised countries (mostly in North America) in which, despite their being naturalised, they are marginalised, to Cairo, where they can expect, thanks to their Western citizenship, to enhance their social status and live a middle-class life.1

Another reason for undertaking secondary migration relates to cross-border marriage. A cross-border marriage involves one of the spouses leaving their first country of migration to join their partner who lives in another country that is not the country of origin. These "offshore marriages" (Voigt-Graf 2005) remain understudied, although they are part of migrants' transnational marriage practices, as becomes apparent in my empirical data.

<sup>1</sup>Although Al-Sharmani does not define the term, "reverse" could refer to either going in the direction opposite to that of the initial migration or reversing a marginalised socioeconomic situation thanks to the new move.

Transnational scholars have thus explored a vast array of mobility practices that occur in transnational social fields, practices that simultaneously reinforce those fields. Varied forms of return, to-and-fro movements and secondary moves build on migrants' connections with different localities across borders as well as on their identification with those different places, as this book will discuss.

#### *2.1.2 The Literature on Circulation*

Mobility has also been widely discussed in a strand of literature focusing on circulation as a form of mobility alternative to (sedentary) migration. Many studies reveal how some women and men regularly cross borders to engage in economic activities, circulating between different places and coming back on a more or less regular basis to their place of residence. Already in the 1970s, Zelinsky (1971) contrasted migration to circulation practices: while the former was defined as "any permanent or semipermanent change of residence, […] a spatial transfer from one social unit or neighbourhood to another, which strains or ruptures previous social bonds" (225– 6), circulation "denotes a great variety of movements, usually short-term, repetitive, or cyclical in nature, but all having in common the lack of any declared intention of a permanent or long-lasting change in residence" (226). Like Zelinsky, Chapman and Prothero (1983) do not differentiate between cross-border movements and movements within nation-states: they analyse circulatory patterns in so-called "Third World societies", demonstrating how such practices may be part of longterm strategies to benefit from resources located in different places (see also Chapman 1979).

Since the 1990s, scholars in different parts of the world have approached circulation empirically, finding similar patterns despite the variety of economic activities in which mobile women and men are involved. The seminal work of Alain Tarrius (1993, 2000, 2002) and other (mostly French) scholars (see among others Peraldi 2001; Morokvasic 1999; Schmoll 2005; Tarrius et al. 2013; Morokvasic et al. 2003) has challenged the traditional understanding of migration and the ideas of integration, sedentariness and ethnicity that went with it. This strand of literature, which is interested in individual mobility practices as well as larger mobility systems, has fostered a fundamental renewal of the theoretical, methodological and epistemological premises in migration studies (Cortes and Faret 2009). These scholars further emphasise the existence of territories of circulation (*territoires circulatoires*) that do not follow the borders or logics of nation-states but have their own hierarchies and forms of sociality (Tarrius 1993).

Women and men on the move engage in varied economic activities based on their ability to cross borders regularly. Those who are involved in "suitcase trading" around the Mediterranean circulate between different countries, crossing borders and buying and selling products mostly in informal markets (Peraldi 2001, 2007; Schmoll 2005, 2006; Morokvasic 1999, 2007). Marques et al. (2001) analyse similar patterns of transnational informal trade carried out by former Cape Verdean migrant women

who have returned home: they circulate between Cape Verde, Portugal (where they used to live and have kept social networks they continue to mobilise in their business) and other places, generally bringing back goods they sell in Cape Verde. Some women active in the sex industry develop similar strategies of circulation, working in different countries but more or less regularly going back to their country of origin, where they expect to live in the future – as for instance with cabaret dancers in Switzerland (Dahinden 2009, 2010; Thiévent 2010), Filipina entertainers in Japan and elsewhere (Parreñas Salazar 2010) and sex workers from North Africa or Eastern Europe who develop trajectories crossing different countries in Europe before possibly going back to where their families reside (Tarrius 2011; Tarrius et al. 2013). Potot (2007) studied the circular routes taken by Romanian migrants who work in diverse odd jobs in the formal and informal labour markets of France, Spain and Britain and regularly go back home and undertake new circular journeys. Finally, Poland's accession to the EU has facilitated circular movements: women and men develop flexible forms of mobility, accessing consecutively different national labour markets and regularly returning to their place of origin (Gozdziak 2014).

Whether circulating for business, petty jobs, manual labour or sex work, these women and men have developed strategies that rely on a specific resource: their mobility and the skills that go with it. In this sense, mobility becomes a fundamental asset, and their "*savoir-circuler*" (Tarrius 2002) involves skills in crossing borders, carrying and smuggling goods, navigating between different cultural and legal systems and developing useful social networks in the places they reach (Peraldi 2007; Schmoll 2005; Dahinden 2010). Mobility is not simply a means to link one place to another: it constitutes a central element of individual and collective livelihood strategies. Improving their living conditions does not imply a long-term change in their place of residence, as in traditional forms of migration, but instead requires the development of sophisticated strategies based on circulation and regular border crossings (see Zelinksy's definition above).

Most studies on circular mobility describe it in terms of strategies developed as an alternative to sedentary migration: those involved in this type of mobility do not envisage long-term settlement except in their place of origin. In this sense, circulation does not constitute post-migration mobility practices as they are understood in this book. Recently, some scholars of circulation have accounted for similar mobility practices by former migrants. Based on two studies in France and Italy, Schmoll and Semi (2013) demonstrate how some settled migrants from North Africa engage in cross-border trade activities based on circulation. They analyse how these activities contrast with the classic ethnic business entrepreneurship that researchers and policymakers alike usually focus on. A recent book by Tarrius et al. (2013) illustrates through different case studies how migrants or their descendants may start practising circulation after periods of sedentariness. Using the term "career", Tarrius and Missaoui describe how migrants' sedentary children, who are in regular contact with circular migrants because they participate in the same economy, start embracing mobile lives themselves, leaving traditional paths of integration. In the same book, Qacha examines migration trajectories composed of stages ("*parcours par étapes*"): stages of sedentariness allow migrant women to consolidate local knowledge and social networks and acquire residency rights, which may later be used to develop circulation practices within Europe.

My study includes similar mobility practices developed by migrants who have acquired residency rights (mostly through naturalisation) in the country where they initially settled, and shares these scholars' interest in cross-border mobility as an ensemble of skills that some people may mobilise strategically.

#### **2.2 Post-Migration Mobility Practices: A Typology**

Specific types of cross-border movements have been described and discussed extensively in the literature, as the previous section has shown. My aim now is to develop a comprehensive perspective on the "post-migration mobility practices" that take place across borders, and to systematically analyse these practices as coherent wholes within particular biographies. Examining mobility as a system makes it possible to understand that different types of movements are interlinked and have different effects depending on the representations and meanings that are attached to them (Stock and Duhamel 2005). In this light, individual systems of mobility can be thought of as representing the ensemble of the places an individual goes to and the types of movements she undertakes to link them (ibid). The comprehensive approach and typology I adopt here should not, however, overestimate the strategic dimension of the development of such practices. Mobile women and men generally start crossing borders without a clear plan of how they will (or even may) further develop their mobility "career" in the future. Opportunities and chances arise, obstacles force them to modify their plans and others' successes or failures give them ideas from which they develop their projects. "Systems of mobility" relate to ever-evolving practices, often built step by step, abandoned, adapted and improved depending on the structural conditions under which they develop (Moret 2017).

Post-migration mobility practices take multiple shapes. The frequency of movements, their geographical locations, the length of the stays in the different places, the reasons for which they are undertaken and the collective arrangements they implicate combine in various ways. Six ideal types of post-migration mobility practices are described in this section (they are visualised later in Fig. 2.1):


These ideal types should not be regarded as describing social reality accurately, but as abstract constructions of this reality. They are tools to analyse complex social phenomena – in this case geographic mobility practices – and to think of them in a coherent way (Weber 1965). While these ideal types are related to existing categories

**Fig. 2.1** Post-migration mobility practices: a typology

of mobility – most of which have been discussed in the previous section – they have emerged from my empirical data. Specifically, the ideal types build on the frequency of the cross-border movements, the duration of the stay in the different locations, the locations themselves (i.e. whether they include the country of origin and/or third places) and whether the movement entails a change in the main place of residence. Table 5.1 in Chap. 5 details these dimensions.

Because social reality can never be fully contained by the categories social scientists create to describe it, it is impossible to definitively situate each respondent in one or another of the ideal types. Most biographies include elements of more than one type: practices change over time, and they combine in different ways. Different mobility types can therefore be found at different points in a single respondent's story, and sometimes, although less often, even simultaneously. However, the specificity of each ideal type is based on distinct criteria. For all but one, I have selected one or two life stories that are particularly illustrative of the type of mobility discussed.

#### *2.2.1 Star-Shaped Mobility*

"Star-shaped mobility" refers to practices involving regular movements to different places, always for short periods of time, before coming back to the main place of residence. The main place of residence constitutes the centre of the star, while the destinations of the movements are its tips.

It has similarities with circular forms of migration as described, for instance, by Tarrius (2002), Dahinden (2010), and Thiévent (2010) with regard to the frequency of movements and the diversity of the places of destination. There are at least two major differences, however: first, in star-shaped mobility, movements are undertaken from a country that, in contrast to most circulation practices, is not the country of origin, but the place to which the person has migrated and in which she or he has settled. The second difference lies in the importance of the main country of residence to the mobility practices. Although people leave their main country of residence on a regular basis, they spend most of their time there, where they are generally strongly anchored. This local incorporation is evidenced by the migrants' work, social life, political or associational involvement and family.

#### **2.2.1.1 Nuur**

Nuur is a man in his late twenties who arrived in Switzerland at the age of 14. Thanks to uninterrupted studies before his arrival and his willingness to learn, he managed to integrate into the local school system, catch up with other pupils, obtain further education and secure a stable, skilled job. He became Swiss at the age of 22 and decided to serve in the army, taking this duty of young male Swiss citizens seriously. He has also set up and/or been involved with several migrant (sometimes Somali) associations and is an active member of a local political party. Nuur's local incorporation and participation in the economic, cultural, social and political life of his city is thus important.

In parallel, Nuur has become increasingly mobile. The first time I interviewed him, he told me, *"*You know, since I got the Swiss passport, I have been travelling all the time*"*. I met him several times over the next 2 years and learnt more about his diverse mobility practices and how he manages to be mobile and simultaneously have a full-time job in Switzerland.

We Somalis are not like you: you plan your holidays three months ahead, six months ahead. It's enough if I sleep tonight and tomorrow I wake up and I say, "But wait, next weekend I might just hop over to London. I'll leave on Friday and come back on Sunday". That's it. Or just by chance I realise that Monday is Whit Monday, it's a public holiday. [I tell myself:] "Why don't you take a long weekend off? Oh I'm going to leave". […] And sometimes, as there are many women who have children [who work with me], I am the one who is on duty, which means more extra hours. And the problem is that my colleagues are used to planning their holidays six months ahead, while I don't even know what I am going to do three weeks ahead! [Semi-structure interview, recorded]

While he stresses the cultural differences between "We Somalis" and "you" (referring, it appears, to me as well as to his Swiss colleagues), he also acknowledges his situation as a young single man (at the time of this interview) working mostly with mothers of young children. These gendered differences are part of his mobility strategy: while his female colleagues find it more difficult to organise their lives and work schedules, Nuur finds advantages in taking more than his share of work. It allows him to work extra hours when he is in Switzerland – which is not a problem, given that he has few domestic responsibilities – and to "bank" time to maximise his travels.

Nuur thus travels regularly, but mostly for short periods (a maximum of 3 weeks in a row, but mostly just a few days). His travel has multiple purposes that sometimes overlap. One involves his business activities, mainly in relation to his aunt's transnational trade. For instance, before the war started in Syria he travelled to Dubai and Damascus to bring back jewellery, gold and furniture that his aunt then sold, mostly to Somalis who live in Switzerland.

Nuur also travels for reasons having to do with political activities related to his region of origin in Somalia. In 2010, he spent 3 weeks in the US as a representative for Switzerland at the annual gathering of a diaspora association that supports the political and economic development of a region in Somalia.2

A third reason for Nuur's travels is that he recently set up a transnational humanitarian project to support poor people in his region of origin in Somalia. Nuur told me that he initiated the project in Switzerland with a few other people there and then

<sup>2</sup>The use of "diaspora" in the name of this association shows that this term has been appropriated by Somali intellectuals who live in Western countries and want to stay or become politically involved in their region of origin, as Kleist (2008a) has demonstrated.

contacted people to join it, either directly or through people he knew. This network extends in particular to the Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States and the United Arab Emirates. Because he needed to establish a *"*strong*"* and *"*reliable*"* network to carry out the project in Somalia, he actively involved people from his extended kin group who, unlike him, had contact with influential people in the region, "elders who are there and through whom we can intervene and settle problems". He recently travelled to Somalia for the first time since he had left the country when he was a child to witness the progress of the project for himself. I know from email exchanges that he has been back there at least a couple of times since then.

Last but not least, mobility is a way for Nuur to maintain and reinforce his family and kin networks. He regularly visits members of his family who live in different places in Europe and North America. Furthermore, at the beginning of the 2010s he married a Somali woman from his extended family who was living in London: I had the opportunity to meet his wife, Mulki, and interview her during one of my stays in Britain. When they married, their plan was that Mulki would join him in Switzerland, but for various reasons she was only able to do so 2 years later. During that time, Mulki became pregnant and had a child, which created an additional reason for Nuur to travel to London frequently.

Nuur's experience of star-shaped mobility is varied and allows him to develop economic, political and social activities and networks, and to navigate in a transnational space that involves four continents while maintaining a strong anchorage in his city of residence. Importantly, his mobility is characterised by an embedding in strong and extended kin (clan) networks. This is not the case for all mobility practices, as Aman's biography shows.

#### **2.2.1.2 Aman**

Aman is a woman in her early forties who lives in Switzerland with her husband and their five children. She left Somalia at the beginning of the war and arrived in Switzerland in 1990 at the age of 20. Although she was about to study medicine when she left Somalia, she was unable to pursue that goal in Switzerland and now works as a freelance interpreter. This professional situation is quite precarious because it does not guarantee fixed employment or income, but its flexible character gives Aman more freedom to travel. She was naturalised in the mid-2000s, and having a Swiss passport has given her greater freedom of movement. She started to visit close family members and friends who live in different places, some of whom she had not been able to visit before she became Swiss:

The first time I travelled [after obtaining Swiss citizenship], I went to the United States, to visit my brother and my mother, whom I had not seen for 17 years. It was the first time that my kids met her. I saw the entire family, people I used to know who now live there. Then I went to Dubai to visit my brother, whom I had also not seen for 17 years. I did not know his kids, only by phone and from pictures. And yes, I took the opportunity – I went to Holland to visit my cousin. [Semi-structured interview, recorded]

Star-shaped mobility is a strategic way of conciliating transnational activities with domestic or work responsibilities in one's main country of residence. Aman plans her travels according to school holidays and her own professional duties. When I met her, she always travelled with her children, but not systematically with her husband, who was still in the process of becoming naturalised. Talking about her first trip to the US, she recalls:

It was the first trip I made, but I was lost. You lose the sense of travelling when you don't travel. It had been 17 years since I had left. At first it was a little hard, but good. […] But it's a long way from here to the United States, it's an eight-hour time difference, and with three children, and a change in New York, where there are so many people, it was… [she stops. J: "It was a big trip…."]. Yes, a very big trip [laughs], and it was the first time. Everyone told me: "You're brave, [to do that] with young children!" [Semi-structured interview, recorded]

However, while travelling with her children is difficult, she mentions that it also has advantages, since it allows her to bring additional luggage, which she sometimes uses to carry goods for other people. Indeed, while she stresses the social dimension of her mobility (visiting family and friends), she concedes that she brings social and material goods with her and her children. Travellers are often asked by less-mobile Somalis to bring gifts, letters and even small amounts of money (although Aman refuses to carry money) to their kin members or friends who live in other parts of the world. Information is another important good circulated by mobile people. Aman recalls having reconnected cousins who had lost touch after leaving Somalia. These kinds of services, performed through mobility, contribute to establishing wider local and transnational networks and thus transform mobility capital into social capital. Aman told me how being in other countries created opportunities to meet with new people:

What is good is that people invite you. When you do these little favours, they thank you and invite you for dinner. And that creates new connections. [Semi-structured interview, recorded]

But Aman, like other women, does not limit what she transports to non-economic goods. On her return trips to Switzerland, she uses her luggage allowance to bring products she sells to her network of mostly Somali women. Her informal business activities involve items desired by Somalis that are hard to find in Switzerland: traditional clothing for everyday life or special events such as weddings, jewellery, decorative objects, curtains or food. But they may also involve global products such as electronic devices or computer games. Although her business activities remain limited and do not constitute her main source of income, Aman's transnational starshaped mobility contributes to her economic strategy.

In sum, star-shaped mobility practices are characterised by frequent to very frequent travels to a multiplicity of places, which sometimes include the country of origin. While Nuur's mobility practices seem to increasingly include a particular region in Somalia, both his and Aman's travels take them to a variety of other places. Furthermore, this first ideal type, unlike some of the others, does not involve a change in the main place of residence. For both Nuur and Aman, their city of residence constitutes the centre of the star: they have resided there for a long time; their close family lives there; they are employed and earn money there. However, they undertake regular trips out of the country, which connect them to places and networks and allow them to develop activities in parallel to those they are committed to in their main country of residence.

#### *2.2.2 Pendular Mobility*

The second ideal type of mobility is constituted of regular to-and-fro movements between two countries, with medium to long stays in each. Each of the meaningful places is characterised by some kind of local anchorage and associated with specific spheres (for instance, family, education, work, political activities). Pendulum-like mobility practices have attracted the attention of many researchers (see above), who have shown that people who move to and fro between two locations can benefit from opportunities located in two different places.

In many cases, pendular mobility takes place between the country of migration and the country of origin, either as a form of mobility *alternative* to permanent migration, as with the Polish women who commute to Germany studied by Morokvasic (1999, 2003), or as a strategy developed *after* sedentary migration, for instance after retirement. Given my theoretical interest, I have focused here on the second type, which involves people who can be thought of as having a "dual residence". In the literature, the country of origin is almost always one of the involved countries – and I have indirectly heard of such cases in my study as well. However, Farhan's pendular mobility practices demonstrate that such is not always the case.3

#### **2.2.2.1 Farhan**

Farhan is a man in his forties who resides part-time in Switzerland, part-time in Britain. Coming from a middle-class family in Mogadishu, he interrupted his tertiary education when he left Somalia 20 years ago. He arrived on his own in Switzerland and became a Swiss citizen some 15 years later. After his arrival as a young and single man, he made a point of investing in higher education: working in an unskilled job, he first took private French lessons he financed himself, and later, thanks to his savings, entered a private school for 2 years to obtain his *maturité* (upper secondary diploma needed to pursue tertiary education). After 4 more years of working part-time and studying at university, he got his degree and found a job in the field he graduated in.

In the early 2000s, he married a Somali woman living in London with whom he has since had four children. Since his marriage, to-and-fro movements between Britain and Switzerland have shaped his life. During the first 8 years, Farhan kept

<sup>3</sup>Farhan's biography is analysed in further detail in Chap. 4.

studying and working in Switzerland, spending as much time as he could with his family in London. Finishing his studies and obtaining a Swiss passport facilitated his regular movements: together, they meant increased financial means and the end to visa requirements. During this period, he worked long shifts (including night shifts) for 3 weeks and spent every 4th week in London.

In 2008, he moved to London to live with his wife and children. Despite his happiness at being reunited with his family, his working conditions and career prospects, which were constrained by his limited knowledge of English, never satisfied him. A couple of years later, he started penduling again, dividing his life between a job in the same Swiss institution he had been at 3 years earlier and his family in London, spending about half of his time in each location. Furthermore, although he admits that commuting between the two countries is sometimes demanding, he also repeatedly told me about projects he had in mind that would require him to travel between Europe and Africa in a similar way, but with longer stays. For example, during one of our discussions while he was living in London, Farhan told me:


This quotation illustrates Farhan's utilitarian approach to mobility, which enables him to take advantage of two places, both of which require his physical presence if he wants to attain his various goals. The transnational field in which he navigates offers him several diverse opportunities, and only by travelling to and fro can he make use of them. The Swiss labour market offers him better opportunities in terms of income and working conditions, while London is in his eyes a better place for his family: his wife finds herself in a familiar environment, which allows her to manage their children's activities; his children have access to the kind of education he wants for them, which includes the Somali language and religious education. Britain also represents a way for Farhan to, in his own words, "get closer to Somalia": in the last couple of years, he has come into contact with a few highly educated Somali men who live in London with whom he holds regular intellectual discussions about global political issues, especially the situation in Somalia. He mentions missing such debates in Switzerland and hopes that his participation in this informal group will eventually lead to future concrete projects in Somalia. Although he is in close contact with his sisters, brothers and other family members in Somalia, Farhan has never returned there in the 20 years since he left, and he does not intend to return permanently. Yet he repeatedly mentioned his wish to "contribute" to his country of origin, to be involved in its development in some way. His two cities of residence, one in Switzerland, the other in Britain, have become places with specific meanings for Farhan: while he speaks the local language, has developed work-related networks and has a skilled job in Switzerland, much of his social life is now located in Britain.

Farhan is the only person in my sample who systematically undertakes pendular mobility (although I have heard indirect accounts of others who do so). His story demonstrates particularly well the characteristics of this type of cross-border mobility, which involves regular movement between two places and, generally, medium stays in each one. While to-and-fro movements typically link the individual's country of immigration and country of origin, Farhan's movement demonstrates that they can also involve a location other than the country of origin. The distinctive feature of this type of movement is that it adds to a first main place of residence a second one, and that social actors are strongly anchored in both places at the same time.

#### *2.2.3 Secondary Migration*

People who undertake secondary migration – the third ideal type – leave a first country of residence to which they had migrated and in which they had settled for another one that is not their country of origin, where they also settle. In other words, "secondary movers" change their main place of residence. In many cases, they retain some kind of connection with their previous country of residence, which they may visit regularly. Secondary movements may thus lead the previous country of residence to become part of an individual's mobility system.

As already mentioned, a significant number of Somali migrants is known to undertake regular or irregular secondary movements from a first country of arrival in Europe to another one (Van Liempt 2011a; Lindley and Van Hear 2007; Bang Nielsen 2004; Ahrens et al. 2014). In Switzerland, this phenomenon is rather rare: among my respondents in Switzerland, for example, a small number had lived in Italy before moving onward. Among my respondents in Britain, in contrast, about half had lived in another European country (Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland or France) before moving on to Britain. Furthermore, I heard of many cases of transnational marriages, sometimes among my informants, sometimes among their relatives or acquaintances. In most cases, these marriages included the secondary migration of one of the spouses (not necessarily the woman). In Switzerland, I met two women who had left Britain to join their husbands.

Hani's story below is not totally typical of European Somali movers: while, like many, she moved from a first country of residence in mainland Europe to Britain, her trajectory included an additional secondary move to a non-European country in between.

#### **2.2.3.1 Hani**

Hani is a woman in her forties who had been living in London for 5 years when I met her. She has five children and is separated from her husband. When she fled Somaliland in the late 1980s with her two oldest children, she settled in Denmark, where she gave birth to her other children, started university and became involved in an association that supports migrants. As a member of one of the first Somali families to settle there, she soon became, in her words, "the Somali women community leader". In 2002, however, she decided to move with her children and husband to the UAE, to pursue her academic education. Hani explained that she had had some difficulties in completing her studies in Denmark, where she did not have any relatives, while having to look after five young kids. But she had cousins in the UAE who could help her. In other words, the UAE offered her some opportunities Denmark did not. Her secondary move, although intended to help her graduate, was sustained by a transnational gendered arrangement.

After having obtained an MBA, her life took a new turn because she decided to come back to Europe, but to use her EU citizenship to settle in a new place: London. Here too, specific motivations guided her decision to leave her place of residence and choose Britain as a new place to settle:

Education was expensive there [in the UAE], and I couldn't afford the education fees for all my children. And it was not easy to get visas to stay, and it was difficult to find a job too. But the main reason was that my mum was very old, and she was living here in the UK. Actually, I came to visit my mum here, and I saw she was in bad health and very lonely. I saw some opportunities here, free education for my children, and I decided to come here. [Semi-structured interview, notes]

After 3 years in the UAE, Hani's resources were insufficient to allow her to remain there: among other things, the cost of private education, the lack of a stable legal status and – perhaps relatedly – difficulties in accessing the labour market despite her diploma pushed her to re-evaluate her situation. In the meantime, visits to Britain opened some new doors for her, as these cross-border movements allowed her to perceive new "opportunities" as well as her mother's needs. Hani's sister, who had been living in the Netherlands until then, also undertook a secondary move to be near their mother and benefit from opportunities offered by London, including, according to Hani, the freedom to practice Islam, the availability of Somali food and other things "from the homeland", the proximity of other Somali people and the opportunity to practice English, an international language perceived as useful anywhere in the world.

Hani was very keen on presenting herself as a "very active" woman involved, in particular, in associational activities aimed at other migrants. As with other respondents, while her activities in her first (European) country of residence addressed migrants in general, she later came to focus specifically on Somalis – in her case Somali women – when she settled in Britain. The large Somali population and Britain's multicultural policies (which focus on ethnic groups' rights) certainly constitute part of the explanation. Hani also undertook a couple of visits to Somaliland after having relocated to Britain: she states that those visits have allowed her to identify the needs of vulnerable women "there and here", reinforced her commitment to this particular population and led her to take new initiatives. After her first visit, she enrolled in courses for "community interpreters" and "health advocates". After the second one, she decided to open up her own organisation, active in both Somaliland and London.

Hani has retained strong connections with her first place of residence in Europe, Denmark, where she lived for 13 years. In particular, she is in close contact with many of her friends there, whom she visits regularly. Furthermore, her children's father returned to Denmark after their stay in the UAE, and she foresees that some of her children may want to go back to their place of birth at some stage. The links she has created with different places over the years emerged in the spatial interview, when I asked her to comment on the places she had mentioned as important (i.e. Somaliland, Denmark and Britain):

Hopefully, I will go back to Somaliland one day when my children are grown up. I could settle there. Or I don't know, settle there and come back to visit them. Or I could also maybe stay with them here [in London] or in Denmark. I don't know. Because my children might choose to live here or in Denmark. [Spatial interview, notes]

In sum, the main characteristics of this type of post-migration mobility are a single move away from the main place of residence, followed by a long stay and a concrete anchorage in the place of destination. Furthermore, the move involves two countries, neither of which is the country of origin: if the change of residence involves the country of origin, we are then dealing with return, discussed below.

#### *2.2.4 Temporary Visits to the Country of Origin*

The fourth type of mobility consists of regular movements to the region of origin in order to visit relatives, check on one's property, carry out business or work, be involved in local politics or implement a humanitarian or development project. The regularity of the movements and the length of the stays in the region of origin may vary, and they also change over time. This definition is consistent with the growing body of literature on migrants' return to their country of origin, which has grasped the complex and diverse processes involved, including, in many instances, repeated or circular movements (see for instance Stefansson 2004; Black and King 2004; Sinatti 2011; Sagmo 2015; Oeppen 2013). King (2000), for example, acknowledges that migration and return are increasingly seen "as part of wider ongoing processes of global mobility". In a study on Somalilanders who returned to their country of origin, Hansen (2007) refers to these movements as "revolving returns" to capture their mobile character.

Among my respondents were people who either regularly visit their place of origin or have undertaken longer but temporary "returns". Most of them return to Somaliland, in rarer cases to other parts of Somalia. For all of them, obtaining a passport from their country of residence was a prerequisite to being able to travel

there. Awa's story illustrates how regular returns may strengthen social and symbolic links to the "homeland".

#### **2.2.4.1 Awa**

Awa is a 35-year-old woman who lives in London and describes herself as an "activist". She was a teenager when she arrived in the Netherlands with her family. In Amsterdam, she studied, worked and became involved in refugee and integration issues.

She had travelled to Somaliland a couple of times before, but a specific trip in 2001 (to participate in the making of a documentary) took on a particular meaning for her: she recalls that having been away from her main place of residence for 2 months changed the perception she had of it and of her life there, allowing her to "have some distance" from it. That is when she made the sudden decision to move to London and settle there. This particular trip to Somaliland – which would be followed by others – set the ground for her decision to use her European passport to undertake a secondary move to London. Since this move, Awa has been a part-time teacher, but most of her time is dedicated to organising important cultural events in London and Somaliland (and sometimes the Netherlands) through the association she set up. She is involved in many associational activities in Britain, but also in the Netherlands, where she still feels her friend, work and political networks are strong, in some cases even stronger than in Britain.

In recent years, she has been travelling to Somaliland (and sometimes to neighbouring countries) more and more regularly, and always for long periods of time (1–2 months). In 2010, a Dutch media organisation commissioned her to travel there to explore the possibility of setting up a Somali "diaspora radio" network composed of local Somali radio stations in the region. She also went to Somaliland during the recent elections as a member of a team of international observers. But the most important reason for her travel to Somaliland over the last few years is the organisation of a yearly cultural event. This event is transnational in many ways: it targets the local population, but also Somalilanders who live abroad: as Awa told me, it is held in the summer so that the "diaspora can easily come". The festival is organised jointly by Awa's London-based organisation and a Norwegian-based organisation of a friend of hers, and with the funding support of organisations based in different European countries.

However, although Awa sometimes refers to Somaliland as "home", she has never permanently lived there, even though part of her family was originally from there. Before leaving for Europe in the late 1980s, she and her family had lived in different places in southern Somalia. To her, returning to her "place of origin" is thus more about building a different future than re-enacting some kind of lost mythical past (see Stefansson 2004 on that topic; Darieva 2011). When I mentioned the fact that she has never lived there, she answered:

Eh, no, but I think the last eight years that I've been working here and there, especially the last two or three years that I have been going more often, I have felt a sense of injustice dumped on these people. So I think that has influenced me a lot. […] I think many people go there and see that's what the country is like, and they come back and think, "Oh my God, I haven't been advocating enough for them, so who am I to blame anyone else?" I think that going back and forth has shaped people's identity. [Semi-structured interview, recorded]

Later on in the same interview, I asked her if she thought she would 1 day live permanently in Somaliland. She answered:

Again, I'm not from there. So no, no. […] If I feel I can't do this in Hargeisa anymore, for me it's not interesting to live in Hargeisa. It's about: what can you really contribute? And really, increasingly, for me, Somaliland youth and Somaliland are becoming a priority in my life, in one way or another. It's the most important thing for me now, at this particular moment. And they are really amazing kids. But so few opportunities, so few opportunities. [Semi-structured interview, recorded]

Awa's "revolving return" practices illustrate that regular visits or temporary returns to one's homeland can take many forms, and that they are complex and often ambivalent processes. Moreover, as with the other types of mobility practices, temporary visits to the country of origin exert a (sometimes powerful) influence on present and future life conditions and projects in the individual's main country of residence. Despite the multiplicity of forms this type of post-migration mobility practice can take, its distinctive feature is the frequency of the moves, which are always to and from to the country of origin, and without a change in the main place of residence. Although the country of origin may become increasingly meaningful in the lives of migrants who practice regular returns, as is the case for Awa, the country of immigration remains the place where they live and work most of the time.

#### *2.2.5 Definitive Return*

My sample has been designed to include only people whose main country of residence at the time of the interviews was either Switzerland or Britain. For this reason, I have not been able to meet anyone who had definitively returned to their country of origin after having lived in Europe for some time. The literature on Somali (and other) migrants describes this practice (Fink-Nielsen et al. 2004; Hansen 2008; Kleist 2007), and I have indirectly heard of people returning "for good" during my fieldwork, especially in Britain. Whole families may return, but the splitting of the family in different places and a "staggered return" (Fink-Nielsen et al. 2004), i.e. the move of only some members at first, are common practices. For instance, a respondent told me about her brother's wife and children, who had returned to and settled in Somaliland, while their husband and father had stayed in Europe and provided for them economically. A socioeconomically satisfying return was rendered possible by splitting the family up, which allowed them to benefit from the varied opportunities offered by different contexts: economic means in Europe and educational opportunities for the children (according to my respondent's account) in Somaliland.

The qualifying term "definitive" is not meant to suggest that returnees do not visit their previous country of residence: they often do visit their previous country of residence, where they may have family and friends, to spend time with them. "Definitive" refers instead to a change in the main place of residence: the country of origin becomes the main place of residence of returning migrants.

Even though no illustrative case studies can be used here, definitive return constitutes a specific type of post-migration mobility practice that cannot be left out of the typology. It consists of a single move to a new place of residence (as in secondary migration), but the destination is the country of origin.

#### *2.2.6 Immobility*

Even though this typology is about mobility practices, it is necessary to include a sixth ideal type, which concerns people who do not cross borders, or who do so only rarely. In short, their everyday lives and socioeconomic conditions are not conditioned by present or future individual mobility practices. This does not mean, however, that they are not influenced by others' mobility or that they are not anchored in transnational networks. One of the powerful contributions of the idea of the "transnational social field" is that it connects migrants with people who have never moved, i.e. who have stayed in the country of origin (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). This study shows that mobility is also not a necessary condition for remaining part of a transnational social network for people who have migrated.

Immobility may be the result of a constraining legal status in the country of residence: depending on their legal situation, migrants may be forbidden to leave the territory of the nation-state in which they live, or asked to request visas to enter other countries (which nationals would not need to do). Furthermore, refugee status comes with a restriction against travelling to the country of origin. Yet there are other reasons for people to remain immobile, and not all of them are a result of constraints on movement. Avoiding the sedentarist bias should not lead researchers to the opposite extreme of considering immobile people as exceptions whose sedentariness must be justified. Some of my respondents simply told me that they had no reason or desire to move, which is sometimes a sufficient explanation. The two following life stories are very different from one another, yet both are characterised by sedentariness.

#### **2.2.6.1 Imaan**

Imaan left Somalia in 1990 with her parents and siblings to settle in neighbouring Djibouti. Her eldest sister found a way to move to Europe, and in 1996 she financed Imaan's journey to join her in Switzerland, while the rest of the family stayed in Djibouti, where they still live, sustaining themselves with the sisters' remittances.

Imaan's sister has three children and receives social assistance, as a result of which she has not been able to apply for naturalisation. Expectations of Imaan were therefore high, and as soon as she was allowed to work (after completing a year at school, i.e. the last year of compulsory schooling in Switzerland), she started to do so as an unqualified nursing assistant. She tried to pursue further education in nursing but soon gave up, because it meant lowering her income, and perhaps – although she did not mention it explicitly – the economic support she could give to her family. When I first met her, she was eagerly waiting to become naturalised and visit her parents in Djibouti. She became Swiss soon after that meeting, but because she was pregnant, she decided to postpone her travel. She married a French Muslim man and gave birth to her first child. When I last met her a couple of years later, she was pregnant with her second child and not planning to travel to Djibouti for at least 2 more years.

However, since her arrival in Switzerland, Imaan has not been totally immobile. In 2004, she received a temporary residence permit (B Permit), which allowed her to travel to European countries, but only with a visa. In her narrative, crossing borders has been a painful and humiliating experience. When she held this permit, she went to France with friends twice but without a visa; she got caught the second time and was brought back to Switzerland by the police, a situation that infuriated her and made her cry at the time. She also went to London a couple of times to visit one of her good friends who had left to and settled there. She recalls:

I went to Britain in June, but it was really complicated to get the visa. It has become much more complicated than it used to be: they take your fingerprints, photos. I told them I was not going to file an asylum claim there, I don't want to live there, but I had to go through all this. And you need to fill in a form from their website, everything is in English, so you need to find someone who understands. And then you get an appointment, and you cannot change it; you have to go on the day they tell you. Otherwise you need to start everything over again. And despite all this, every time I arrive there [at the airport's customs], they search me. Once it took me an hour to go through customs there! I had arrived at 10 p.m. and when I got out it was midnight! I'm fed up with this; it really is too difficult. I am looking forward to going through customs with a Swiss passport. [Semi-structured interview, notes]

In 2011, she, her husband and their baby went to New York on a 2-week holiday because, as she told me, her husband "really wanted to travel" and "had always dreamt of going to New York". She recounts a very difficult trip, partially because she found that travelling with a toddler was not easy. But she again emphasised how difficult it was to go through customs even with a Swiss passport, contrary to her expectations. Imaan believes she was treated differently from other travellers, including her husband – she was searched more thoroughly and asked to go through special x-ray scanners – because of her appearance:

I told my husband, "You see: they are racist". I am Somali. Is it only Somali people who do silly things [*faire des bêtises*]? I am veiled. Is it only Muslim people who do silly things? I'm off to a bad start! [*Je suis mal barrée*] [She laughs] […] In the end, we went through, but it was not easy. [Semi-structured interview, notes]

Imaan's husband's professional situation is quite precarious at the moment. Although she hopes it will improve and would like to reduce the amount of time she

works, she works full-time at a clinic and tells me how hard things have become, stressing the fatigue, stress and general lack of time to do the things she used to do before she had a child. When I met her the second time, I asked her about the people she had mentioned when I had met her before her marriage: it appears that she is finding it hard to maintain her social relationships, both in her city of residence (not finding the time to see her friends and acquaintances) and transnationally (calling her family in Djibouti and her close friend in Britain less frequently). Imaan finds herself in a situation in which she provides economically for her parents in Djibouti and for her family in Switzerland and is responsible for most of the domestic duties. This situation, related to her gendered and classed position in Switzerland and transnationally, also influences her relationship to mobility. Imaan has never had the resources necessary to be mobile, because of her legal status, a lack of money and time and "technical" reasons (due to her pregnancy and young child). Her recurring negative experience in crossing borders and travelling also influence her relationship to mobility. Stuck in a position where managing her life (and that of her family) is a difficult enough challenge, she does not see mobility as something she could benefit from.

#### **2.2.6.2 Nadifa**

Nadifa is a woman in her forties who arrived in London with relatives 25 years ago and has remained there since. She had studied computing science and become a college teacher before she met her British husband and became pregnant:

And when I had my first child, I couldn't work so I started helping Somaliland. [Semistructured interview, recorded]

From then on, she became involved in many different "diaspora organisations", as she calls them, that support development projects in Somaliland, organise conferences in London with representatives from the Somaliland authorities and advocate for the international recognition of an independent Somaliland, but also for the recognition of a specific Somaliland identity in Britain. Over the years, she has also developed a very strong discourse regarding the specificities and importance of her "homeland", its "people", "history", "traditions" and above all "culture". During our two encounters, Nadifa offered me a homogenising, often essentialised, vision of Somaliland and Somalilanders, maybe thinking that that was what I was expecting. For instance, she often used the pronoun "we" even to answer personal questions. However, when I insisted on knowing more about her personal trajectory, a different picture emerged. This is illustrated in the next two quotations about mobility. The first time I met Nadifa, it was during a joint interview with her and Cabdulahi, a man who is also very involved in activities that address London's Somaliland population. We were discussing return.

N. It's a bit like Israel; you know, all Israelis want to go back. It's a bit like that for us: everybody thinks about home in Somaliland.


The gap between her discourse of a collective "we" and her personal relationship with return is striking, as she is a counter-example to the romanticised picture she paints. The second time I met her, we had more time to talk about her personal trajectory. At some stage, I asked her how often she travelled back to Somaliland, assuming that, because of her daily involvement with issues related to Somaliland and Somalilanders, this was a more adequate question than the more simple "Have you ever been back to Somaliland?" I was stunned by her answer and my false assumptions:


My clumsy insistence made Nadifa feel embarrassed and attempt to justify her nonmobility. The discrepancy between her highly transnational identification, connections and practices, on the one hand, and her sedentary lifestyle, on the other, illustrates that the former do not necessarily go hand and in hand with mobility. While Imaan's transnational networks and commitments are very limited, Nadifa's constitute an important part of her activities. However, both women have organised their lives without cross-border mobility. Interestingly, these women are among the few people I met who are married to people who are not originally from Somalia. While no conclusion can be made from this similarity, it is interesting that both women partially justify their lack of mobility through their gendered responsibilities and implicate their husbands in (some of) their decisions not to travel. Nadifa's transnational involvement grew stronger when she became a mother, but getting married and having children have kept her from visiting the country she still calls "home" after 25 years. As for Imaan, she has kept postponing her trip to Djibouti, where her parents live, because of her pregnancies and the difficulties of travelling with a toddler, but also her husband's wish to travel to the United States.

Immobility constitutes a peculiar type in the typology: it is characterised by very few to no cross-border movements, and, for people who are legally able to travel, by the absence of a desire to be mobile. A sedentary lifestyle, however, does not exclude the possibility of strong transnational connections to places and people across borders.

#### *2.2.7 A Visual Recap and Concluding Remarks*

From the short biographies in this chapter, it is clear that the mobile women and men I met do not correspond specifically to any single ideal type. Indeed, the typology I have developed does not correspond to types of people, but to types of practices. Migrants may practice different types of movement at different points in their lives. From some of the stories above, it also appears that one type of movement often sets the basis for other types of mobility. For instance, a secondary movement from Continental Europe to London may involve a stronger connection and identification with the country of origin, leading to the start and intensification of visits there. In other instances, one type of mobility may transform into another type: this is the case, for instance, when people regularly visit their place of origin, each time extending their stay, until the point where they divide their lives between the two places, regularly moving to and fro: they have shifted from the "temporary returns" type of movement to "pendular mobility".

These six types of mobility differ in terms of: (1) the frequency of the movements undertaken (from the absence of cross-border movements to a single move to very frequent moves); (2) the duration of the stay(s) in the destination (from short stays to settlement); (3) the places to which people move (only the country of origin, only a third country, neither of them or both of them); and (4) whether they entail a change in the main place of residence for the mover. A table summarising these dimensions is included in Chap. 5. Figure 2.1 presents a visual recap of the six ideal types.

#### **2.3 Activities on the Move**

The descriptions of different types of mobility practices and the illustrative case studies indicate that repeated border crossing is far from unusual among many of the respondents. Awa's words about "people [who] move for reasons" (in the Introduction) resonated in my head for a long time. She was referring in particular to Somalis' propensity to undergo secondary movements (a topic that was being discussed in academic and political circles in Britain at the time), but her comment fits any of the types of mobility described above. In this section, I want to focus on the different types of activities that migrants may undertake through transnational mobility. While the focus remains on individual motivations, I also acknowledge some of the structuring institutions and contexts within which those activities take

place. Local and global economies, labour markets and political environments intervene in shaping opportunities and constraints for people on the move. So do extended transnational families.

Several authors discuss different areas of transnational practices, distinguishing in particular between sociocultural, economic, political and, more recently, religious practices (see for instance Al-Ali et al. 2001; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Vertovec 2009). There are obvious similarities between their categories and my own, but they do not overlap entirely.

Naturally, a given move is often motivated by more than one reason: people travel, cross borders, settle in the destination or not, while carrying on multiple activities. Moreover, while some activities are carefully planned, others are the result of opportunities that may not have been foreseen. The sections below describe the main activities respondents carry out while moving, describing the specificities of each one. Based on illustrative quotations from respondents, they illuminate the fundamental importance of physical presence in other places for transnational activities to be successful. Mobility is not essential to transnational practices, but, as this study demonstrates, cross-border movements are an important asset for those who wish to fruitfully mobilise transnational connections and identifications.

#### *2.3.1 Maintenance and Reinforcement of Personal Social Networks*

The desire to maintain or foster personal social networks, in particular those involving immediate or extended family members, is an important reason for people to undertake cross-border movements. Aman mentioned her wish to see her mother, brother and cousins after 17 years of separation. Nuur travels to different places to "recreate" kin networks with the aim of supporting his transnational projects. Farhan spends half of his time in London, where his wife and children live. Secondary movements are also often motivated by the wish to reunite with close family members. Many of the people in this study are members of transnational families, with parents, siblings, children, cousins and grandparents who live in different parts of the world, and they have often kept in touch with them (see also Horst 2007; Al-Sharmani 2010).

People visit each other during holidays or long weekends, and hospitality is emphasised by respondents, who nonetheless often have ambivalent feelings about it: visitors are expected to stay at their relatives' place, sometimes at the expense of their own autonomy, while local families are expected to host visitors even when it is sometimes difficult and costly to do so, especially when large families are travelling. Weddings are central events in the lives of many transnational families, since they are opportunities for people who are in a position to travel to meet with each other: Abdulkadir, a 30-year-old man who lives in Switzerland, told me about a

recent trip he made to the Netherlands with his wife to attend a relative's wedding. I asked him whether it was important for him to be there:

Eh, yes, important. Because we got the invitation, and that's usually the only time you can meet your relatives. We can all be in the same place, families from Denmark, families from Holland, from Britain. And we are from Switzerland and we also came. […] That's why I say weddings are good, but they are also good for meeting with others. So you go there, there are 200 people, and that's what gives you the opportunity to meet each other. […] My wife didn't want to come, but I encouraged her to look at things from this angle, that we go there for a wedding, but that we also participate in this annual meeting. Even though it can be twice or three times a year. […] Personally I try to see a little beyond […] and ask myself about the impact that being there at the wedding might have, what information we could deploy, what encounters we could have, what matters we could discuss. [Spatial interview, recorded]

Abdulkadir's comments demonstrate that family and personal networks are flexible rather than static: they are evolving, expanding and retracting structures rather than bounded ones (Brettell 2000). Further, social actors actively participate in shaping their personal networks, maintaining or reinforcing links, creating new ones and letting others weaken. Although recent communication technologies (such as the Internet and Skype) are increasingly used, being able to physically meet with other people is an important way through which social actors "manage" these networks and negotiate their positions within them, as Abdulkadir's emphasis on weddings as an opportunity for physical encounters shows. For Aman too, mobility is a way to expand her transnational social networks: while travelling, she meets new people, does them favours and adds them to her list of potential future contacts.

Family gatherings are also valued because they transmit existing networks to the next generation. Some respondents emphasised the importance of passing on some aspects of Somali "culture" or "tradition". In our discussion about the importance of weddings, Abdulkadir said:

When we arrive there [at the wedding], when we bring our children along, they also learn the tradition, how it works and how it happens at a big party. And many children, if you don't have them participate at these gatherings, then they might be put off by those things. They might say, "Yeah, you always do it the same way. Somalis, you yell, you do those things. Weddings here are not like that. Why don't you do it like it's done here?" And that is what I didn't want. When I grew up here, I thought like that: I would never have gone to a Somali wedding. But now that I am on the right side, I want to tell them, "This is how it is". And when I talk with my circle of relatives and friends, with my wife, I tell them that this is also what we gain from it. [Spatial interview, recorded]

Abdulkadir spent his adolescence in a Swiss foster family and learnt only later about the Somali "traditions" he refers to, and he feels he missed something he doesn't want his own children to grow up without. Attending family gatherings is thus also a way to reinforce identities based on people's place of origin, and to make sure that part of it is also passed on to the next generation.

Physical mobility allows people to meet with those they love, to create or recreate emotional as well as utilitarian ties and to negotiate their positioning in complex transnational power hierarchies. However, the relationships in transnational families involve tensions and conflicts as well as obligations and reciprocity. Collective decisions, for instance, are made regarding the financing and arranging of family members' mobility (see also Al-Sharmani 2010). Nuur described himself as being largely involved in those transnational discussions regarding relatives' migration out of Africa. He told me, for instance, about a cousin whose migration to Europe was being debated within the extended family:

He has been waiting for many years; the family has imposed an embargo on him so he could not get out. This means that no one will give him the money to leave. The money to feed him, yes, but not the money to leave the country and come to Europe. [Biographical interview, recorded]

Those members of the family who have migrated and obtained a high position within transnational networks have the power to impose decisions on others' ability to cross borders. According to Al-Sharmani (2010), these (gendered) transnational family arrangements are based on financial resources, parental authority, considerations regarding family-care responsibilities and knowledge regarding how to facilitate movements (see also Engebrigtsen 2011). The desire or need to maintain and reinforce family bonds (and sometimes non-familial ones) thus constitutes an important incentive for people to move. Simultaneously, extended transnational families – and the internal power hierarchies within them – act as structuring elements of both mobility and immobility.

#### *2.3.2 Business Activities*

Respondents who engage in cross-border mobility practices are also sometimes involved in transnational trade. Aman's and Nuur's involvement in informal business activities is based on their star-shaped mobility, which allows them to buy products in other places, bring them back to Europe and sell them on the informal market there. Their activities are based on global economic disparities, as well as on the demand created by migrants settled in Europe.

There are important differences regarding entrepreneurial possibilities between Switzerland and Britain related to both national legislation and tax regulations and the pool of potential customers. In London, I met a couple of women who own small shops that sell mostly food and/or women's fashion, and a man who had opened a restaurant. They all cater mostly to local Somalis. Only Aziza's entrepreneurial activity (she owns a small fashion boutique) is based on her own regular crossborder mobility practices. She told me that she usually travels to Dubai twice a year to choose the products for her shop:


A: Dubai.


Aziza is clear about the benefit of travelling personally (rather than choosing her goods online or through intermediaries): it allows her to stay informed about the latest fashion and to bring back the best products for a particular segment of the population in London: young girls who want to dress differently from their mothers, but also from other young Londoners. In this sense, Aziza's mobility is a fundamental aspect of her business strategy.

Other respondents told me about their ideas and projects to set up a transnational business. In their accounts, cross-border mobility is also important in helping them make appropriate contacts and acquire first-hand information about opportunities, competition, obstacles and potential business partners. New information and communication technologies open up various business opportunities, but they cannot replace face-to-face contacts, in particular in the early stages of business projects. Shariif, a man in his mid-thirties who lives in London, has travelled to China "at least five times" in the last few years in order to find out about opportunities and make contacts to set up a transnational business specialising in beauty products:

China, I'm thinking this place to start some trading. I'm thinking about this, so that's important. I was considering this place, because this is going to be the most important country in the world. That's what I've seen. I was there three weeks once. I've seen it, all Western factories, business, manufacturing, they make it all in China. From now on, you will see, everything is from China. [Spatial interview, recorded]

He told me that these trips have opened many possibilities, but he made a first attempt by bringing back about 500 units of hair extensions he then sold on eBay. Shariif also spent a few days in Paris with a friend from London to meet with business partners from Dubai, all of whom were originally from Somalia. The transnational nature of this business network is obvious. Shariif's business plans were at a very early stage, but the point here is that they depended on his regular movements to different places.

In sum, mobility is not necessary for all business activities, but it is an important part of some informal or formal transnational trade. Although the Internet is now widely used, some informants told me that they needed to physically travel to obtain information and contacts. Learning about opportunities, acquiring knowledge about products and opportunities and fostering business contacts all require some degree of mobility and face-to-face contact.

Mobile business activities are based on opportunities and constraints situated in local and global economic contexts. Some places are particularly attractive for trade activities – Dubai as a meeting place for businesspeople and a crossroads for trade, or China as the world's (future) dominant economy, for example. Transnational trade is partially structured by informal economic markets with their own rules and hierarchies (Tarrius et al. 2013; MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000), but it is also shaped by customers' demands for specific products and/or cheaper goods. Mobile businesspeople need to compete in these dynamic economic and political contexts for their activities to become profitable.

#### *2.3.3 Work-Related Activities*

As is true for many other people in the world, several respondents cross borders regularly for work-related reasons. On the one hand, people may be attracted by better working conditions or career opportunities in another place, which prompts them to undertake a secondary movement or develop pendular mobility practices. Farhan is in this situation: moving to and fro between London and Switzerland allows him to have a more interesting and better-paid job in Switzerland.

On the other hand, some employers and/or specific types of jobs may require workers to be mobile. These opportunities almost always involve migrants' country or region of origin. For instance, Awa was commissioned by a Dutch organisation to set up and eventually manage a Somali "diaspora radio" (in the end, she refused the job): her task was to travel to Africa and talk to different potential media partners and stakeholders based there and then report to the Dutch organisation. Her involvement in the project, had she stayed, would have required her to travel regularly to Kenya and other places in the Horn of Africa.

In Awa's case, regular temporary returns are a strategy to pursue activities in Africa while living in Europe most of the year. Other respondents had been hired or were actively developing a résumé to fit employment opportunities in what Hansen (2007) critically calls the "development industry". Post-conflict situations often create work opportunities for migrants who have a Western education and work experience along with cultural and linguistic knowledge related to their region of origin (Oeppen 2013; Sagmo 2015). Some of my respondents were well aware that international organisations and NGOs (I have heard in particular of the International Red Cross, the International Organisation for Migration and the United Nations Development Programme) were recruiting people with such profiles.

Yet work-related mobility practices are more often than not based on precarious, temporary contracts with organisations that find an advantage in employing migrants with dual linguistic and cultural knowledge. Hansen (2007) has also found that Somalilanders employed in the "development industry" are often hired on shortterm contracts, although they might cumulate those contracts. Furthermore, the strategic decisions of the international organisations involved remain in the hands of Western professionals, while migrants are generally asked to adhere to the principles of those organisations (Horst 2013; Sinatti and Horst 2015). Mobile migrants who work in post-conflict areas thus face obstacles similar to those they encounter in local labour markets, and they often find themselves in the most precarious and less prestigious levels of these institutions' internal hierarchies.

#### *2.3.4 Voluntary Involvement in Humanitarian and Development Projects in the Region of Origin*

There is often a fine line between work-related activities and other types of involvement in reconstruction, development and humanitarian support in the region of origin. For my purposes, I draw the line between employed and voluntary activities. This section refers to activities aimed at humanitarian relief or development of the country of origin (or a region within it) based on projects developed by the mobile actors themselves, either individually or within a collective unit. Although these projects often benefit from various kinds of funding, the funding cannot be considered to constitute employees' salaries.

While southern Somalia is still politically unstable, Somaliland and, to a lesser extent, Puntland are now engaged in political nation-building, as well as economic, social and cultural reconstruction. These regional differences have an important impact on how migrants position themselves with regard to their involvement in their country of origin. In southern Somalia, their contribution at the moment is largely limited to humanitarian relief and political participation in the (difficult) reconstruction of a democratic state.4 While these processes are also still on-going in Somaliland, further needs have emerged there, and the "diaspora" is increasingly actively involved in developing the region and has high expectations for the future (Hansen 2007; Kleist 2008a; Horst 2017). Furthermore, representatives of Somaliland government and administrative bodies are sometimes present in the countries where members of the "diaspora" community have settled and actively try to reinforce relationships and feelings of belonging, leading to the involvement of "their" nationals settled in the West. Until recently, such outreach efforts from the homeland did not exist simply because there was no state to claim its "diaspora".

My respondents often mentioned their desire or even need to "contribute" to their country of origin. They experience some kind of "moral responsibility" towards their country of origin (Kleist 2008a). The clearest example of mobility related to involvement in the homeland among my respondents is Awa's organisation of a yearly cultural event in Somaliland that aims to improve the wellbeing of local youths. But many of my other respondents are involved in smaller projects to develop their country or region of origin, and many of them use the skills they have acquired in Europe for this purpose. Some people also choose certain career paths in order to develop skills they may be able to use in their country of origin in the future.

<sup>4</sup>Participation in homeland politics is discussed separately in the next section but has important similarities with involvement in humanitarian or developmental projects.

Jawahir is a 34-year-old woman who has lived in Switzerland since she left Africa on her own at the age of 15. Since 2009, she has travelled to Somalia, Somaliland, Canada and Britain to reconnect with her relatives from both her maternal and paternal sides. She is now a skilled technical assistant with a prestigious medical research team in Switzerland. When she first started her studies, she had to choose the fields she wanted to do short-term internships in. She recalls having chosen them "in relation to what I could contribute upon returning to my homeland [*chez moi*]". She was disappointed when, for reasons that had nothing to do with her abilities, she was directed towards another field. However, many years later, she still thinks that her professional skills could be useful in her country of origin:


This extract illustrates different points regarding mobility and the involvement of the "diaspora" in the development and reconstruction of the country of origin. While this involvement does not necessarily require physical mobility, cross-border movements make direct contacts possible, which leads to ideas and concrete projects. First, Jawahir has not planned her project carefully: she develops it according to the various opportunities that arise, including her direct encounter with a representative of the government of Somaliland in Switzerland. Thus, the physical mobility of officials from the homeland – and not only of the migrants themselves – is important in those processes. Second, participation in the homeland sometimes involves travelling there, and mobilising transnational networks that extend beyond the country of origin and the country of destination. In Jawahir's case, her project involves her cousins in Canada, and she physically brought her textbooks to have them translated there. She could have followed a more rational course: she could have sent her documents to her cousins via email; she could also have found a translator in Switzerland; finally, she could have asked her cousins to find an English version of her course materials instead of having hers translated from French. But that is not what she did, which illustrates that other dimensions underlie her actions. It seems important to her to mobilise her personal skills. Further, physical mobility and direct contacts with her relatives are especially important to her: involving her relatives in her project creates a stronger relationship with them, and this relationship is oriented towards their common country of origin. This illustrates both that mobility generally serves more than one aim and that people's involvement in their homeland is complex and multi-layered.

Third, Jawahir mentions the importance of personally moving instead of counting on others' mobility. This issue came up often in the interviews: while some respondents have no choice other than to ask intermediaries to circulate things, in particular information, for them, some who do have the choice believe they are more likely to obtain what they need if they travel themselves.

#### *2.3.5 "Homeland Politics"*

A major concern in the reconstruction of (the different regions of) Somalia is the development of a political apparatus and sustainable governance. The shape that "homeland politics" (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003) takes is varied and relates to the situation in the country of origin. Since some parts of Somalia are still torn by war while others are more stable, the roles of the "diaspora" are diverse and often complex. Its efforts can support reconstruction and nation-building as well as "nationwrecking" (Vertovec 2009) by sustaining the on-going conflict. A significant portion of the Somali population has left the country, and this "diaspora" is very keen on reinforcing its links to its homeland in order to acquire recognition and power (Hansen 2008). This situation is not always perceived positively: for instance, some respondents were critical of mobile political leaders who have Western passports and whose families live in Europe or North America, and they claimed that these leaders do not have any real interest or understanding of the living conditions of people in the country.

There are several ways to participate in homeland politics, from voting from abroad to being involved in elections or constitutional processes (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003), some of which require physical mobility. Awa's involvement as an observer during the recent election process is one such way of participating. Interestingly, Awa was not involved in the political process directly, but as a member of an international external body whose members were of different national origins.

Nuur's involvement in Somali politics is more direct, but it has evolved in the last couple of years. In 2009, he became involved in an association that supported the

government of Puntland, the self-declared autonomous state he is originally from, in their actions. As the president of an association in Switzerland, he took part in a meeting of a transnational organisation that gathered "Puntland intellectuals" from different parts of the world in the US. Other meetings in London and Puntland were planned, but when I met Nuur a year later, his political interests had narrowed geographically: he told me that he was involved in political processes intended to create a new local government, autonomous from Puntland, and mostly based on a regional (and clan-based) identity. At the time, he was mostly participating in large phonebased conferences to this end. However, at the end of 2011, Nuur wrote me an email to tell me he was going to travel to the region to meet the families supported by the humanitarian project he was coordinating, but also because there was a conference there to set up a local government. He was looking forward to meeting "very renowned and very influential people" there.

In the last couple of years, Nuur has thus taken concrete steps to be involved in political processes at different geographical scales, probably based on how accessible they are to him. As other studies have shown (Kleist 2008a, b; Hansen 2007, 2008), the "diaspora" is heavily involved in homeland politics, but Switzerland, where Nuur resides, is not a place where he can access the necessary social networks to enter the political arena. People who could be influential in Somalia in most cases have not settled in Switzerland – and if they did, they left soon afterwards for other countries where they could exercise their power. Mobilising his transnational kin and clan networks and travelling to different places (the US, Britain, Somalia) where meetings are held are important if not indispensable ways for him to enter the game. Positioning himself in the political arena also means meeting these "intellectuals", these "renowned and influential" people who live in different places, and getting known by them.

Involvement in homeland politics does not occur only through transnational networks, however. Nuur, Awa and other respondents involved in transnational political activities (in a wide sense) are usually also involved in political and/or associational activities in their main country of residence. This situation indicates that there is a strong relationship between being incorporated in the country of residence and being involved in transnational political activities, as has been reported widely in the literature (Guarnizo et al. 2003; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003).

Crossing borders allows migrants settled in Europe to pursue different types of activities and to link together different socioeconomic, political and cultural contexts. These activities have been treated separately in this chapter for descriptive purposes. But the case studies demonstrate that there is often a fine line between different types of activities, and that multiple activities are often carried out simultaneously. They also demonstrate that physical mobility is a way for those concerned to circulate various "goods", and to benefit from this circulation. Transnational traders organise the circulation of the products they sell, whether these are clothing, jewellery, furniture, food or electronic devices. Money circulates, formally and informally. Knowledge, information, skills, ideas and norms are acquired in some places and mobilised in others. As Horst (2007) points out, flows of people, money, goods and information are closely interconnected.

#### **2.4 The Places of Mobility**

Mobility is necessarily about linking different places in ways that make sense to the people who undertake these moves, and possibly to others around them. Based on a relational and dynamic understanding of space and place (Cresswell 2004; Löw 2006; Massey 1994; Lussault and Stock 2010), this section discusses the ways in which respondents construct, in their discourses, the various places they consider meaningful in their lives.

"Places" are understood here as specific locations to which people give some kind of meaning, to which they are attached in one way or another (Cresswell 2004). "Localities", in contrast, constitute the contextual background that shapes the opportunities and constraints that migrants face in a transnational social field. Localities provide particular opportunities and create particular constraints to social actors who are differently positioned in transnational social fields (Guarnizo and Smith 1998). Places and localities are closely intertwined, and the relationship between them both is influenced by cross-border movements and further shapes mobility practices.

Stock and Duhamel (2005) distinguish two ways in which people relate to the relevant places in their mobility system: symbolically and functionally. The symbolic dimension involves people's feelings of belonging to a place, of being part of it, whether they are physically there or not, and identification with it. The functional dimension involves the qualities of the place in relation to the practice of specific activities: places offer resources from which individuals in specific social positions can benefit in their varied activities. In the next sections, I will discuss first the different relationships that respondents in this study have developed with their main place of residence in Europe, and then contrast it to the dynamically (re)constructed idea of a naturalised "place of origin".

#### *2.4.1 The Main Place of Residence: "Where I Put My Pillow"*

I define the main place of residence as the place where respondents have established themselves and taken up permanent legal residence. Permanency does not mean that a change to the place of residence is excluded in the future; it refers to the length of the stay in one place, reflected for instance in renting an apartment long term, buying property, holding a local job, enrolling children at school or participating in local associational or political life. Not surprisingly, since my sample is constituted of people who have resided in Europe for at least a decade, respondents refer to feeling comfortable in an environment they master, of having acquired the necessary knowledge and connections to move easily and freely in this environment. This feeling of being concretely anchored in their place of residence is also expressed through references to a possible future in this place.

Many respondents define the relevance of their place of residence in a very pragmatic way. Some, for instance, point to their physical presence in this place at a particular time. Nuur describes the place where he lives as "my city, my current life". Others mention their place of residence as their "base", which implies that it is a kind of anchorage point in a system that includes other places. Mobility scholars have referred to this anchorage point with terms such as "centre of gravity" (Hägerstrand 1969) and – in French – "résidence-base" (Domenach and Picouet 1987).

This pragmatic and present-based relationship to the place of residence is also illustrated by Safia, a woman in her early forties who lived in other European countries before settling in a suburban area of London: she explained why she considers England an important place:

This is where I am. Someone once said that home is where you put your pillow. Well, [name of the neighbourhood] is where I put my pillow; it is my home. [Spatial interview, notes]

The functional dimension (Stock and Duhamel 2005) of one's relationship to one's place of residence is also very present in the accounts of many respondents, who explicitly mention the importance of a place for what it offers them: educational opportunities for themselves or their children, the freedom to live their life as they want, good social assistance and peace, among other things. Jamac is a 55-yearold man living in London who compares his life in the UK with other places he has lived in and liked (Somalia, Dubai and Italy):

London always is my base. Regardless of the weather, or the fact that there's no nightlife, I cannot run from the truth. At my age, I need the health services, the check-ups. And my children are here: they know more English than Somali. [Spatial interview, notes]

Respondents have also developed (often ambiguous) feelings of belonging and identifying with their place of residence (which Stock and Duhamel refer to as the symbolic dimension). These migrants express some kind of emotional attachment to the place they live in, often stating that they "like" or even "love" it. Like Safia above, some people consider this place "home", yet in most cases balance these positive feelings either by restricting them to a specific time ("this is my home for now") or by immediately contrasting this home to another, more deeply meaningful one, mostly the place of origin (for instance by calling it "my second home").

These positive feelings are often mitigated by feelings of not being fully accepted by the host society. As in other recent studies about Somalis in Europe (Valentine and Sporton 2009; Valentine et al. 2009), respondents feel that they are being denied an identity as "Swiss", "British" or simply European. Faysal, who has lived in Switzerland for more than 20 years and says he feels comfortable in his everyday life, explained how he has slowly pulled back on his effort to fully belong. The increasingly hostile political climate with regard to foreigners in general and Muslims in particular has led him to reinvest in an identification he feels he cannot be denied:

So it's better to try and go back home before you…. You need to not forget yourself, here or elsewhere. I tell people, you need to not forget yourself here, because… we have this saying: nothing can cover you but your own soil. That means that even if you try to resemble, resemble here, you are always confronted by reality. [Semi-structured interview, recorded]

Expressions of negative feelings towards one's place of residence, largely based on local exclusionary practices, are often contrasted to a genuine belonging to one's place of origin. This is made explicit in the quotation above with terms like "home", "we" (referring to Somalis or Somalilanders) and the very strong "your own soil", to which one wants to return after one's death, naturalising the link between people and their place of origin (Malkki 1992).

#### *2.4.2 The Place of Origin: "Where I Come From"*

For most respondents, their place of origin is an unquestionable and essential (as well as essentialised) component of their identity. In my spatial interviews, some people looked at me with a puzzled expression when I asked them about the meaning of this place for them. The use of terms like "homeland", "mother country" and "soil" further demonstrates this link between themselves on the one hand and territory and ancestries on the other. The importance of keeping these roots alive is also reflected in the attempt to include the next generation in the ancestry line. Some respondents, for instance, insisted on the importance of travelling to their place of origin with their children, of having them learn the language and culture or even of simply, as Abdinur said with regard to his 6-year-old son, knowing "where he comes from" (i.e. Somalia), although his son was born in London and does not speak Somali. The place of origin is thus essentialised in many discourses as a taken-for-granted important place on the basis of ancestral links to this territory. For many, the presence of relatives in the place of origin is another way through which the symbolic dimension emerges: respondents' regular contact with or visits to parents, grandparents, siblings or other relatives contribute to the meaning given to the place of origin. Farhan has not been back to Somalia since his arrival in Europe 20 years ago, yet he said he speaks to his eldest sister, who lives there, two to three times a week.

The place of origin is also sometimes the object of romanticised and idealised memories that are contrasted to either the place of residence or the (negative) image that currently circulates internationally about Somalia. Shariif's memories of Somalia as "paradise" opened the section on the Somali context in Chap. 1: apart from the warm climate and the beaches, he told me about the numerous cinemas where American movies translated into Italian were shown. The Mogadishu of the childhood he described was a lively, cosmopolitan city with a warm and welcoming atmosphere, contrasting sharply with the common image of a violent and devastated city today.

Places are objects of particular, evolving and imaginary constructions, as Shariif's depiction of Mogadishu illustrates. What is regarded as "the place of origin" is also the product of (sometimes changing) constructions. For instance, it is not necessarily the place where one grew up, or it can become more specific – a region within a country, for example. The delimitation of the place of origin is sometimes the result of "choices" stemming from, for instance, political processes, family events or the changing landscape of clanship affiliations. Clans are linked to ancestral territories, and return may involve choices related to these territories rather than to a place where people actually lived before leaving the country (Bjork 2007). The same is also true of transnational identifications. Awa grew up in southern Somalia, but over the years she has developed a strong relationship to Somaliland, where she has been returning regularly in recent years:

I think, if you asked me five years ago, "Are you from Somalia?", I would have said "yeah". Not that I felt I was from Somalia, but I couldn't be bothered going through that discussion. But if you said to me now, "Are you from Somalia?", I would say, "No, I'm not from Somalia; I'm from Somaliland". I would go through the hassle, of one hour [laughs]. So I don't know; it's collective madness almost, in that sense. [Semi-structured interview, recorded]

What has changed in recent years is Somaliland's struggle for international recognition, strongly supported by part of the diaspora. Awa explicitly refers to the collective character of this "madness", highlighting the relationship between personal identities and political processes.

Events linked to individual trajectories may also modify feelings about the place of origin. Jawahir, like Awa, has never lived in Somaliland, although her mother was originally from there. During our discussion, she recurrently spoke about the tensions between "people from the south" and "people from the north", as she herself differentiated them. She could feel those tensions early in her life, since some of her father's relatives have still not come to terms with him marrying a woman "from the north", even now that both of her parents have passed away. During her migration from Africa to Europe, a smuggler asked her not to mix with the other migrants, fearing that her supposedly "northern accent" might create problems in the group. Jawahir finally mentioned how, during her travels in different countries where she met relatives, she could feel these tensions as "increasingly tangible". While she was raised in the south of the country and by a southerner father (who died at the beginning of the war), Jawahir increasingly came to identify as a Somalilander because she was constantly referred to as such by others. In 2009, she made her first trip back to Somalia: she did not stay long in the south because of safety concerns and because she could not find any relatives who still lived there, and she ended up spending most of her time in Somaliland. She plans to return to the north in the future, would like to implement a development project there and recently married a man from Somaliland who lives in the same city as her in Switzerland. Her story shows that she slowly reoriented herself towards a particular place of origin over the course of her life.

A person's place of origin may also provoke increased concern and interest depending on their life stage: transnational studies have shown that young adults and new parents often develop a fresh interest in their place of origin (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Jeffery and Murison 2011). Some women, like Nadifa, became "involved" in associational activities related to their place of origin when they became mothers and left paid labour. For some respondents, their place of origin took on a new meaning from the moment they actually travelled there and physically "felt" it. A feeling of concern and responsibility for the place of origin may emerge from this first physical contact. Awa's statement is especially eloquent in describing this phenomenon, both for herself and in general: *"*I think that going back and forth has shaped people's identity*".* The place of origin becomes increasingly important in people's lives, hers included, when they engage concretely with it.

The wish to contribute to and develop projects in the country of origin, if it is based on a feeling of a shared history, does not exclude more "utilitarian" concerns, especially in terms of career opportunities or involvement in humanitarian or political activities there. Awa's presence in Somaliland is related to the activities she is able to carry out there. As indicated above, she would not spend time there if she did not have any specific project to carry out there.

Similarly, Abdulkadir, a 30-year-old man who lives in Switzerland, has travelled to Somalia twice in the last few years in the context of a humanitarian project in which he has been heavily involved. Although close relatives, including his father, still live in Somalia and he has always been in contact with them, his reason for travelling there is related exclusively to his voluntary commitment:

Yes, simply that. Otherwise, I would never have returned to Somalia. It was not my intention to return. [Spatial interview, recorded]

These examples show that one's relationship to one's place of origin is not necessarily limited to an emotional attachment to the territory of one's ancestors or mediated through affective ties with relatives who live there. For migrants, their place of origin represents an opportunity to develop personal projects and play an important part in them, a theme that will be further developed in this book.

This section has discussed the dynamically constructed character of the various places people may link together through their cross-border movements. Apart from the country of residence and the country of origin, other places may also be significant at the symbolic and/or functional level for the Somalis in this study. Previous countries of settlement may be regarded both symbolically, sometimes with mixed emotions, and functionally, on the basis of the resources they offer. Other places may play specific functions at particular times without fostering any emotional involvement: this is the case with Dubai, an international business hub, for some respondents involved in trade. Yet other places may only be relevant at the symbolic level: for instance, some respondents mentioned the importance of making a religious pilgrimage to Mecca as a mark of their Muslim identification.

#### **2.5 Conclusions**

This chapter describes the different types of cross-border mobility practices that European Somalis may develop over the years, highlighting the dynamic character of these (im)mobility trajectories. Migrants engage in a wide variety of activities, including maintaining social networks, carrying out business or other work-related activities and getting involved in humanitarian or political projects through their more or less regular cross-border movements. Mobility necessarily entails linking different places together: the place – or more rarely places – where one legally resides, the place one considers one's place of origin and other places in the world that people visit for one reason or another. The study shows that people on the move give these different places meanings, whether emotional or functional.

It is not necessary for people to engage in physical movement in order for them to invest places with meanings: the transnational literature demonstrates that mobility is not a prerequisite for participating in transnational social fields (Levitt 2001; Glick Schiller et al. 1995). Nonetheless, this chapter demonstrates that crossing borders enables people to maintain a physical presence in more than one place, which in turn enables them to develop further activities and projects.

Mobility leads to encounters and experiences from which social actors may draw inspiration for new or expanded activities. Physically "being there", rather than communicating virtually or receiving indirect information, has enabled some respondents to expand, recreate or solidify transnational networks, gather information and learn about opportunities. Informal contexts are especially important when it comes to meeting with people who might become important in the future, as Abdulkadir's reflections on weddings has illustrated. Being able to participate physically in those contexts allows migrants to take advantage of "chance encounters" (see Gladkova and Mazzucato 2017 on the role of chance). Moreover, certain matters are better discussed in face-to-face meetings, which are also crucial to building trust, whether to become business partners, pass on or receive information from another part of the world or engage in common political or humanitarian activities. Being on the move also allows for some degree of informality in the transportation of the "goods" that some people circulate through their mobility, as more formal and institutionalised channels are more subject to taxes and monitoring. Finally, physical mobility often entails changes in the ways certain places are regarded and possibly practiced. Visits to friends or family in other places sometimes open people's eyes to new opportunities, which are accessible through mobility (whether it takes the form of a secondary move, pendular practices or star-shaped mobility). Similarly, regular visits to the place of origin may prompt people to make decisions regarding their place of residence or further mobility practices: Awa, for instance, opted to leave the Netherlands and settle in Britain after a visit to Somaliland. Return visits sometimes also change how people identify with their place of origin (and its population) and reinforce their wish "to contribute". A few respondents were explicit about how a return visit caused them to reorient some of their activities towards their region of origin or the Somali population in their place of residence. For these different reasons, the physical presence enabled by physical mobility cannot always be replaced by "virtual and communicative mobilities" (Urry 2007), although these different types of mobility are complementary.

This chapter has focused on migrants' agency in developing various forms of mobility, conducting beneficial activities and appropriating different places while on the move. These migrants, however, are embedded in larger relations that structure the transnational social fields in which they evolve. Their own social locations within these wider contexts – in terms of ethnicity and race, legal status, gender and family situation in particular – influence the opportunities they may be able to seize, but also the constraints they face. In turn, these more or less constraining or enabling frameworks may act as an incentive to move from or to a specific place or, on the contrary, to stay somewhere. Increasing feelings of exclusion (resulting from xenophobic incidents or public discourses) have, for instance, prompted some of the respondents to leave a first country of settlement in Europe for London. Similarly, this study, like others (for instance Portes et al. 2002; Levitt 2003, 2009), shows that the place of origin often becomes more relevant, and that people start visiting it more often, not only when they are legally allowed to do so, but also when they acquire a higher socioeconomic position in their country of residence and therefore improve their anchorage there.

Social actors' social positions within local economic, political and social contexts – in their countries of residence and origin, as well as in other places – thus contribute extensively to shaping their mobile activities. The migrants in this study often face excluding and discriminating labour markets in their country of residence. While they may be able to make use of some of their professional assets in international institutions, even there the recognition of their assets remains limited. They may get involved in the political and economic reconstruction of their country of origin, but they may be regarded suspiciously there because they have been away for so long. Finally, transnational extended families (and their internal hierarchies) may offer opportunities for mobility, but they often also frame some of their members' (im)mobility regarding who moves or not, where and for what purpose.

As a result, mobility practices should not be romanticised or depicted as a sure way of setting up innovative transnational projects. The case studies above describe relatively successful endeavours, but they have been selected for this purpose and should not be considered representative of all migrants everywhere and in every position. The following two chapters further explore the processes through which the people I met deal with constraining or enabling frameworks when establishing their mobility practices.

#### **References**


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# **Chapter 3 Mobility: A Practice or a Capital?**

The previous chapter illuminated the variety of mobility practices that the Somali migrants in this study have been able to develop and the multiple ways in which they relate to the different places they live in, have lived in or visit regularly. This chapter explores this diversity with a theoretical focus on social differences. Social differences were described in Chap. 1 as the product of an unequal allocation of resources among the population (Bourdieu 1979a, 1986, 1987; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Actors' social location along various axes of differences further influences the valuation that is made, in specific contexts, of their material and symbolic resources.

Based on these theoretical premises, this chapter considers the people in this study to be endowed with more or less economic, cultural and social capital. Because the people I am interested in are migrants, an additional type of capital will be included and discussed: legal capital in the form of residency rights in or citizenship of the country of residence. My main argument here is that mobility needs to be considered a resource: it is not only something that people do; it is also a series of experiences and skills that people may accumulate and possibly transform into a type of capital. As such, it may become a factor of social differentiation.

The empirical part of this chapter develops this argument by demonstrating that specific types of capital can be converted into other types of capital (Bourdieu 1986). It demonstrates that the transformation of mobility into a type of capital relies on the possession of economic, cultural, social and legal capital. Migrants' possession of other types of resources influences the mobility strategies they are able to implement and, more importantly, the ways in which they can turn their mobility practices into advantages.

The ways in which specific types of capital are converted into others are complex multi-directional processes. For reasons of analytical clarity, and because I want to ground my argument about mobility capital empirically, in this chapter I focus on the conversion of other types of capital into mobility capital. This choice does not imply that other types of capital emerge before the appearance of mobility capital. The conversion between all types of capital occurs simultaneously. The next section explores processes of capital conversion in more general terms.

#### **3.1 The Transformation of Mobility into a Type of Capital: A Theoretical Discussion**

Mobility is defined here as (a series of) movements infused with meanings, but also as an element of social differentiation: social actors' relationship to mobility and immobility is shaped by the "politics of mobility" (Massey 1994; Cresswell 2010). Not everyone moves, and those who do so in very different ways. A recent strand of theoretical and empirical scholarship is interested in the ways mobility can be considered an asset, a resource and even – under some circumstances – a capital that can be accumulated and transformed. Based on Bourdieu's concept of capital, some scholars have conceptualised mobility in terms of "spatial capital" (Fournier 2008; Lévy and Lussault 2003), while others have referred to "mobility as a capital" (Kaufmann et al. 2004). Both conceptualisations are discussed in this chapter, and I will explain my preference for the latter.

#### *3.1.1 From Resources to Capital: A Critical Introduction to Bourdieu's Theorisation of Capital*

This analysis builds from the fact that resources are not allocated equally, a situation that influences individuals' social locations. There are various types of resources; they can be material and non-material, and they can pertain to the economic, cultural and symbolic spheres. Time, skills, knowledge, abilities, information, money and other economic assets, social status and access to networks are all resources through which people can pursue social advantage. Social inequalities and processes of inclusion and exclusion are related to the unequal distribution of resources.

Resources are material and symbolic goods that exist concretely in time and space, but they become resources through their actualisation (Morawska 2001). I am particularly interested here in the processes through which social actors access and mobilise different types of resources and gain control over them. My aim is to understand how people can use mobility practices strategically to access different or additional resources that they cannot access otherwise.

Bourdieu's understanding of capital is central here (see in particular Bourdieu 1979a, b, 1980, 1986). Bourdieu has built a "meta-theory" (Brubaker 1985) of social inequalities that adds to the Marxian understanding of economic capital other types of capital that are different from yet intrinsically related to it and, under certain conditions, convertible into it (Bourdieu 1986). According to Bourdieu, economic capital, cultural capital (in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind,

the possession of cultural goods and formal educational qualifications (Bourdieu 1979b)) and social capital (resources related to the possession of a network of durable relationships (Bourdieu 1980)) are the three types of capital that individuals may possess and accumulate. All three types may take the character of symbolic capital when they are perceived and acknowledged as legitimate, go unchallenged and, most importantly, remain hidden (Bourdieu 1987). Social actors may be endowed with specific amounts and combinations of the three fundamental types of capital: Bourdieu's classic examples are academics, who have little economic capital but a great deal of cultural capital, while top managers in the private sector have a great deal of economic capital but little cultural capital (Bourdieu 1979a). Under certain conditions, the different types of capital are convertible into each other, and social actors can attempt to convert them to maintain or improve their social position (Bourdieu 1979a; Wacquant 2008) (see more on conversion below).

Capital should not be confused with resources. While capital can be thought of as a kind of resource, all resources are not capital. They become capital when they are systematically mobilised by social actors to attempt to accumulate social advantages over time (Savage et al. 2005). My interest here is to illustrate how social actors strategically mobilise the resources available to them in an attempt to improve their social position, thus turning them into different types of capital (see also Anthias 2007; Erel 2010 for a similar argument). Mobility, in this sense, is not a type of capital per se: it is a resource that some people are able to actualise in the appropriate contexts, thus transforming it into capital.

Whatever their type, resources and capital are endowed with a symbolic value determined by the specific context in which they are actualised or transformed into other types of capital. Differences and their ordering into hierarchies are the outcome of the symbolic valuation of resources, which valuation is dependent on specific contexts. At the level of society, which is what primarily interested Bourdieu, different resources may have different symbolic values depending on the social field in which they are evaluated. A social field is "a space of objective relations between positions defined by their rank in the distribution of competing powers or species of capital" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Social space, in Bourdieu's view, is constituted of numerous discrete and relatively autonomous social fields (for instance, the economic, artistic, intellectual and juridical fields), which each having its own logic and concerns. It follows that the various types of capital do not have the same value in the different fields, or even in the same field in different historical periods (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). That is, different "rules of the game" apply in different contexts. I follow Lahire's call (2001) for a looser definition of social fields that also encompasses less strictly bounded and defined social environments and hierarchies.

Bourdieu's analytical framework (which is only briefly and selectively described here) has been critiqued for at least three major reasons. First, it has been accused of "ethnocentrism" (Anthias 2013) and of being "nation(-state) blind" (Nowicka 2013 refering to Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Lacroix further addresses it as a "sociology of 'people-at-their-place' [… which] leaves no room for addressing emergent processes and the social complexity of actors' positions and belonging"

(Lacroix 2012). Different scholars have challenged the view that people hold a consistent social position within a single national context and have attempted to "transnationalise" theories of capital and social inequalities (see for instance Erel 2010; Weiss 2005; Nieswand 2011; Kelly and Lusis 2006; Nowicka 2013; Sayad 1999). These scholars envisage the possibility of people navigating in social fields that are embedded in multiple and distant societies. In the context of migration, the symbolic value of individuals' resources may vary enormously depending on where they are evaluated, i.e. in the place of origin, the place of residence or other national or regional contexts. Typically, migrants' cultural capital (whether formalised or not, and especially when the migrants come from developing countries) may be valued highly in their country of origin and contribute to their good socioeconomic position there, but not be recognised or valued in a Western national context, as a result of which it can hardly be mobilised in this symbolic system (see for instance Weiss 2005 for convincing case studies; Erel 2010; Bauder 2003). Resources thus need to be given symbolic value to become socially meaningful and be used effectively by social actors. This means that the struggles people engage in are not only over attempts to access resources, but also attempts to challenge the symbolic order in which the resources they possess are evaluated.

Bourdieu insists that people's chances of successfully negotiating changes in the symbolic order are necessarily linked to their social position, as a result of which people tend to reproduce the social order rather than challenge it (Bourdieu 1987). This leads me to the second – and probably most common – critique of his work: his focus on reproduction neglects the possibility that social systems can change (Calhoun 1993; Jenkins 1992; Lacroix 2012; Lahire 2004). Although actors are dynamic in their pursuit of power and wealth, the social order itself, in Bourdieu's approach, remains bound to reproduce itself (Calhoun 1993). Lahire (2004) builds on Bourdieu's framework by focusing on the multiplicity of possible socialising bodies and contexts: in highly differentiated societies, social actors' trajectories lead them to encounter heterogeneous socialising frameworks and contexts in which their dispositions are "actualised". I follow Lahire in my empirical analysis, in particular by including the multiple contexts and specific social networks and hierarchies in which Somali migrants gather, but more importantly reinvest, their various types of capital.

Third, Bourdieu's theoretical apparatus has been critiqued for not taking gender seriously enough, for developing a "male-gendered conception of social structures" (McCall 1992) and for focusing primarily on public social spaces (see also Lahire 2001; Erel 2010). Despite these criticisms, many feminist scholars have critically adopted aspects of his framework and built on it to investigate gendered social processes (see in particular McCall 1992; Adkins and Skeggs 2004; Huppatz 2009). For instance, Anthias discusses how class is not the only social position relevant to being able to understand the processes through which resources are endowed with specific symbolic value. "Gender and ethnicity [also] involve the allocation of hierarchies of value, inferiorizations as well as unequal resource allocation (on their basis and not through the intermediate relation of production relations). For example, women may be paid less for the same job as men, or jobs that women do may be allocated a different economic value" (Anthias 2001).

As long as these criticisms are incorporated into Bourdieu's sociology of social inequalities, his theory is particularly well suited to understanding many aspects of migrants' practices.

#### *3.1.2 Mobility Capital and Spatial Capital*

Based on Bourdieu's theoretical conceptualisation of capital, mobility scholar Vincent Kaufmann and his colleagues (Flamm and Kaufmann 2006; Kaufmann 2009; Kaufmann et al. 2004) have developed a conceptual framework of mobility that understands *mobility as capital*, which they alternately refer to as "motility". While "mobility" is already understood to mean more than movement (i.e. movement with meanings), "motility" incorporates the idea that movement is potentiality also an asset. Mobility as capital, therefore, conceptualises "the capacity of entities (e.g. goods, information or person) to be mobile in social and geographical space, or […] the way in which entities access and appropriate the capacity for sociospatial mobility according to their circumstances" (Kaufmann et al. 2004). In this line of thinking, spatial mobility is linked to social mobility, as the ability to be mobile is related to the ability to deploy strategies to improve one's situation. What makes mobility a type of capital is not only being physically on the move, but also the potential of being so. This holistic conceptualisation of mobility allows for the inclusion of not only past or present movements, but also potential future ones. As the empirical data will make clear, people develop certain kinds of strategies while being immobile knowing that the resources they are acquiring will be capitalised most effectively through mobility.

As a result, motility is not only something one *practices*; it is also something one *possesses*. Social actors are more or less able to travel, cross borders and access different places. Kaufmann and his colleagues (Flamm and Kaufmann 2006; Kaufmann et al. 2004) argue that motility can be understood best through three interrelated factors: access, skills and appropriation. Actors' *access* to different types and degrees of mobility is linked to opportunities and constraints shaped by the structural conditions in which they are embedded, as well as their social location within them (Kaufmann et al. 2004). In this case study, migrants' opportunities and constraints need to be considered in reference to the different localities that constitute the transnational social field within which they move. Economic means and legal documents allow people to leave a country, cross borders and enter other nationstates' territories, for instance. Time is another necessary resource for mobility: being on the move transnationally means spending time away from one's main country of residence, and therefore from family, work and other responsibilities. The second determining factor of motility is *skills*: being mobile requires particular skills to organise the movements and carry them out (plan a journey, take one or more means of transportation, carry one's luggage, find one's way in an unknown destination and so on). The third factor is the cognitive *appropriation* of opportunities to realise projects: access and skills are not sufficient if actors are not in a position to strategically use them to actually transform mobility into a type of capital. Appropriation involves the ways in which "agents (including individuals, groups, networks, or institutions) interpret and act upon perceived or real access and skills" (Kaufmann et al. 2004). Social actors take possession of what is available to them and make choices to enact particular forms of (im)mobility. Appropriation is further shaped by the "needs, plans, aspirations and understandings of agents, and it relates to strategies, motives, values and habits" (ibid). In other words, appropriation involves the options people choose from the opportunities available to them, but also the constraints they face. Normative prescriptions, values and representations are important in shaping the options that are and are not chosen (and, as will be detailed later, the people by whom they are chosen).

My choice to work with the concept of "mobility capital" (or alternatively – and synonymously – "motility") may lead to confusion, and needs some clarification. Mobility is not always and intrinsically a type of capital: it can become capital for some people under specific circumstances. "Mobility capital", as the term is used in this text, thus refers only to mobility practices and experiences that social actors have been able to transform into a type of capital. "Mobility", in contrast, refers to the cross-border movements that migrants undertake and their significance. My idea of "mobility capital" is further developed in Chap. 5 (see also Moret 2017).

People are therefore endowed with more or less of this mobility capital, which makes it a differentiating dimension of social life. Kaufmann (2009) argues that motility relates not only to vertical positioning, but also to horizontal social differentiation. It is not only about being higher or lower in social hierarchies, but also about a differentiation of "lifestyles on the basis of individual relationships to time and space" (Kaufmann 2009). There are different ways to envisage or undertake regular cross-border movements, as Chap. 2 illustrates. The diversity of mobility strategies cannot be arranged exclusively on a vertical hierarchy, from those that bring higher rewards to those that do not lead to much change in one's social position. This also serves as a reminder that mobility should not be perceived as a necessarily positive and fulfilling practice. Being mobile does not always mean that one is better off than those who are not, and it can even become a constraint and burden for some people (see also Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013; Schapendonk et al. 2018). For instance, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants who are not accepted in a country where they would have liked to settle may experience negatively the forced mobility with which they are confronted, whether they opt (or are forced) to return to their place of origin, engage in irregular onward migration or return to a first country of asylum (as required by the Dublin Regulation).

Other scholars use a different concept to examine these processes – *spatial capital* (see in particular French geographers Lévy and Lussault 2003; Fournier 2008). With a specific focus on space and place rather than mobility, Lévy and Lussault (2003) define spatial capital as a pool of places, territories and networks that social actors have appropriated and from which they can draw advantages, as well as their capacity to "master" this pool and widen it. They acknowledge the centrality of

mobility practices in the appropriation of different places, but they also point to the fact that mobility is not always necessary to take advantage of these localities. In a compelling case study on elite migrants in Latin America, Fournier (2008) illustrates that past mobility practices, and the local knowledge and social networks acquired during mobile stages of life, may still be used advantageously later without the need to be mobile. This situation also emerges from my case study: the mastering of more than one locality does not always require physical mobility to be profitable. However, some degree of mobility is generally necessary to remain up to date with a situation, maintain social contacts and personally engage with the activities concerned (business and politics, for example) (see Chap. 2).

The concept of spatial capital focuses on the places that mobility makes it possible to join together into a single field. It thus emphasises that places might have been appropriated in the past and thus still be relevant for social actors even when they do not physically visit them. Places that are, to a certain degree, "mastered" might become more relevant in the future, which is a reason for people to maintain them in their pool of appropriated places. Walker (2011), in a study on the links that Comorians who live in different parts of the world maintain with other places, also acknowledges that people know that conditions might change in their current place of residence and therefore often maintain connections with "all sites on their trajectories, allowing them to favour one place over another according to their needs or ambitions" (Walker 2011). The concept further allows for the recognition that places can, under certain conditions that do not necessarily entail constant physical presence, be considered as offering specific resources to those who have developed and maintained connections with them.

While mobility and places are intrinsically related, my analytical focus is on the former, which justifies my use of mobility capital despite the evident advantages of the concept of spatial capital.

#### *3.1.3* **Savoir-Circuler***, the Accumulation of Experiences and the Convertibility of Capital*

There are at least two characteristics that make mobility a potential type of capital. I focus first on the fact that it is acquired and accumulated through the development of specific skills as well as through experiences and socialisation, and second on the convertible character of different types of capital.

First, like other types of capital, motility requires the development of specific skills and dispositions to maintain and further develop those skills (see Bourdieu 1986 on that dimension of capital). This case study demonstrates that people use mobility to improve their situation, whether consciously or not, and that in order to do so they have to develop specific skills. Alain Tarrius (1993, 2002) and other scholars (see for instance Schmoll 2005; Morokvasic and Catarino 2010; Dahinden 2010a) working on circular mobility and circulation use the concept of

"*savoir-circuler*" to investigate those skills. The concept includes the technical skills that mobility necessitates (organisational skills, the ability to cross borders, perhaps illegally, and so on) but goes beyond it. It entails a more general capacity, that of being able to constantly be on the move and include mobility as an integral part of actors' global strategies. In her study of mobile cabaret dancers, Dahinden (2010a) shows that this capacity to circulate constantly between different countries (and which she describes as a kind of mobility capital) enables these women to improve their living conditions in their country of origin. Mobility thus becomes a core livelihood strategy that acts as an alternative to more traditional sedentary migrations (Morokvasic 1999, 2003).

Furthermore, the skills of *savoir-circuler* include being able to cross borders and go through different territories that have their own regulations and norms, which requires the ability to deal with different socioeconomic, political, legal and cultural contexts, and to move between them (Tarrius 2002). In this sense, mobility relates to what other authors have termed a "cosmopolitan habitus" (Fournier 2008) or a "transnational habitus" (see in particular Vertovec 2009; Guarnizo 1997; Nedelcu 2012; Kelly and Lusis 2006). These concepts are also based on Bourdieu's theoretical framework, and they refer to a set of durable dispositions that allow the actors involved to develop the skills and abilities necessary to move easily between economic, social and cultural systems (Vertovec 2009). These skills, which are unevenly distributed among social actors, are acquired through the accumulation of the diverse personal experiences of mobility: people learn from past experiences, whether positive or negative, and are prepared to experience the same situations again (Flamm and Kaufmann 2006). Experiences of cross-border mobility are not necessarily perceived positively and may lead actors to avoid such practices. Flamm and Kaufmann also argue that the "subjective feeling of control" over mobility comes not only from past experiences, but also from socialisation processes with regard to mobility. Fournier (2008) also emphasises the inherited character of mobility within families through examples of travelling habits, the facility and even the need to move and the importance of mobility as a topic of discussion (Fournier 2008). This kind of intergenerational transmission can be seen in this study when migrant children who live in Switzerland can describe precisely how a Somali family lives in London without ever having set foot outside of their country of residence. Levitt (2009) examines what it means for second-generation migrants to be raised in a transnational social field, in particular in terms of developing knowledge and skills related to different contexts that may become useful in the future (see also Sperling 2014).

The second aspect I want to focus on is the *convertibility* between mobility capital and other types of capital, in particular economic, social and cultural capital. Bourdieu argues that the different types of capital can be accumulated and converted into or exchanged with one another (Bourdieu 1986). This dimension of capital is fundamental to this study, which focuses on the exact ways in which the possession of mobility capital is based on the possession of other types of capital and the social position these endowment are linked to, but also on the processes through which mobility capital can be valorised and transformed into these other types of capital. Based on empirical evidence, this chapter shows that mobility capital is a much *for* mobility as it comes *from* mobility, answering one of the criticisms of the concept (see for instance Jayaram 2016 for a critical analysis of mobility capital).

On the one hand, mobility capital can only be accessed if social actors have other types of resources they can mobilise and invest in. Bourdieu argues that social capital, for instance, is not simply transmitted and inherited and thus given: people need to invest time and economic means to maintain it and develop it further (see Bourdieu 1980, 1986). This part of the multi-directional conversion processes is explored in this chapter, which examines how Somali migrants build on the other types of capital they have accumulated to develop their mobility capital.

On the other hand, the cross-border mobility practiced by the respondents in this study is mostly intended to improve their living conditions: they mobilise this resource in order to enhance their economic capital (for instance, when they carry out transnational business activities), their cultural capital (for instance, when someone moves from a mainland European country to Britain in order to obtain a university degree or knowledge of English) or their social capital (for instance, when participating regularly in meetings with people who might, because of their social position, 1 day help them obtain important political positions). The convertibility of mobility capital into other types of capital is the object of the next chapter.

In sum, this theoretical discussion argues that mobility capital is a relevant concept for analysing and understanding post-migration cross-border mobility practices. Mobility becomes capital not only through technical access, but also as a result of people's ability to master specific skills and take advantage of opportunities to develop strategies (Kaufmann et al. 2004). As an unequally distributed capital, it becomes a factor for social differentiation. As with other types of capital, it is acquired through socialisation and experience, can be transmitted from generation to generation and necessitates investment in terms of time and economic capital. More importantly, those who possess mobility capital can convert it into other types of capital, and to reassess and reinforce their social position within specific social fields and other hierarchies. What is important here is not only whether or not people move, or how often they do so, but also, and more importantly, the way they mobilise their ability to move in order to access other types of capital (economic, cultural, social). Mobility capital exists, in other words, only when "value is created" (Jayaram 2016). If not, then mobility practices remain what they are: the act of people moving across borders. As this study argues, social actors' position greatly influences their capital endowment and the valuation of their resources, which differs depending on the context.

The following sections demonstrate concretely how other types of capital are converted into mobility capital. I argue that not everyone is in a position to be mobile or, more importantly, "productively" mobile, i.e. to transform mobility practices into benefits and advantages. I thus enter into a detailed discussion of how different types of capital are mobilised by respondents to develop mobility practices that contribute to improving their situation. I will start with more technical and obvious types of resources: financial means and legal documents are fundamental to mobile people's ability to cross borders. I will then discuss less evident types of capital: cultural and social capital. We will see that access to mobility, and especially the accumulation of motility, relies in direct and indirect ways on cultural and social capital as much as on economic and legal capital. These different types of capital, although they are analysed separately here, are interconnected, as conversion occurs between them as much as it does between each of them and motility.

#### **3.2 Converting Economic Capital into Mobility Capital**

For most respondents, migration has meant an important loss of socioeconomic status relative to that in their place of origin. As was described in Chap. 1, the majority of Somali migrants in Europe are not socioeconomically advantaged. While some receive social assistance from the state, most others are employed in sectors characterised by low salaries and insecurity.

This situation has important consequences in their lives in their country of residence, but also on their possibilities of developing mobility practices, in particular when those practices require multiple and regular moves. Cross-border mobility requires financial assets to pay for transportation, accommodation and other travel expenses, such as visas. When mobility includes visits to relatives or friends, in particular those who live in poorer regions of the world, expenses arise from the need to buy gifts. As other research has shown, for migrants, bringing money and gifts to those who have remained in the country of origin is as much a matter of supporting those who are in a more difficult situation as it is a performance to demonstrate that they have done well in their country of residence (Salih 2003; Nieswand 2011). Abdulkadir, a 30-year-old man who knows most of the Somali population in his city (in Switzerland) and regularly acts as a formal or informal mediator, told me during an interview about a woman he knew who had been waiting for 17 years to get her residence permit, which would allow her to travel to Yemen, where her sister and other relatives were living. He told me how surprised he had been when he met her after she returned and heard that she didn't want to go again:

So I asked her how it was, and she told me, "Well, it was really good, it hasn't changed, people are still the same, but I've spent a lot of money. I am really happy that I went, but now I will stay here, because I cannot afford it. [J: And when she says that she has spent a lot of money, what was it for?] The money, that means around 1,500 or 2,000 Swiss francs [about €1,200 to €1,600]. But when people travel, the money they spend is not to stay in a hotel, no, because they will go and visit the people they know and live with them. And so, with the money they would have spent on hotels, they will try to contribute. And most of the time, when you come from Europe, people tell you, "I have this problem", "I have a problem", and little by little, you end up giving 100 francs here, and 100 francs there, and when you stay for a month, money goes quickly. So you are happy to contribute, but you would also have liked to keep this money for something else. […] But now this woman, she still thinks, "Maybe I will try to save some money, maybe one day I can visit my other sister who is in another country". But to be able to go there, you need preparation. But because a lot of people don't work, many don't earn much money, it may take a year, or even two or three years. [Semi-structured interview, recorded]

Other indirect expenses associated with travelling have to do with the loss of income when people are away: while those who have secure employment often travel during their holidays and do not lose income, that is not true for those who are on contract or freelancers.

The quotation above illustrates that people may need to plan a single trip for years in order to save enough money. For those who travel regularly and try to capitalise on their mobility practices (such as the star-shaped and pendular movers presented above), a relatively solid financial basis is even more necessary. Economic capital thus becomes an investment in the hope that (expensive) mobility practices will be valorised successfully and turned into capital.

Similarly, a single permanent move also requires economic capital. Awa recalls her move from the Netherlands to Britain:

And just not to romanticise, it was difficult. So the first six months, luckily, […] I could get money here from the Netherlands. You know, when you are looking for a job, when you have been working for, let's say, for the last six years or so, then you can take some of your rights for six months. […] And it was really difficult, especially if you're not used to claiming benefits, or you know, to being homeless. I didn't want to be dependent on family or friends, so that was quite hard. And then I found a part-time job. [Semi-structured interview, recorded]

Her position as an educated and working single woman without children and with a European passport allowed her to undertake this move without having to rely on family or friends, as she herself mentions. Individuals' social position, in terms of gender, family situation, legal status and social class in particular, affects their access to (certain types of) mobility, but it also structures the conditions under which cross-border movements eventually lead to advantages, thus becoming a type of capital.

To conclude, the influence of economic capital is not limited to access to the financial means needed to travel. Economic capital is converted into other types of capital, in particular cultural and social capital, although this transformation mostly remains hidden and unacknowledged, even by those who possess this type of capital (Bourdieu 1986). This section has discussed the transformation of economic capital into mobility capital. The next section discusses another type of capital that should not be neglected in discussions of the mobility of Somali people – their legal right to cross borders, or "legal capital".

#### **3.3 Converting Legal Capital into Mobility Capital**

Bourdieu's conceptual framework does not include individuals who move or have moved from one nation-state to another and thus neglects the reality of migrants, and transnational mobility in general. When discussing migrants' mobility practices, it is crucial to discuss their legal status and whether they possess legal documents that allow them to leave specific nation-states and enter others. While some scholars have explored the link between the possession of legal documents and the ability to cross borders and develop mobility practices (Riccio 2001; Al-Sharmani 2004, 2006; Hammond 2013), theoretical debates regarding legal capital as a dimension of social differentiation are limited.

#### *3.3.1 Legal Capital: Empirical Evidence*

Nation-states are crucial in determining the development of migrants' transnational practices, especially regarding border crossings. Somali citizens need visas to enter most nation-states, in particular industrialised states; moreover, these visas are difficult to obtain, which makes international travel difficult for people who can only count on their Somali passport. In this context, the acquisition of other documents that allow cross-border mobility becomes important. These documents need to be issued by the authorities of another nation-state that has recognised some responsibility over people who are physically in its territory. The legal status that European states grant Somali asylum seekers has an important impact on their rights and obligations, not least their right to cross-border mobility. The provisional admission that most Somali asylum seekers in Switzerland have been granted is mostly considered a "bad" status, in comparison to full refugee status, in part because it strongly limits cross-border movements (Kamm et al. 2003; Moret 2006). Faysal, an interviewee I met in Switzerland, told me why so many Somalis had left Switzerland and travelled to other European countries irregularly to file a new asylum claim: "Somalis are people who are not looking for money, but for documents. Documents to travel". These words, "Documents to travel", point explicitly and vividly to the connection between legal capital and mobility capital. Some kind of secure legal status (documents) is needed when one wants to cross borders. Freedom of movement was a recurring theme in many of my interviews with people in Switzerland, pointing to its centrality as a potential resource for social actors. Although it was not as strong an issue for British respondents, other analyses of mobility practices have demonstrated the importance of being able to secure a stable legal status to have some degree of freedom of circulation. A secure legal status makes it possible to not only leave one's main country of residence, but also re-enter it legally and circulate freely across borders (Riccio 2001; Al-Sharmani 2006). Citizenship in one's country of residence is the only status that is stable enough to allow most kinds of mobility practices. Circulating travellers, in particular those who undertake star-shaped or pendular movements, need to be able to leave their country of residence, but also to enter the other states on their itinerary. For instance, Farhan, who travels between Britain and Switzerland, found his movements much easier once he obtained a Swiss passport, which meant the end of the visa requirement every time he entered Britain.

For secondary movers, the possession of an EU passport also makes it much easier to settle in another nation-state. The European Union is the context *par excellence* where cosmopolitan norms complement national rights and citizenship can be enacted across national borders – but only for those who are considered to belong fully (Benhabib 2005; Ahrens et al. 2014; Verstraete 2003). Citizenship constitutes

a clear advantage for those who undertake such moves within the EU, for instance in terms of the transfer of social rights, as Awa's quotation above indicates: being European allowed her to have access to unemployment rights in another member state. Furthermore, moving before obtaining the citizenship of a country where one has settled means losing the right to obtain it: this explains why Mulki, who had been living in Britain for a few years before she got married to Nuur, waited to get her British passport before actually moving to Switzerland to be with him. The acquisition of legal capital thus requires a significant investment of time and effort: naturalisation processes are characterised by increasingly strict criteria regarding how long applicants have to remain in the country and their socioeconomic situation. The physical presence of at least some members of the family unit in the country in question makes it easier for applicants to secure residency rights (see Ong 2003). Some practices related to mobility and immobility appear to be directly related to the acquisition of a specific nationality, for instance for transnational couples who have a child: Ammar, a young man who had been living in Switzerland with a provisional admission that had recently been changed into a residence permit, got married to Aaliyah, a British citizen of Somali origin, who joined him in Switzerland after their wedding. However, as they had decided that their child would be born in Britain, where part of Aaliyah's family lives, she moved back to Britain when she was 7 months pregnant. Although the reasons behind that decision are not clear from their account, it seems that the transmission of Aaliyah's British citizenship to their daughter played a part in it. Her moving back to Britain to give birth there facilitated their child's acquisition of an important resource, i.e. a passport from a European state, which Ammar was not able to transmit to her.

A stable legal status in the main country of residence thus constitutes legal capital in the sense that it opens avenues for mobility opportunities that would be more limited or unavailable otherwise (see also Hammond 2013). But another crucial dimension of legal capital is that it also guarantees the ability to come back and/or settle again after any length of time spent elsewhere. Al-Sharmani (2004, 2006, 2010) demonstrates the importance of "legal capital" through a convincing empirical study: she compares female Somali refugees who filed an asylum claim in Egypt with Somali women who secured citizenship in the US and later resettled in Egypt (socalled "émigrés"). For these émigrés, resettlement constitutes a strategy both to avoid the exclusion they faced in North America, despite their citizenship, and to continue to benefit from the advantages offered by that citizenship, for instance in terms of social rights, freedom of mobility and the guaranteed right to return at any time.

Furthermore, citizenship entails some responsibility from the state to its nationals. A specific relationship between the state and its nationals is created through naturalisation, based on rights and obligations of both parties. Citizens may expect protection from their state, even when they are outside its territory. Ammar, a young man who is about to obtain Swiss nationality, told me about his future travel plans and his wish to visit different places, including Somalia:

Travelling to Somalia is easier with the [Swiss] passport. It is also easier there, if you want to move around, or to obtain some protection if anything happens, to go to the embassy if you need it. [Group interview with Aaliyah, notes]

The state's protection beyond its territory constitutes another resource that mobile people can count on when they cross borders. Nationals have the right to not only come back to their country of citizenship, but also claim its support should they be in trouble in other nation-states that cannot offer them protection.

#### *3.3.2 Legal Status as a Type of Capital*

To sum up, legal status can be considered a form of legal capital, which is similar to other types of capital discussed by Bourdieu. The discussion here will focus only on the relationship between legal capital and mobility practices in order to draw parallels. Legal capital is not either absent or present: it admits of degrees, as different types of legal status in the country of residence open different avenues of crossborder mobility, depending on the rights that go with each legal status and whether those documents are recognised by other nation-states. While provisional admission (in the Swiss case) does not grant the right to leave the country, residency rights (in either Switzerland or Britain) do, although the ability of those with residency rights to travel is restricted by the regulations of the states they enter, for instance by requiring a visa. Furthermore, non-citizen residents are limited in their right to reenter or receive protection from the state that has granted them the right to leave the country. Only full citizens have secured a strong enough legal relationship with their state of residence to be able to leave it, return to it and claim its protection when outside its territory.

For migrants to be able to accumulate legal capital, they must make a substantial personal investment of time and effort (see Bourdieu 1979b for cultural capital). The increasingly restrictive criteria according to which authorities base their decision to grant a more secure legal status have to do with the person's economic situation, acquisition of the local language and knowledge of local habits. The ability to meet these criteria in turn relates to the possession and transformation of other types of capital, namely economic, social and cultural capital. Furthermore, legal capital is a resource that is transmitted to one's descendants, in particular in nation-states with a *jus sanguinis* tradition. In these states, children are born with the nationality or legal status of their parents, not of the state in which they were born. That the children of nationals are born with that nation-state's citizenship while the children of non-nationals are not is considered natural and obvious, and legal status is thus not perceived to be a type of capital, suggesting a hidden form of power similar to that associated with other types of capital (Bourdieu 1986, 1987).

Further differentiation occurs at the international level, since not all nationalities and passports are evaluated in similar terms. As Al-Sharmani has shown in her study in Egypt (Al-Sharmani 2004, 2006), Somali refugees with a Somali passport are faced with many restrictions regarding their access to the labour market and education, while American Somalis enjoy far more rights. Global power relationships at the international level thus also influence the value of a specific relationship when it

comes to cross-border mobility. The idea of "good passports" (i.e. North American or European) came up on a few occasions during my fieldwork.1

Importantly, legal citizenship does not set all nationals of a given country on a completely equal footing. Some rights may differ depending on how citizenship was acquired, i.e. whether it was by birth, naturalisation, marriage or other ways. Beyond legal differentiations, citizens are treated differently according to representations and prejudices based principally on race, ethnicity or religion. Khosravi 2007 discusses the "situational, conditional and unconfirmed" legal status of having an EU passport when its holder is a naturalised, brown-faced person. Faysal (in Chap. 1) and Imaan (in Chap. 2) both mentioned difficulties when crossing borders, even with their Swiss passport. They attribute their different treatment by customs authorities to the colour of their skin, their name or their veil, clearly pointing to markers of ethnicity, race and religion.

Legal capital thus emerges from the specific relationship between an individual and the state in which they have settled, but also from the global relationships between states. Its differential distribution among the population is mostly perceived as legitimate and natural, yet it is the result of a historically constructed world system based on a division between nation-states. The naturalisation and legitimisation of differences based on legal status are exactly what makes legal capital more powerful. Because it is institutionalised and acknowledged as legitimate, legal capital becomes symbolic capital and a source of power in a society and a world organised according to a logic of difference (see Bourdieu 1987). Glick Schiller and Salazar (2013) challenge classical sociological perspectives "to expand this understanding so that the ability and legal right to travel become one of the criteria by which class is defined and class privilege upheld" (196). In this sense, legal capital should be included in analyses of social inequalities in transnational social fields.

#### *3.3.3 The Complex Relationship Between Mobility and Immobility*

The relationship between a state and its residents and/or citizens rests on rights and obligations, but also on normative values and expectations, some of which deal with mobility and immobility and the complex relationship between them.

First of all, as has been mentioned, migrants' access to a stable legal status, and especially to citizenship, is linked to personal commitments and investments in the country of residence. Implicitly or explicitly, it is based on the assumption of a certain degree of immobility. Candidates for naturalisation, for instance, are expected

<sup>1</sup>The Global Passport Power Rank 2017 indicates the "strength" of passports, ranking them by the travel freedom their holders enjoy. While a Somali passport allows visa-free entry into 33 countries, a British passport allows it for 156 countries, and a Swiss one for 155 (source: https://www. passportindex.org/byRank.php).

to have resided in the country in question for a certain number of years and not have left it for long periods of time. Short-term and permanent residence permits may also be revoked or refused extension when their holders have resided outside of the country for more than a certain number of years. Furthermore, the granting of stable legal statuses and naturalisation is often dependent on candidates having adopted activities and identifications related to the country of residence while severing their links with other places, in particular their country of origin. This norm, implicitly intended to enforce relative immobility, reflects the logic of the nation-state (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002).

States' expectations of migrants who want to secure a legal status, in particular citizenship, stand in contrast to some of these migrants' motivations for trying to do so. For many respondents in this study, access to the passport of their country of residence means, among other things, access to new avenues for mobility. Although it was also mentioned in the British context, respondents in Switzerland were particularly prone to stress the right to mobility as a key change in their situation through naturalisation (see also Moret 2009). Their emphasis on this point can be explained by the ban on mobility that their provisional admission imposes on most Somali refugees in Switzerland and the length of time they must be residents before they can apply for naturalisation (Moret 2006). Being able to cross borders again after a long period of forced immobility (the 17 years that Fatuma mentioned is not exceptional for Somalis in Switzerland) takes on a meaning that those who have not experienced it might not acknowledge. There is thus a dissonance between authorities' expectations regarding new citizens, which revolve around local anchorage and relative immobility, and migrants' focus on their increased freedom of cross-border mobility. These conflicting views can be understood by looking at each party's interests in the naturalisation process: while authorities focus on new citizens' loyalty to and identification with their new nation, migrants tend to focus on the new rights they acquire when they become citizens (Achermann and Gass 2003). However, while access to mobility is an important motivation, it is never an exclusive or even the primary motivation. While people do focus on the new rights they acquire when they become citizens of their country of residence, they also acknowledge the obligations that accompany them. For instance, among the Swiss respondents in this study, there were two young men (both of them particularly mobile) who valued military service, an obligation for all male Swiss citizens, highly. It would not have been difficult for them to find ways and arguments to circumvent this duty (like many other Swiss young men), yet both mentioned the importance of participating in the Swiss Army as a sign of loyalty and attachment to their new country.

In sum, legal documents, in the form of passports and residency permits, are fundamental elements of differentiation between people when it comes to mobility. These varied types of documents issued by nation-states determine who is able to leave a territory and enter others, for how long and for which specific activities. Absolute freedom of movement does not exist: it is always related to the specific

relationships one has built with places, in particular with the nation-state apparatuses of those places. Legal capital ensues from migrants' social and structural position within a given context, that of their country of residence. In parallel, it is linked to the position of this state in geopolitical hierarchies of power.

Border control and immigration policies are thus particularly important in constraining or facilitating migrants' access to mobility, and even more so their ability to transform mobility into capital. Yet this discussion about legal capital in relation to (im)mobility does not imply that legal recognition by more powerful states is the only way through which people are able to deploy transnational ways of living and accumulate mobility capital. Some mobile people may find some advantages in developing alternative frameworks to those imposed by nation-states. Tarrius (2002) demonstrates that some informal (or even illegal) activities developed through cross-border mobility are best undertaken far from states' gaze. Similarly, Schmoll and Semi (2013) make a case for "invisibility as a strategic and relevant asset for people who rely on borders and take advantage of the gaps between different states' regulations and structures" (380). In an essay about irregular migrants' collective struggles in the United States, De Genova (2010) makes a similar argument by showing that access to legal status could lead to restrictions in some people's "autonomy of migration". By making "anti-assimilationist gestures", these undocumented migrants are, in his view, claiming the right to "be there", but also the right to circulate freely across borders and remain outside states' expectations for inclusion.

However, while legal recognition may increase migrants' visibility and the control that the state can exercise over their activities, it remains the case that the legal right to cross borders is a significant resource for those who aim to accumulate mobility capital. In an informal discussion, Awa said to me that the important thing in her eyes is not to be moving around all the time, but to know that she can move, even if she does not actually do so or does so only rarely. Her comments demonstrate that mobility is a resource that some people are in a position to mobilise if and when they need it: legal capital participates in the ability to build on this resource and benefit from it.

#### **3.4 Converting Cultural Capital into Mobility Capital**

Education, professional experience, institutionalised or informal skills and knowledge are fundamental assets in individuals' professional and social trajectories. This section focuses on the ways in which cultural capital, which may take different forms, intervenes directly or indirectly in the development of migrants' mobility practices.

#### *3.4.1 Cultural Capital in Migration Studies*

The concept of cultural capital is central to Bourdieu's theoretical framework. Bourdieu (1979b) distinguishes between three forms – or states – of cultural capital: embodied (or incorporated), objectified and institutionalised. Incorporated cultural capital includes the knowledge and skills possessed by an individual who has invested time in acquiring them and that cannot be transmitted instantly, in contrast to, say, a gift. The ability to speak a language without a foreign accent and behave according to the cultural norms of an institution are examples of embodied cultural capital. Objectified cultural capital involves material cultural goods such as paintings or books. It will not be discussed here. The third state is institutionalised cultural capital, a quantitatively measurable evaluation of someone's cultural capital stemming from its institutional recognition. It can be found in academic degrees, for instance. Erel (2010) argues that, apart from formal cultural capital, informal knowledge and education are also an important part of one's cultural capital. Knowledge about implicit institutional or organisational rules is an example of informal cultural capital.

Migrants' cultural capital has been the object of many studies, most of which demonstrate that it is devalued when they move from poorer and less powerful states to wealthier ones (Bauder 2003; Erel 2009, 2010; Weiss 2005; Kelly and Lusis 2006; Nowicka 2013). The non-recognition of credentials earned in other countries and the non-validation of professional experience in the country of origin systematically exclude migrants from higher positions in the labour market (Bauder 2003; Nohl et al. 2006). Institutionalised cultural capital, unless it consists of very high qualifications, is not easily "transnationalisable" for migrants who arrive in rich nation-states. The place where institutionalised capital is acquired is thus highly significant in its valuation elsewhere, pointing to mostly economic hierarchies of power between nation-states. Weiss (2005) investigates these hierarchies by differentiating between "nation-specific cultural capital" and "transnational cultural capital". While nation-specific capital is validated only in the place where it has been acquired, transnational cultural capital involves education and experiences validated internationally because they have been acquired in states in a position of "cultural and economic hegemony" (Weiss 2005). Transnational cultural capital can involve expatriates who acquire their education in industrialised countries and are then sent by their (also Western) organisation to work in less dominant nation-states.

There is a second important strand in the literature on migrants' cultural capital discussing embodied cultural capital. Studies show that, apart from institutionalised cultural capital, migrants also often lack embodied cultural capital to access dominant institutions in the labour market or the higher levels within them because, among other things, they lack local embodied knowledge about implicit rules, behaviours and "locally-shared professional cultures" (Erel 2010; see also Weiss 2005). Yet the inclusion of migrants in the study of cultural capital has allowed authors to acknowledge that ethnicity/race, coupled with gender and social class, is also part of embodied cultural capital and further influences people's access to the labour market in particular. Stereotypes related to ethnicised (and gendered) skills may negatively affect people's job prospects, as all studies on discrimination in the labour market have argued (see for instance Fibbi et al. 2003). But embodied skills related to ethnicity, for instance linguistic and cultural knowledge, also act as assets in specific fields, for instance intercultural mediation or ethnic businesses: they are valued because they correspond to specific needs in certain economic niches. Kelly and Lusis (2006), for example, discuss how "Filipo-ness", and especially "Filipaness", constitutes an asset in the health and caregiving sectors, because cultural and gendered stereotypes have constructed these specific migrants as "naturally" possessing caring and nurturing skills.

Erel (2009, 2010) examines these processes through the concept of "migrationspecific cultural capital": she focuses on the ways in which migrant women may build on their cultural resources and engage in strategies to revalorise them in their country of residence – for instance, by engaging in associational or political activities related to their ethnic or national origin in their country of residence, capitalising on previous experiences in specific social fields. However, there is an agreement in the literature that cultural capital that builds on "ethnic" skills (linguistic or cultural knowledge) or ethnicised stereotypes often leads to a dead end in terms of social mobility, at least as far as marginalised groups are concerned. Migrants from poorer countries, especially women, often fall into these categories. The segments of the labour market in which their specific cultural capital is valued are often poorly paid and little valued. Ethnicised skills are often coupled with gendered representations, and women are often found in these ethnicised professional niches, for instance caregiving work, intercultural mediation and informal ethnic businesses (Lutz 1993; Erel 2009; Nowicka 2013).

Migrants' institutionalised and embodied cultural capital has thus been the subject of an abundant literature in migration studies. Most of it describes and analyses the ways in which cultural capital brought from the country of origin is circulated and re-evaluated in the country of residence, often leading to processes of dequalification and/or strategies of revalorisation of cultural resources in specific social fields. The empirical discussion below partially builds on this literature, but it focuses on the diverse ways in which institutionalised and embodied cultural capital intervenes in the development of post-migration mobility practices. The analysis examines not only migration-specific cultural capital, but also the cultural capital that has been acquired after migration and that may be circulated and valued in other places through mobility practices, as well as cultural capital that is specifically mobilised in cross-border mobility. This study demonstrates that, while migration has involved a strong devaluation of the respondents' cultural capital, their mobility strategies are a way through which they attempt to revalorise their cultural capital, both institutionalised and embodied, and both migration-specific and acquired after migration in their country (or sometimes countries) of residence.

#### *3.4.2 Cultural Capital Acquired Before Arriving in Europe*

The respondents often obtained a higher education in Somalia, sometimes even abroad, before the war started. However, as with many migrants from nonindustrialised countries, none of the women and men I have met have had their credentials validated in Europe (see also Bauder 2003; Nohl et al. 2006).

Nonetheless, institutionalised capital, even if it is not recognised in the countries to which migrants go, often comes with a specific type of embodied capital: the cultural ability to access formal education, for instance found in habits of learning or the self-discipline to learn. These "durable dispositions" (Bourdieu 1979b) are not lost with migration, and may become important assets in migrants' future trajectories. Data show that embodied rather than institutionalised cultural capital may contribute to respondents' socioeconomic trajectory in the country of residence, and it may help them in developing their cross-border mobility practices. Cultural capital in this sense intervenes indirectly rather than directly in the acquisition of mobility capital.

The formal and informal education received before migration is crucial in determining what education and professional career is possible in the country of residence. Unlike more recent Somali migrants, who often had interrupted schooling or even none at all, those who arrived 10 or 20 years ago sometimes attended private schools, often in other countries. Aisha, for instance, arrived in Switzerland as one of the first Somali refugees in 1991, at the age of 40, with her youngest daughter, while the rest of her family settled elsewhere. She recalls the 1st year after her arrival in a city in the French-speaking part of Switzerland:

In 1992, I bought a whole course to learn French from Italian. I could not even say "yes" in French! Because, you know, I went to primary school in Italian, and then, regarding secondary school…. Actually, Egypt had given money to Somalia for education, a lot of money. So I went to secondary school in Arabic. It was not too difficult because I had been to Qur'anic school, but it was not exactly the same language. So I had to take extra lessons for Arabic. And in parallel, my mother was quite strict: she enrolled me in an English school. In fact, I could choose two other languages; I chose Italian and English. If I had known what was ahead of me! But all this became useful when I came to Switzerland. […] It was quite easy for me to learn from Italian, not the pronunciation, but the rest was all right. I had the book, and the exercises and the tapes, 30 tapes. I used to learn in the evenings and at night. My daughter remembers Valérie, one of the course's characters. [Biographical interview, notes]

Aisha is conscious that having been socialised and educated in different languages helped her when she arrived in a place where she had to learn yet another one. She says that her knowledge of Italian made it easier for her to learn French. Moreover, she was a medical doctor in Somalia: her learning habits, characterised by independence, self-reliance and perseverance, are embodied capital stemming from her educational background in Somalia. She mobilised her knowledge of how to learn (a real capital) to learn French by herself. Aisha very quickly became involved in her city and developed a large and diversified local network. She is now almost retired, but she has a busy professional life, in particular organising and giving courses for Somali and other migrant women. Her change of careers after migration thus also enabled her to use some of her "migration-specific cultural capital" (Erel 2010) (in terms of linguistic and cultural knowledge rather than professional qualifications), even though it placed her in an ethnicised and gendered professional niche (Erel 2009; Lutz 1993). Aisha has also been mobile all her life, regularly visiting Britain, where her husband, with whom she never reunited, and other children live.

Aisha did not undergo the long process of validating her educational credentials and work experience in Switzerland, which would have involved going back to university. Not being able to work in her initial profession (which she referred to as her "real profession") came up on a few occasions during the biographical interview. She told me about a satisfying professional life in Switzerland, but she was conscious of its limits, for instance in economic terms: her pension is not big enough for her to retire yet. She also believes, probably correctly, that her diploma and experiences would have been recognised in Britain more easily, pointing to the constraints imposed by particular national contexts.

Aisha faced major obstacles that forced her to reorient her career in a less economically and socially rewarding direction. However, her story is illustrative of the ways in which embodied cultural capital, in the form of learning habits, socialisation in international environments and knowledge of other languages may become assets when adapting to a new context after migration. The case of Nuur further illustrates the links between cultural capital, incorporation in the country of residence and the development of mobility practices. He arrived in Switzerland at the age of 14, after having lived in a Middle Eastern country for several years, where he was enrolled in private schools, which enabled him to obtain an (uninterrupted) education and learn different languages. This educational trajectory gave him the tools and self-confidence necessary to fight for adequate remedial classes: he mentioned similar self-learning strategies as Aisha (using an Arabic-French dictionary), but also confrontational strategies with teachers to obtain additional private remedial lessons. Unlike many other young migrants who have less cultural capital, Nuur could successfully and rapidly integrate into the Swiss educational system, pursue further education and acquire a good socio-professional position in his city, which in turn enabled him to acquire a diversified mobility capital.2 It is not only legal stability, but also socioeconomic stability, that is necessary to be able to establish mobility practices aimed at obtaining more resources. Cultural capital becomes an indirect factor in shaping people's access to mobility, as it allows people to capitalise on their mobility practices and thus transform them into motility. The next section describes how cultural capital shapes these processes in more direct ways.

<sup>2</sup>As a reminder, Nuur practices star-shaped mobility and is actively involved in business, political and humanitarian activities in relation to his country of origin.

#### *3.4.3 Mobility-Specific Cultural Capital*

Cross-border mobility requires the possession of specific embodied and informal (much less institutionalised) forms of cultural capital, which are valued differently in the different local contexts in which they are needed. Linguistic skills are particularly important. Some of the businesswomen I met mentioned regularly using their knowledge of Arabic, Italian and English (which they learnt in Somalia before migrating or in previous countries of residence) when they buy merchandise in other countries. But language can serve more mundane goals as well. Imaan, the young woman in Switzerland who has found most of her travel experiences to be negative, expressed that requesting a visa for Britain required knowledge of English, or the help of someone who understands the language.

Knowledge of international and national regulations becomes central. Shariif, a London-based man who plans to develop a business in beauty products for which he has been prospecting in China, told me:

But there are rules, regulations. You have to, you know, go with the system. You cannot just go over there and import what you want. In certain areas, you have to receive permission, you know. There are special cosmetics, for example, very dangerous; you can buy very cheap cosmetics that are very dangerous. […] So when you sell them here, you may injure many people, and you are in – you know, it's your responsibility [laughs]. So you have to be careful. [Spatial interview, recorded]

I encountered other examples of the importance of knowledge of such regulations. During one of my stays in Britain, I had an informal discussion with a woman who owns a small retail shop in London: I wanted to buy a few things from her that I knew were not easy to find in Switzerland to bring back to some of my respondents there. As any good businessperson would do, she tried to convince me to buy more: as I argued that I already had heavy suitcases to carry back home, I realised she knew exactly how much luggage weight was allowed by different European airlines. On a couple of other occasions, I witnessed respondents active in cross-border businesses who were particularly aware of airline, customs, import and tax regulations. Cultural capital regarding the transnational circulation of goods also includes embodied dimensions. In a study on Tunisian women traders, Schmoll (2005) shows how women develop strategies by building on their (ethnicised) femininity to avoid having to declare their goods when going through customs: they have acquired skills that allow them to play with customs officers' reluctance to search them, for instance forcing respect and distance by wearing a veil. When mobility practices also involve the (legal or illegal) circulation of consumption goods, money or people (smuggling activities), the ability to communicate and negotiate with (and sometimes cheat) the state and its authorities can also be important.

Recurrent mobility practices rely on intrinsic, or directly related, skills, such as "*savoir-circuler*" (Tarrius 2002) and a "cosmopolitan habitus" (Fournier 2008), which can be considered a fundamental embodied cultural capital. In turn, accumulated experiences of mobility participate in the (re)production of mobility skills (Fournier 2008; Flamm and Kaufmann 2006). In the interviews, respondents often mentioned that travelling is easier when it becomes habitual. For instance, Aman, who has travelled a lot since, reminded us in Chap. 2 that "you lose the sense of travelling if you don't travel".

The same idea emerges from the following quotation from Awa, a particularly mobile woman who currently lives in London:

If you move 200 times in your life, then moving is not that big a deal. For me, to move tomorrow is not a big deal. [Semi-structured interview, recorded]

Both statements emphasise that the recurrence of movement is necessary for mobility to become a simple matter, almost an act of routine, demonstrating the embodied character of this type of capital. Being able to move, and to capitalise on those movements, requires time and personal investment (see Bourdieu 1979b on this aspect of embodied cultural capital). Once you are comfortable with the rules, norms and technical skills that are necessary to travel, you can start organising your movements in a more productive way.

Cross-border mobility involves a related embodied cultural capital, that of being able to move and communicate in different linguistic and cultural contexts, and to interact with different kinds of people in those contexts. In London, I met Nadja, who joined one of my respondents whom I was informally meeting for dinner. This young Somali-Australian woman was travelling around the world, meeting with (Somali) people who live in different places, with a purpose that remained unclear to me. During dinner, in a very casual discussion about being afraid of what you don't know, she told us about her parents' migration from Somalia to Australia: while her father, who had "already been travelling a lot and knew other languages", found the move to Australia "easy", things were more difficult for her mother, who had always lived in Mogadishu. Her father's mobility had in her view made it easier for him to come into contact with people from different national, ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

This "cosmopolitan habitus" (Fournier 2008) is here understood as a practical asset that is part of mobile people's cultural capital, not a global way of situating oneself in the world (see also Beck 2008; Hannerz 1996). It can be regarded as some kind of pragmatic cosmopolitanism that may coexist with kin, ethnic, national or religious affiliations (Glick Schiller et al. 2011). It consists of the ability to meet with strangers to pursue a common goal in a given place at a given time, and is therefore close to the concept of "*cosmopolitanisme des rencontres*" (encounter cosmopolitanism) developed by Tarrius and his colleagues in reference to circular transmigrants in Europe and elsewhere (Tarrius et al. 2013).

This section has shown that cultural capital can be converted into mobility capital in several ways. First, institutionalised and, more importantly, embodied cultural capital acquired before migration constitutes a fundamental resource on which incorporation trajectories in the country of residence can be built, and these trajectories in turn set the ground for the development of mobility practices that require some degree of socioeconomic stability in the country of residence. More directly, mobile respondents capitalise on skills and knowledge that specifically relate to their own cross-border circulation, or to that of the goods or other things they carry with them. This could be referred to as "mobility-specific cultural capital".

The conversion of cultural capital into mobility capital has to do with all three dimensions of the motility model developed by Kaufmann and his colleagues (Flamm and Kaufmann 2006; Kaufmann et al. 2004). By influencing the structural conditions people encounter in their country of residence, cultural capital participates in shaping access to mobility, the first of the dimensions. Cultural capital most obviously refers to skills and knowledge, which constitute the second dimension: several skills are needed to transform mobility practices into capital. Third, the cognitive appropriation of opportunities also deals with specific aspects of cultural capital, in particular the mobilisation of "mobility-specific" resources.

#### **3.5 Converting Social Capital into Mobility Capital**

#### *3.5.1 Social Capital in Migration and Mobility Studies*

The concept of social capital has been discussed and debated in the sociological literature (see in particular Bourdieu 1980; Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000; Portes 1998), and although authors disagree on major theoretical and epistemological points, most concur that "social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures" (Portes 1998). Still in line with the Bourdieusian stance adopted in this chapter, I consider social capital to consist of the social relations (actual or potential) that social actors are in a position to mobilise in order to pursue some kind of social advantage by transforming them into other types of capital (Bourdieu 1980). The amount of social capital with which individuals are endowed is unequal and related to their position in society as well as to time and other resources that can be used to access and maintain social relationships and transform them into social capital (ibid). Here again, social capital differs from social relationships in that it is characterised by its potential to secure social advantages.

In the late 1980s, migration scholars began understanding international migration through the conceptual and theoretical lens of social networks (see in particular Boyd 1989; Massey et al. 1993; Brettell and Hollifield 2000). Since then, a wide literature has explored "how social networks both shape and are shaped by migrants' mobilities through space and time" (Ryan et al. 2015).

While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss this literature in detail, a brief discussion of Granovetter's influential argument on "the strength of weak ties" (1973, 1983) is useful to understanding how social capital is interrelated with motility. For Granovetter, "the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, emotional intensity, intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie" (Granovetter 1973). Contrary to the default assumption that strong ties are most important for social actors, the American

sociologist argues that weak ties are crucial to social mobility because they are the channels through which ideas, information and resources cross social distances. More precisely, weak ties connect people outside individuals' primary groups of close friends and family, and thus give rise to opportunities that may not be available through those intimate relationships. In other words, while the people to whom someone is closest may share many similarities with the person in question, they often also only have access the same resources and information as that person. Weak ties, in contrast, often act as bridging connections to resources outside the group. Weak ties thus make it possible to acquire information despite social distance. People who develop few weak ties tend to become "encapsulated" within groups where little information from outside reaches them, and to be marginalised (Granovetter 1973). In an article published 10 years after his original contribution, Granovetter (1983) acknowledged that weak ties do not all have the same value and do not always act as bridging ties – that is, they do not always connect people to distant others with different types of resources. Socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals can often count on some kinds of weak ties, but these bonds tie them to people in situations similar to their own and thus do not enable them to acquire new resources. The quality and volume of capital possessed by the people to whom one is connected are important (see also Dahinden 2005).

Ryan (2010) develops Granovetter's idea further by distinguishing between vertical and horizontal weak ties in a case study on highly educated Polish migrants in the UK. She builds on the view that the value of weak ties depends on the relative social location of the actors involved: these social locations influence the ability of a weak tie to function as a bridge and reduce social distance. Polish mothers, despite often possessing a relatively high amount of cultural capital, often develop localised networks with other mothers who live in the same deprived areas as themselves (see also Ryan 2011): these gendered social networks, characterised by a low socioeconomic status, cross ethnic lines but remain what Ryan considers horizontal weak ties because they do not lead to socioeconomic advantages. Vertical ties, in contrast, tend to allow social mobility. They most often develop in the workplace, where individuals may be able to create relationships with people who occupy more privileged positions. In this sense, migrants may have access to the same social relations but, because of their social position (in terms of gender, age or ethnicity), they are able to mobilise them in different ways (Anthias 2007; Anthias and Cederberg 2009). The social valuation of individuals' position (within and beyond ethnic groups) has important implications for the "mobilisability" of resources, including social relations.

Furthermore, social connections do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes and may even have negative effects. For example, some studies have demonstrated that (kin and ethnic) social networks often constrain and control migrant women and young people (Anthias and Cederberg 2009; Zontini 2010; Allen 2009; Cederberg 2012). Allen (2009), for instance, found that, among Somali and Sudanese refugees in the US, female sponsored refugees (i.e. those who came through family-reunification schemes) found it more difficult to access the labour market than their male counterparts – but also than women who had not arrived through family-reunification schemes. Allen argued that these differences result from the embeddedness of these women in ethnically homogenous social networks. These women's attempts to obtain waged employment were constrained by gendered reciprocal obligations and social norms. Portes and Landolt (1996) have extensively discussed the possible negative implications of social connections, in particular regarding people of the same ethnic or national origin (see also Portes 1998).

More generally, recent discussions on migrants' networks have demonstrated their dynamic character: some social relationships may develop, while others are lost; similarly, the significance of social connections may also evolve over time (Ryan 2010; Schapendonk 2015). Furthermore, for social connections to become significant enough to change people's lives, social actors need to invest effort to activate and maintain these uncertain resources: this "social network work" (Pathirage and Collyer 2011), however, does not guarantee a positive outcome (see also Schapendonk 2015).

#### *3.5.2 Empirical Evidence*

The stories of Nuur and Imaan, who both reside in Switzerland (and whom we have already met in Chap. 2), will be used to illustrate how the size and characteristics of a person's social networks, as well as that person's position and responsibilities within them, shape the ways in which they may or may not be able to transform them into social capital, which might in turn become a fundamental element of motility. It is useful here to remember that this study does not involve any systematic (qualitative or quantitative) network analysis. For this reason, I do not claim to offer a comprehensive description of these two respondents' social networks. Instead, I build on the data I have about some of their social connections, at the local and transnational levels, to illustrate how specific social ties may intervene in shaping mobility practices. Furthermore, I am aware of the performativity involved when respondents talk about their social networks (Ryan et al. 2014): while some people might feel shy to talk about their significant others or not find it relevant to mention some people, others take pride in presenting themselves not only as well connected, but also as influential within their networks. The latter is partially the case for Nuur.

#### **3.5.2.1 Nuur**

Nuur arrived in Switzerland with his parents and siblings, which made it easier for him to concentrate on his education rather than having to care for other kin members still in Africa. As a result, he has been able to obtain a fairly good job and develop important connections at the local level, through both his associational and political commitments. At the same time as he builds social ties in relation to the majority society, he reinforces, at the local level of his city of residence, his position within the Somali population there. For this study as well as a previous one, Nuur recurrently took pride in facilitating my access (or offering to do so) to Somali migrants, be they young female asylum seekers who had just arrived, settled mature women involved in informal businesses or ambassadors, in Switzerland and Britain.

But what is particularly interesting here is how Nuur mobilises his transnational connections and partially transforms them into social capital, and how these processes intervene in his accumulation of mobility capital. As was described earlier, Nuur has developed strong "star-shaped" mobility practices – regularly moving to different places (and for different reasons), but always for short periods of time – that allow him to combine his transnational activities with his local commitments in Switzerland. The social, political, economic and associational activities Nuur carries out while on the move essentially build on transnational ties that are mostly related to his extended kin group (or subclan). Furthermore, he presented his family as holding a powerful social position in this transnational group, from which he himself benefits. The following quotation illustrates how social capital relates to one's social position within a network. Nuur told me about his late father, whom he has never lived with:

My father was – how can I put it? He was among the wise men from the tribe? Yes, that's it: he was a tribal leader. You know, I read Mandela's biography, and it reminded me of my dad and of what my mum used to say about him. In fact, my dad was responsible for conflict issues, between tribes, those things. He was called everywhere; he would act as a mediator, an intermediary. If he wasn't there, no one would do anything. I don't know my dad, but today I just need to say "I am [full name]", and [people say] "Oh, [name]'s son, oh, hello. Ah, you know, when your father told such and such poem…". "My father was a poet?" I'm thinking in my head. And then I call my mum, and she says "Yes, of course!" And I learnt from a stranger that my dad was a poet. There was a man who came to visit us, it was a cousin who was working for an important bank here. He is now one of the big men leading this conference [on developing a regional government in his region of origin]. I had never understood why he showed me so much affection. When we arrived in Geneva [as refugees], he was living here with his family, and every weekend, he would come, he would take me out. He knew I loved reading, so he spent 600 francs to buy books for me. He loved reading too, so he would look after…. But why is he so nice to me? His brother is here, but he doesn't make so much time for him. And one day, when I had grown up, I asked why he was so nice to me. He told me, "You know, your dad was really good to me". So my dad had looked after him. […] What I learnt from this man, and from many other men too, is that my dad used to marry young people. That means that all young men, when they were 18 or 19 years old, he would tell them, "What are you doing? Why aren't you getting married? You can do what you want, study, but you need to know…. You get married, you have a wife, you have children, and then, even if you study, your children will grow up and one day you'll be old". And many listened to my dad and…. There was this man who came to my wedding. He came from the United States, I didn't even know him, he told me, "My name is so and so. You don't know me, but I know you. Today I have seven children. It was your dad who married me; it was your dad who chose the girl for me. Well, the girl, I already wanted her, but it was he who went to [ask for me]". My father was a very respected man, everywhere. And the fact that he would bring a boy and say, "We want your daughter", that would be enough. And there weren't any conditions, or money. And my dad would even pay for them to get married. [Biographical interview, recorded]

Nuur offered me a description of his father reconstructed from multiple positive testimonies of people around him. It appears that he recurrently mobilises members from this extended transnational family to carry out his activities. His ability to access them and transform them into social capital (i.e. gain benefit from them) comes from his inherited position, as the son of a particularly respected man in Somalia and in a transnational social field. However, Nuur also invests time and other resources to actualise and reinforce these social relations and strengthen his own position, reputation and visibility within those networks, in particular through mobility. Social capital is only produced and reproduced through sociabilities requiring specific skills and a constant investment in time, effort and often economic capital (Bourdieu 1980). Nuur follows multiple strategies for this "social network work" (Pathirage and Collyer 2011) in order to maintain and expand his transnational (mostly kin-related) network, through marriage, political alliances, business partnerships and humanitarian involvement in his region of origin, including using the experiences and skills he has acquired locally in Switzerland.

The ways in which Nuur mobilises particular connections, especially while on the move, demonstrate the dynamic ways in which social relations are transformed into social capital. As mentioned in Chap. 2, he created a humanitarian association active in his region of origin by mobilising kin members he knew in different places in Europe. He specifically looked for people with specific characteristics, including that they had access to reliable partners in Somalia, whom he did not contact directly himself. When Nuur travelled to Somalia to see how the project was going, his aim was also to meet with these possibly important people there. By actively seeking to develop "vertical (weak) ties" (Ryan 2010), Nuur reinforced his transnational social capital. Other studies on circular migrants (see in particular Tarrius et al. 2013; Morokvasic-Müller 1999) explore the transnational networks that mobile people develop while on the road, based on encounters at particular times and in particular places: these relationships are characterised less by emotional ties (although they may develop) than by their usefulness. These networks may also be extended in relation to specific projects and the physical places where these projects take place. Recalling a business-related trip to Istanbul, Nuur told me how he called on his (extended kin related) transnational network to find a contact person in a place that was entirely new to him:

I stayed for five days. And him [the cousin], I met him there, through the tribe. So I went to Istanbul; I didn't know anyone there, so I called a cousin [in the Netherlands], I said, "Do you know anyone from the family in Istanbul, since you came through Istanbul?' [Showing me pictures on his smartphone] You see, this is us in his apartment. Can you imagine, we don't know each other, but after a couple of days we're like family. This is the tribe. [Semistructured interview, recorded]

Nuur's social capital is simultaneously voluminous, geographically extensive and composed of connections to people who themselves are endowed with economic, cultural and social capital, at least in specific social environments. Thanks to his social position within these networks, in terms of both gender, social class and ethnicity on the one hand and his lineage on the other, he is able to mobilise those relationships to pursue personal and collective projects, mostly at the

transnational level and in relation to his region of origin, which is the common defining factor of his networks. The relational aspect of social networks emerges from his story, illumining how the mobilisability of social connections depends on individual skills and power (Schapendonk 2015; Anthias 2007). Nuur's social capital both enables him to develop the mobility strategies from which he gains socioeconomic and symbolic advantages and is a product of these regular mobility practices.

#### **3.5.2.2 Imaan**

It is difficult to illustrate empirically how a lack of capital influences people's actions and strategies. Two long semi-structured interviews gave me some insights into Imaan's life and some of her ties with significant others, at two different moments. Furthermore, comparison with other respondents illustrates how social connections may be transformed into social capital and influence practices of mobility – and how a lack of social connections limits people's possibilities. Imaan's story, characterised by rare and negatively perceived mobility experiences, provides interesting insights into the ways in which limited social capital may make it difficult to pursue social mobility, but also intervene negatively in one's ability to accumulate mobility capital.

Imaan arrived in Switzerland when she was 15 years old, through irregular channels, although she was reunited with her eldest sister, who was already living there with her husband and children (see Chap. 2 for a fuller account). When she first arrived in Europe, her priority was to meet her local and transnational responsibilities towards her family, even though doing so required her to postpone her educational and career ambitions. She started working as an unqualified nursing assistant: her attempts to obtain qualifications failed and, despite her experience, she was unable to obtain another, more rewarding job.

In her interviews, Imaan only mentioned her immediate family as a relevant kin group linked by solidarity: she migrated to Europe, thanks to her eldest sister's help, to assist her in her domestic tasks. It appears that she is a central economic actor in this transnational family unit. Her sister, a mother of three children, has never been able to become economically self-sufficient, has been living with an unstable legal status for more than 15 years and thus has limited economic means to provide for her children and parents. Imaan's parents and other siblings all live in Djibouti and have a very limited income apart from the remittances they receive from her (and her sister).

In the spatial interview, Imaan made very clear that she does not have any other important people, besides her parents and siblings, who live elsewhere. Furthermore, she is not in contact with anyone, and indeed does not know anyone, who lives in Somalia. Her position within her kin and family networks is the dominant one: as a result, they benefit from being connected to her rather than vice versa. In other words, she is hardly in a position to transform those relationships into social capital. In this situation, she may remain socially stuck and be unable to draw on her social networks to develop beneficial mobility practices. This illustrates the need to focus not only on those social connections that allow migrants to get ahead in their lives, but also on those that do not work or may keep people "in place", both socially and geographically (see also Schapendonk 2015; Ryan 2010). Unless we do so, we may be prone to believing that social networks can only benefit a person.

But the social relationships that Imaan has developed in Switzerland also have to be taken into account. In recent years, her local social networks have changed, and even shrunk, demonstrating the contingent and dynamic character of social connections. In 2010, she married a French man she met through friends. At the time of our second meeting, he had been looking for a job for a long time, working in odd jobs and taking a course (in a field with low wages and recognition) in the meantime. Thanks to her fixed employment, Imaan was thus the main economic provider of the nuclear family. Her husband lost both his parents at a very young age, and they would visit his aunt – with whom he had grown up – in nearby France from time to time.

Apart from these occasional visits, Imaan mentioned having reduced contact with her family and friends because of the lack of time resulting from her full-time work and new parental responsibilities. It has been difficult for her to keep alive the few social contacts she used to have in her city. Her new family situation and responsibilities (in terms of both economic and domestic burdens) have affected her ability to maintain her local social relationships. In sum, when we look at the "strong ties" (Granovetter 1973) in her social networks, in Switzerland and elsewhere, we can observe that, besides being limited in volume, they are characterised by low levels of all types of capital, unlike Nuur's. Not only is Imaan unable to count on people who are close to her to pursue social advantages, but she herself needs to partially dedicate her (limited) resources to them. In this situation, it is no wonder that she has been unable to develop strategies involving social or physical mobility.

Yet, weak ties may be as important as strong ones when it comes to obtaining access to different kinds of resources (Granovetter 1973). Following her arrival, Imaan focused on becoming economically active, which jeopardised her ability to obtain an education, but enabled her, on the one hand, to meet her transnational responsibilities towards her close kin members and, on the other, to obtain a stable legal status in Switzerland, and later naturalisation. This came with a cost, however: although she has integrated into the labour market, her job provides few assets that can be mobilised for upward social mobility. Low socioeconomic positions often translate into a limited access to "weak ties", which are important in enabling individuals access to resources they cannot obtain directly (Granovetter 1973; Ryan 2010). During an interview, Imaan told me that employment conditions in state hospitals were better than in the private clinic where she works, yet she had no hope of being hired there:

If I left my job, I couldn't go and work at a state hospital. You need a diploma, and I don't have a diploma. I have experience, but I don't have a diploma. They want that. Or you need to know someone, a colleague who can [help you get in]. [J: And that you don't have?] And that I don't have. [Semi-structured interview, recorded]

In this excerpt, Imaan is explicit about her lack of institutionalised cultural capital *as well as* social capital: in her view, people can obtain better jobs if they have a diploma and people who can act as intermediaries and facilitate connections. In a case study on refugees in Malmö, Cederberg (2012) demonstrates that developing relationships with the majority population enables migrants to retrieve information and develop a sense of belonging; yet her informants face major obstacles in forging such relationships. Imaan is aware of the lack of vertical weak ties (Ryan 2010) in her local social networks, which makes it difficult for her to obtain a better job at a state hospital and thus to improve her socioeconomic situation.

Imaan's story of relative immobility illustrates how different types of capital – or, rather, the lack thereof – may directly or indirectly shape access to mobility and its potential as capital. While at first her unstable legal status prevented her from visiting her parents in Djibouti and made it difficult for her to visit her close friend in London, later on she encountered other constraints. When she finally obtained legal capital (through naturalisation), she also faced increased economic constraints (as the main provider for her family) as well as time constraints, which made it difficult for her to expand her social relations in her city and elsewhere. Her situation prevented her from investing in the necessary "social network work" (Pathirage and Collyer 2011) needed to accumulate social capital. Furthermore, her gendered position (in interaction with her civil status and social class in particular) is of great importance in understanding her trajectory: first as a single daughter, and later as a married mother, she has taken on responsibilities for others that have partially prevented her from pursuing opportunities.

Imaan has never mentioned mobility as something she would like to practice more. It is a delicate task to make an implicit reading of her lack of mobility through the lens of her lack of social capital. Yet I find it useful to discuss the biography of a person whose social capital is relatively limited, at both the local and transnational levels. While I cannot be certain that more social capital would have led Imaan to develop mobility practices, it can be assumed that her limited mobility capital is at least partially related to her low level of "mobilisable" social relations. Other respondents' stories show that certain conditions need to be met for initial moves to be perceived positively and eventually pursued. Social connections that can be mobilised in the place of residence as well as in other places are crucial to the development of mobility capital. Imaan's social networks, when compared to Nuur's, for instance, are quantitatively smaller and much less geographically extensive, and they involve many fewer connections to people who themselves possess some resources.

The ability to convert social capital into mobility capital is dependent on various conditions. As has been discussed, the number and quality of individuals' social relations are especially important to the amount of social capital those individuals possess (Bourdieu 1980). The stories of Imaan and Nuur have illustrated how their position and status in relation to significant others create specific constraints and opportunities (see also Anthias and Cederberg 2009). In a migration context, and when mobility is at stake, social capital is further characterised by the places of residence of those who embody the connections, as well as by their geographical spread. When social relations can be called on in a specific place, they create opportunities to develop activities there. Social capital thus plays a role in the appropriation of places.

Yet this section has also shown that access to local networks in the dominant society is also crucial (see also Ryan 2010; Cederberg 2012): those (often weak) ties at the local level largely influence the conditions under which mobility practices can develop. The diversity and characteristics of the social networks in which motility may develop will be discussed further in Chap. 4.

Finally, all three dimensions of the motility model (Flamm and Kaufmann 2006; Kaufmann et al. 2004) are evident in the transformation of social capital into mobility capital. Social capital intervenes in access to mobility indirectly by influencing people's socioeconomic conditions, which influence their ability to engage in crossborder movements, but also more directly by influencing their ability to appropriate places that are yet unknown. Nuur's access to Istanbul (and other places) was facilitated by his ease in mobilising a social connection there. In the same vein, social capital intervenes in transmitting the specific skills and knowledge that are needed to implement mobility strategies, including formal or informal knowledge regarding where to find someone or something in a new place. Finally, social actors' position within their social networks constitutes a major factor in shaping their ability to appropriate opportunities. Imaan could have mobilised some of her limited resources to develop mobility practices and benefit from them, but representations and normative prescriptions, notably regarding gendered responsibilities, have influenced her options, encouraging her to remain immobile.

#### **3.6 Conclusions**

Not everyone is in a position to develop transnational mobility practices, or to benefit from them. This chapter has shown that the people in this study have different relationships to mobility, and I relate the differing nature of these relationships to their differing quantities of other types of capital. It has demonstrated some of the processes through which social actors acquire, accumulate and convert different types of capital. It has shown that mobility capital develops on the relatively solid basis of economic, cultural, social and legal capital.3 Earlier in this book, I have argued that crossing borders is a way for people to access additional opportunities and improve their living conditions. This chapter demonstrates that the development of sustainable mobility practices, and especially their transformation into mobility capital, is dependent on the possession of other forms of resources validated in specific social fields.

<sup>3</sup> It might be useful to remind the reader here that the focus on this particular direction in the conversion process is only analytical and does not imply that conversions do not also take place in the opposite direction. The accumulation of mobility capital simultaneously shapes social actors' ability to develop and expand other mobilisable resources, as the next chapter shows.

I have analysed these processes under the theoretical perspective of capital and social positions. As I argued in Chap. 1, social actors occupy specific positions related to particular contexts, and those positions are directly related to the amount and types of capital they possess. Capital endowment is not only a matter of social class, but also of gender and ethnicity/race: these powerful axes of social difference help shape the constraints and opportunities that individuals are likely to encounter (Anthias 1998, 2001). What people are – in relation to others – and what they do, including when they cross borders, is partially shaped by intersecting social hierarchies. Respondents' stories show that social class, gender (as well as family situation and age), ethnicity/race, religion and migratory status all participate in socially locating people and influencing their life trajectories and experiences. The next paragraphs discuss each of these "systems of relations" distinctly, but most examples show that they constantly interact with and mutually shape each other (Walby et al. 2012).

The contrasting examples of Nuur and Imaan first demonstrate the influence of social class. Although they both arrived in Switzerland as refugees, their family backgrounds influenced their trajectories significantly. Thanks to the (relatively) privileged position of his family at the transnational level, Nuur was released from economic transnational responsibilities and had some initial cultural capital, which helped him accumulate more in his new host country, and he could later mobilise (family) social relations to develop his transnational projects and benefit from his mobility practices. At the time of her migration to Europe, Imaam was also part of a privileged group of people who had the economic means to leave Africa. However, her limited economic resources, once she arrived in Switzerland, and her responsibilities within her local and transnational networks led her to focus on earning money. She managed to succeed in that task, but her success came at the cost of her ability to acquire other assets, in particular in terms of education, which could have helped her obtain cultural capital.

Beside differences in these respondents' backgrounds, gendered positionings and responsibilities have also created opportunities and obstacles. During my fieldwork, people mentioned that families preferred to "send" young women than men to Europe because of their supposedly greater loyalty to those who stay in Africa (see Al-Sharmani 2010 for a nuanced analysis of gender relations in Somali transnational households). It is difficult to assess whether this has been true in Imaan's case, but what is certain is that her new marital and parental status, interrelated with gender, has influenced the opportunities open to her. Not only has she become the main economic provider of her new family unit, but she is also responsible for most domestic duties (she explicitly stated that she no longer has the time to see her friends or call her parents because of her domestic tasks). She has not been able to pursue her educational plans and has had to continuously postpone her visit to her parents in Djibouti. As a young wife and mother, Imaan has to keep many of her local and transnational projects on hold and cannot increase her cultural capital, while her social networks shrink. Nuur, who also married and became a parent (under very different circumstances), has not experienced such obstacles. On the contrary, he has continued to mobilise the assets he already had, and he has possibly

even expanded his social networks thanks to his marriage to a woman who lived elsewhere, and he has been able to continue building up projects in both his country of residence and, thanks to his mobility, other places. In sum, having children has not affected his plans in the way it has Imaam's.

Both Imaan and Nuur were able to acquire a stable legal status and become Swiss citizens. However, gender and parental status also intervene in migrants' ability to acquire legal status, as the example of Imaan's sister demonstrates. When she arrived in Switzerland, she was too old to enrol at school (unlike Imaan, who was able to go to school for a year) and already a (divorced) mother. With three children (one of them from a new marriage in Switzerland), she has never been able to become economically self-sufficient and has been denied a Swiss passport. Policies in the fields of immigration, asylum, integration and citizenship, like most other policies, also rely on gendered representations and assumptions. Care, immigration and employment regimes operate together to influence migrant women's access to specific segments of the labour market (often low-skilled sectors with little security), limiting the state support they can access (for example, day care) and linking legal statuses with specific rights and obligations (Bonizzoni 2014). Other research has shown that for undocumented migrants who want to regularise their situation, it is often harder for women to meet the necessary criteria: because of their family responsibilities and the types of jobs they have (unregulated, low-paid, part-time and so on), they face greater difficulties in demonstrating the durability and the stability of their employment and their economic independence (Gafner and Schmidlin 2007; Hagan 1998). Imaan's sister, like other mothers, is faced with similar constraints on her ability to acquire a secure status. Besides impacting her ability to become integrated into her country of residence, this situation also limits her transnational opportunities. Legal capital is crucial to the ability to develop mobility practices.

Finally, hierarchies based on ethnicity and race, but also on religion and migrant status ("being a migrant") also affect people's positioning and their ability to accumulate diverse types of capital. Difficulties in validating credentials, accessing adequate education and joining the labour market recur in many respondents' accounts. A few female respondents in Switzerland further explained how they have been refused some jobs or even educational paths because they wear a veil. I have heard only a few direct accounts of discrimination in the labour market during my fieldwork, and I have not focused my interviews on that aspect of respondents' lives. However, other studies demonstrate that migrants often encounter exclusion processes based on ethnicity, race and religion, processes that contribute to their remaining in unskilled, low-waged and insecure sectors (see for instance Bauder 2003, 2005; Erel 2009; Kelly and Lusis 2006). Economic marginalisation, as Imaan's story shows, limits one's ability to obtain various types of capital, including mobility capital.

However, many respondents in both countries mentioned their unease with a political climate that they perceive to be increasingly xenophobic, Islamophobic and restrictive towards foreigners and ethnic minorities. Othering practices are also evident in the negative experiences some respondents have had when crossing borders – being singled out, despite a European passport, because of their appearance or name. Concrete obstacles to accessing resources, but also racist incidents and feelings of exclusion, shape people's access to opportunities in their country of residence, but also potentially motivate them to develop alternative projects elsewhere. This argument is developed in the following chapter.

Social actors thus occupy specific classed, gendered and ethnicised/racialised social positions, but always in relation to specific contexts. Local contexts, or the "localities" (Dahinden 2010b; Guarnizo and Smith 1998) in which people are embedded, both constrain and facilitate their access to local resources. Respondents' main place of residence is a major context from which they draw resources. That is where all mobile respondents draw a significant share of the economic, cultural, social and legal capital they transform into motility. In particular, opportunities to integrate into the educational system and labour market as well as discriminatory procedures and legislation regarding asylum, integration and naturalisation are important in shaping people's access to resources in their country of residence. The discussion of the importance of "legal capital" for the development of profitable mobility practices further illuminates how (European) states' border regulations and immigration policies structure access to motility. As for other resources, the ability to capitalise on mobility is dependent on some degree of control over one's crossborder movements. Migrants, in particular those from poorer countries, need to invest time and energy, as well as other types of resources, to acquire this control over their own mobility. This control entails the power to choose whether or not to cross one or many borders, how often, when, where and under how much surveillance. In other words, respondents' social and legal position in their country of residence shapes their access to and accumulation of mobility capital.

However, places other than the place of residence are also relevant to understanding the transformation of different types of capital into motility. These include the country of origin (providing, for instance, the social capital on which political or humanitarian projects build) and other places that are relevant in migrants' mobility systems – for instance, previous places of residence or places that are visited by star-shaped travellers.

The next chapter explores how respondents' mobility practices play with the differentiated valuation of capital in the different places and networks they link together. By transnationalising capital, social actors are able to benefit from their mobility. It also discusses further how the ways in which actors acquire and transform capital are linked to their positions in classed, gendered and ethnicised/ racialised boundaries and hierarchies.

#### **References**


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# **Chapter 4 Transnationalising Resources: Three Biographies**

I have argued that mobility practices may turn into a type of capital that some of the respondents in this study are able to mobilise. Depending on the amount and composition of the other types of capital migrants possess, they can develop different practices of cross-border movements, which in turn allow them to obtain various advantages. In this chapter, I unpack how mobility may enhance migrants' socioeconomic situation. By focusing on a selected number of respondents' biographies, I demonstrate the complex and multifaceted processes that allow some people to circulate and "transnationalise" their capital thanks to their practices of border crossing.

Crossing borders is not only about quantitatively increasing the number of places where resources can be gathered: it is also about being able to circulate these resources and gain from doing so. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the twin processes involved when social actors cross borders and benefit from their mobility. On the one hand, mobility allows a geographical shift from one place to another: mobile people acquire specific resources in one place and reinvest – or mobilise – them in another place where they are valued more highly. On the other hand, there is often a shift in the social contexts and networks in which these resources are acquired and those in which they are reinvested. In both cases, and this is this chapter's main argument, social actors benefit from a favourable exchange rate of capital between the two contexts at stake. Mobility is the core resource that makes the transnationalisation of capital possible.

#### **4.1 Theoretical Debates on Migrants' Circulation of Capital**

Capitals do not have intrinsic and universal values. Their valuation depends on the context and the social field in which they are activated and mobilised (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Social status and symbolic power relate not only to the accumulation of resources, but also to the ability to mobilise them in social environments where they are valued most highly. If one's social position depends on one's possession of and access to different types of resources, and if these resources' symbolic value is historically and contextually constructed, then mobility and transnational practices complicate the story because they introduce multiple geographic locations into the game.

The first part of this section offers a theoretical discussion of the processes that allow migrants to benefit from the differences in the valuation of capital in different places by transnationalising the capital they possess. In doing so, it explores various debates in the literature on migration and transnational practices. First, I discuss scholarship that has attempted to illuminate the various ways through which migrants' social position may improve through the cross-border circulation of capital. A move from one place to another enhances resources' value, and migrants benefit from this favourable exchange rate.

The second part of this section examines the twin processes through which resources also gain value by being activated in social environments other than those in which they have been acquired.

#### *4.1.1 Social Positions and Inequalities in a Transnational Space*

Social theories of inequality (including Bourdieu's) tend to examine social positions, the differential allocation of resources and social hierarchies within the single arena of the nation-state. Bourdieu's conceptual landscape has been critiqued for not sufficiently taking into account the sometimes inconsistent and contradictory social positions of people even within a single national context (Bennett et al. 2009 in Erel 2010), let alone multiple national contexts (Nowicka 2013; Weiss 2005). This research is situated in a (quite recent) field that aims to "transnationalise" theories of capital and social inequalities (Erel 2010; Weiss 2005; Nieswand 2011; Kelly and Lusis 2006; Nowicka 2013; Beck 2007). Considering social inequalities under a perspective that challenges methodological nationalism makes it possible to ask a key question: "how can the frames, the units of social inequalities be constructed across borders and between people and populations whose identities also include solidarities which are based on other interactive and participatory classifications than nations and political units?" (Beck 2007).

In the late 1990s, Sayad (1999) initiated an epistemological turn in the sociology of migration by emphasising the interconnections of migrant's social statuses in their country of origin and in their place of immigration (in his case Algeria and France). Since then, the idea that migrants embedded in transnational fields often experience diverging social statuses, depending on whether they are evaluated with respect to their country of origin or their country of residence, has been developed further, often with a focus on status in the region of origin (see in particular Goldring 1998; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Nieswand 2011; Salih 2003; Anghel 2009). These authors demonstrate that transnational practices are an important means

through which migrants can maintain and improve their status and that of their kin in their place of origin. These practices include remittances, investment in a house or other property (land, business), gifts they bring with them when they visit, financial participation in important celebrations such as weddings and funerals, sponsorship of others' legal or illegal migration and participation in hometown associations. Salih (2001) demonstrates how Moroccan women who live in Italy make a great deal of effort to prepare for their annual visit to their place of origin, consuming and displaying particular consumption goods (for instance, clothes, shoes and domestic appliances) as symbols of their social status as residents of a European country. In a study on Ghanaian migrants in Germany, Nieswand (2011) emphasises how fulfilling social obligations and redistributing resources earned in the country of residence leads to a higher social status in the country of origin, despite the fact that the migrants in question no longer have the cultural capital or socioeconomic position that used to be the symbolic markers for higher social statuses in this context. Nieswand's research demonstrates that symbolic systems and the value of capital may be challenged (in this case by temporarily returning migrants): existing local hierarchies of power are modified by transnational practices and the circulation of not only people, but also the material and symbolic goods they carry with them (see also Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Goldring 2001). Symbolic systems are subject to negotiations and struggles regarding the legitimate sources of symbolic power and the value of different types of capital. Symbolic struggles revolve around not only the possession of resources, but also the value of these resources in a specific context and their position in a socially meaningful hierarchy. For instance, migrants introduce new resources into their country of origin that gain value mainly because they are associated with Western lifestyles and consumption practices (Salih 2001, 2003; Nieswand 2011).

What is particularly important here is that these discrepancies in statuses – what Nieswand (2011) calls migrants' "status paradox" – can only be properly understood when we take into account the different localities of the transnational field in which people are embedded, their characteristics and their relative position in a global context. Social locations may be multiple and contradictory depending on the context in which symbolic value is given to resources. For Nieswand, the status paradox "emerges in interaction with the opportunity structures for transnational transfers of resources on the one hand and the specific problems that occur by converting the material and symbolic resources earned in one socio-spatial context into social status in another" (2011).

This chapter focuses on the strategies through which mobile migrants transfer resources obtained in one place in order to have them be evaluated and mobilised advantageously in another. These strategies rely on the conscious or unconscious acknowledgement of symbolic exchange rates between different localities. This is where the different social, economic and political contexts that constitute actors' mobility systems become crucial, because they determine the value of specific resources, always in interaction with the gendered and ethnicised/racialised position of those who possess them. For a migrant of Somali origin, being fluent in English constitutes a form of cultural capital that has a different value depending on whether

it is mobilised to obtain a skilled job in Britain or to be employed in an international organisation or an NGO active in Somaliland. Two interrelated dimensions are at work. The first relates to actors' social location, in terms of their gender, ethnicity, race, religion, legal status or age, which is valued differently depending on the context. While being Somali, Black or Muslim may all have a negative impact on the value of specific resources (such as possessing job qualifications and speaking English) in the labour market in Britain, these same attributes become assets when the job needs to be done in Somalia. The second dimension relates to the intrinsic value of resources in relation to the locality itself (as well as the social field in which they are evaluated): being able to speak English might be an especially valuable asset when attempting to obtain a better job in Somaliland, but it is less so in Britain.

Nation-states are important in structuring the possibilities of transferring and exchanging resources, and therefore in determining their symbolic value (Nieswand 2011; Nowicka 2013). Weiss (2005) argues that the symbolic value of resources depends on the social, economic and political contexts in which they were accumulated, and on the international position of these contexts. States hold different positions in global power relations: imbalances in economic and political power can be seen in the international disparity in GDP per capita. States' differing positions can also be seen in the differences in the right to cross border and enter a national territory associated with different passports. "The position of (national) spaces in which an actor is situated structures the opportunity he/she is offered" (Weiss 2005) in terms of the ability to accumulate resources, but also in terms of mobilising them and capitalising on them, i.e. gaining advantage from them.

Scholars of migration and transnationalism have shown that the different positions of nation-states in global power hierarchies are important vectors and incentives for migration, as well as post-mobility and transnational practices (Glick Schiller 2010; Nieswand 2011). Weiss (2005) develops two concepts to grasp the ways in which these differences play out in people's strategies to transnationalise their resources: spatial autonomy, and the quality of spaces one has access to. Spatial autonomy refers to social actors' differentiated ability to choose optimal environments in relation to the resources they can mobilise. It refers to the possibility of moving to different places, rather than the actual fact of being mobile: as such, it is close to the concept of "motility" developed by Kaufman and his colleagues (Kaufmann et al. 2004; Flamm and Kaufmann 2006). Spatial autonomy is directly related to the quality of spaces that are accessible, i.e. their relative position in global power relations. "As spaces offer opportunities and preclude options, the unequal rank of spaces to which an actor is materially, socially and symbolically attached is one important factor structuring social positions on a world scale" (Weiss 2005). It follows that the transnationalisation of resources may be a strategic way for migrants and other mobile people to exploit the differences in the symbolic value of their resources in different localities. However, some resources are more easily "transnationalisable" than others, i.e. transferred and exchanged in a place other than that in which they have been acquired. In particular, it is much more difficult for migrants from less powerful states, even if they are highly skilled, to validate their cultural or social capital in Western countries than it is for those who move in the other direction (Weiss 2005). Much of the literature in this field has focused on the ways in which resources gained in the destination country are mobilised in the country of origin to enhance the social position of migrants and their relatives. The empirical sections that follow demonstrate how capital can also be transnationalised in others directions.

#### *4.1.2 The Valorisation of Capital Within Specific Hierarchies*

Geographical location is not the only dimension that determines the symbolic value of the resources circulated by mobile migrants. The concomitant shift involves gathering resources in specific locally bound or transnational contexts and mobilising them in other environments where their value is higher. I argue that migrants' social position within different hierarchies influences their ability to convert their capital into social advantages when it is transferred.

Bourdieu's concept of social fields provides a useful theoretical tool through which to understand how social relationships and networks are structured by power relations (see also Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). According to Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), different types of capital are valued differently depending on the social field in which they are mobilised. Lahire (2001) argues for a less restrictive, "metaphoric" definition of social fields than Bourdieu's, which "is limited to configurations within which power struggles between agents with objective characteristics and differentiated interests, strategies, etc. take place" (39, personal translation). Based on this idea, I am interested in the different and interlocking sets of relationships in which individuals are embedded, and in which they occupy specific social positions.

The aim of empirical analyses, from this perspective, is to define the different formal and informal structures that are relevant to respondents' lives and practices, the institutions with which the respondents are connected and the various networks in which they navigate. I refer to these structures as the "frames of reference" within which respondents acquire resources or reinvest them. I focus on contexts that are significant for the empirical issue under investigation, namely the transfer and circulation of various types of capital. This chapter thus interrogates the multiple contexts and social fields in which Somali migrants are simultaneously embedded through their participation in local, national and transnational networks and institutions.

As other researchers in transnational studies have done (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Nieswand 2011; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004), I examine these ideas through an empirical analysis of the diverse social connections that respondents have created with significant others who are located in different places. The social fields (widely defined) in which migrants participate will be analysed more specifically under the light of the social hierarchies that cross them.

As discussed in the theoretical introduction, social actors occupy specific social positions in relation to hierarchies and boundaries related to gender, class, ethnicity

and race. However, their positions may be inconsistent depending on the context and the social fields in which they are understood: migrants, for instance, may belong to a disadvantaged socioeconomic group vis-à-vis the local population but simultaneously hold privileged positions within particular networks, for instance those based on a shared ethno-national background. The analysis will focus on these inconsistencies and show the processes that make it possible for social actors to benefit from mobilising resources gathered in one social context and investing them in other, often ethnicised, social networks. It will also demonstrate that cross-border mobility acts as an important facilitator of these transfers. The idea of simultaneity is especially important here: it is *because* people are connected to different institutions and embedded in different networks at the same time that they can transfer resources from one to the other and benefit from doing so.

Migration scholars, in particular those working from a feminist perspective, have demonstrated how networks characterised by ethno-national homogeneity are crossed by (internal) social hierarchies based on gender, legal status and education. They argue that these "migration-specific social fields" (Erel 2010) constitute contexts in which some migrants are able to valorise some types of capital that they cannot valorise in the majority society. In particular, a strand in this literature focuses on the ways migrants actively valorise some of the resources they have brought with them when they migrate to the country of residence (see for instance Erel 2009, 2010; Nowicka 2013; Anthias and Cederberg 2009; Anthias 2007). Erel (2009, 2010) argues that migrants not only adapt whatever cultural capital they have brought with them from the country of origin to the host country, but also develop strategies to validate their capital in frameworks that are alternative or oppositional to the national framework. She confronts a "national (cultural) capital" (based on a concept by Hage 1998), validated at the local level of the nation-state, with a capital validated within what she calls a "migration-specific social field". This field is the one in which migrants are able to bargain over the value of their resources and transform them into capital, mostly through two related processes. The first is the gathering of new resources in addition to those they already had previously to migration. The second is the development of strategies to validate their cultural capital in specific social fields, often building on internal differentiation within the migrant network, for instance gender or ethnicity. In the case of the Turkish women in Erel's case study, being Kurdish or having knowledge of a "good" Turkish language may be mobilised in the migration country to access employment, for instance as teachers for Turkish children. Gender, belonging to a majority or minority population in the country of origin, religion, rural-urban origin and legal status are all markers of social differentiation and demonstrate the heterogeneity of the migrant population.

"Migration-specific networks" are characterised by shared ethnicity or nationality among their members, and people who participate in them hold various social positions within them determined partly by gender, educational level, legal status and religious identification, for example. Some scholars are interested in how ethnicity can become a resource for some people who occupy privileged positions within these networks. In fact, ethnicity has been acknowledged as a potentially strong resource that migrants may mobilise in their country of settlement, although

with important drawbacks. Ethnicity becomes a part of migrants' "migrationspecific cultural capital" (Erel 2010) when, for example, it enables them to have access to specific sectors of the labour market. The field of intercultural mediation, which has been increasingly institutionalised in recent years (Dahinden and Bischoff 2010), is one of the specific sectors in which "cultural" and linguistic knowledge constitute indispensable assets, in particular in the local context. Many of the respondents in this study are or were employed as intercultural mediators in their country of residence, using their ethnicised/racialised embodied cultural capital. However, these service jobs, aimed at other, less privileged migrants' needs, rarely lead to upward mobility: instead, they are ethnicised/racialised (and gendered) niches based on skills and knowledge that are difficult to transfer to other sectors (Erel 2010; Lutz 1993; Liversage 2009).

The issue of ethnicity as a resource is also central in the literature on ethnic businesses (Pécoud 2010; Morokvasic-Müller 1999). According to the "ethnic approach" (Pécoud 2010) or "ethnic resource model" (Piguet 2010), ethnicity may be crucial to the success of migrant entrepreneurs who benefit from their cultural skills and specificity. Such may be the case when the clientele is defined by ethnic boundaries with specific needs and wishes, when the entrepreneurs count on (often cheap) labour from their ethnic group to develop their business, or when a local population is potentially interested in finding specific "exotic" products (Piguet 2010; Anthias and Cederberg 2009). This perspective on ethnic businesses, which focuses on the networks in which entrepreneurs, their customers and their employees move, has been criticised for two major reasons. First, it does not pay enough attention to the socioeconomic, legal and institutional contexts in which ethnic businesses develop. Migrants often face high levels of competition and have little choice but to enter the lowest threshold of the market, and they often remain trapped in poor areas with poor customers (see for instance Jones et al. 2010; Ram et al. 2008).

Second, it obscures both the tensions and the other lines of differentiation that cross the populations in which migrant businesses exist (Pécoud 2010; Anthias and Cederberg 2009; Anthias 2007). The focus on intra-ethnic solidarity diverts attention from the heterogeneity of the migrant population, which also shapes access to, and success in, business activities. Studies (for instance Anthias 2007; Anthias and Cederberg 2009) have demonstrated, for example, that ethnic entrepreneurs are often only able to survive by making use of cheap labour provided by family members, women and/or newly arrived migrants. Their ethnic background may help these employees acquire these jobs, but the jobs occupy the lower positions in an already marginalised segment of the labour market. This study includes respondents who are or have been active in these ethnicised and gendered economic niches, i.e. intercultural jobs or ethnic businesses. It focuses on how individuals' social positions within different social fields influence their ability to acquire or invest different types of capital within those fields, but with a specific focus on the transnational (and not only localised) character of those processes.

More generally, recent academic discussions about migrants' social networks have pointed to the importance of also examining networks that are not characterised by ethno-national homogeneity. Ties with people "outside the ethnic group" may act as important bridges to the majority population and thus constitute important sources of capital (see also Chap. 3 for a more thorough discussion of migrant's social networks). There has been a tendency to assume that the most important ties (and thus those worth exploring) are the ones migrants create or sustain with people of the same ethnic background, and these ties are often presumed to be strong ones. Critiquing this assumption, however, some recent studies have empirically analysed the networks in which migrants are embedded without limiting their investigation to (strong) ties with co-ethnics: they demonstrate the relevance of other types of bonds in migrants' lives (see in particular Ryan 2010; Cederberg 2012; Glick Schiller et al. 2006; Dahinden 2005). These studies have demonstrated that building up relationships to people and institutions "outside the ethnic group" is of great importance in being able to access different resources and improve one's socioeconomic conditions.

Migrants' access to what can be considered the majority population (i.e. the nonmigrant population), in particular through weak ties, has a major impact on opportunities for settlement, incorporation and social mobility in general. Many authors have found that, in spite of their attempts to build these types of connections, many migrants find it very difficult to access those networks (see for instance Cederberg 2012; Ryan 2010). Processes of social closure towards migrants prevent these "outsiders" from accessing resources that are available to the majority population. For instance, strategies to make new friends outside of the ethnic group are confronted with class discrimination based on ethnicity (Ryan 2010) or difficulties related to structural conditions such as life in ethnically segregated areas (Cederberg 2012). In a study on access to positions for migrant doctors, Raghuram and her colleagues (2010) demonstrate the ways in which migrants are pushed into less desirable positions within the field because of tendency of non-migrant networks to favour nonmigrants, as well as discriminatory practices and racist attitudes.

Including in the picture the networks that migrants find it difficult or impossible to access thus makes it possible to grasp the contextual and structural elements that shape the kind of bonds and relationships that people are able to build. It points to the relevance of the social position that individuals occupy in specific contexts in their ability to develop different kinds of ties.

Theoretical and empirical debates regarding, on the one hand, differentiated "migration-specific social fields" and, on the other, the inclusion of non-ethnically bounded social networks in analyses of migrants' lives are important to my argument in this chapter because they examine the processes through which capital is acquired or invested in social fields in light of the specific hierarchies that cross them.

#### *4.1.3 Farhan, Safia and Fatuma*

Many of the respondents in this study have developed various types of mobility practices, all of which, in one way or another, affect the ways in which they transnationalise their capital. The life stories of two women and one man have been chosen to illuminate how the processes described in the theoretical discussion above

actually occur in their lives, and how they relate to their practices of mobility. How do the resources that migrants arrive with affect their processes of settlement and mobility? What types of capital do the migrants accumulate to develop cross-border mobility practices and benefit from them? How are assets gathered in one place and converted in another context? In what social fields in particular do these migrants most fruitfully invest their capital? What role do ethnic belonging and representations about it play in these processes?

Mobility practices develop over long periods of time, depending on the amount and types of capital that have been accumulated in specific places and at specific times. Earlier in this book, for instance, I have shown that a stable legal status, in particular citizenship in the country of residence, may allow migrants to benefit from wider opportunities for cross-border mobility. Likewise, marriage, the arrival of children, divorce or having grown-up children leave the household may affect how and whether mobility capital can be mobilised. A diachronic perspective takes these evolutions in the respondents' lives into account and thus allows for a better understanding of the different dimensions that shape the constraints and opportunities they face at specific moments in their lives. It also shows how mobility capital builds from recurring experiences of mobility – which are not always experienced positively at the time – and from increased control over one's movements.

The three life stories recounted in this chapter principally focus on the events that occurred between the respondents' initial migration to Europe and the time of the interview(s). A few aspects of the respondents' situation in their country of origin before they left are also included to illuminate their socioeconomic background and the resources they could count on when they arrived in Europe. Attention is largely given to cross-border mobility as it has been, is currently being or will be practiced. However, it would not be possible to understand those practices without relating them to the settlement processes in which respondents simultaneously engage.

The stories of Farhan, Safia and Fatuma have been chosen, on the one hand, because they demonstrate clearly how mobility capital is acquired transnationally, converted and invested, and, on the other, because of the variations they present. These mobile migrants have developed different types of mobility practices at different times in their lives, which together include all the ideal types described in Chap. 2 (except for definitive return). The respondents were based in different places at the time of the interview, in Switzerland, in London or penduling between the two. Their level of education, type of professional activity and employment, family situation and projects for the future differed significantly. Furthermore, while Fatuma and Farhan are originally from the southern part of Somalia, Safia's family is from Somaliland. However, they are all citizens of a European country in which they have resided or are currently residing; they are in their early 40s, have children and were among the first refugees to arrive in Europe at the beginning of the conflict in Somalia. Their trajectories cannot be considered representative of those of Somali migrants in Europe, or even of the other respondents in this study. However, the multiple and interrelated processes through which these migrants activate their mobility capital to transnationalise their resources can be observed in most of the mobility practices developed by the people I have met.

#### **4.2 Farhan: Penduling and Taking the Best from Two Places**

We already met Farhan in Chap. 2. After having lived and worked in Switzerland while spending weekends and holidays with his family in London for 8 years, he moved to Britain. A couple of years later, however, he decided to take a job in Switzerland again, and he started penduling once again. I had the chance to meet him on many occasions during the research, in both Switzerland and London, and to conduct five interviews with him: this has allowed me to observe changes in his aims and strategies over time, and to have in-depth discussions with him regarding various themes. He was always very keen to meet with me, and he shared a great deal of information about his own trajectory and offered very perceptive analyses on many issues. Farhan's story of constant movements between two nation-states in Europe is illustrative of the differentiated resources each context offers, but also of the ways these resources may be "transnationalisable", i.e. be validated in places other than where they were acquired. Mobility becomes capital because it allows the individuals who are endowed with it to expand their sources of various assets and validate them in different places. This case study also points to the role played by the British context in (re)creating connections with the place of origin, Somalia.

#### *4.2.1 Migration to Switzerland: The Importance of Acquiring Education*

Farhan arrived in Switzerland in the early 1990s at the age of 20, after having interrupted his university education in Somalia. He has always regarded higher education as a priority, for himself and his children. In his early years as a migrant, he took advantage of his position as an educated single man without transnational economic responsibilities to obtain a tertiary education. He was aware that the social background of those like him who arrived in the early 1990s played a role in having this opportunity, contrasting it with that of Somalis who have left the country more recently:

When we left the country, our parents were from the middle class, and the jobs that we could find [here], such as cleaners or kitchen porters, weren't very rewarding, so we didn't really want to take them. [Semi-structured interview, UK, notes]

Despite this relatively privileged position, his educational trajectory in Switzerland was not without difficulties, because of the non-recognition of his Somali highschool certificate, his unstable legal status and the constraints of having to finance his studies himself. His aim from the start had been to acquire a higher education, but soon after his arrival he took an unskilled job. This rapid involvement in the labour market, as well as the French lessons he partially financed himself, allowed Farhan to slowly build a local social network with colleagues and friends, and to understand how the Swiss labour and education markets function. After a few years, he decided to obtain his *maturité*, the Swiss diploma that is equivalent to a high-school certificate and opens the door to tertiary education. Of the limited options offered to adults who want to obtain this diploma, he chose the shorter but more expensive one, in a private school. He told me that he had saved money from his wages, but that the school director had agreed to charge him reduced fees because of his situation. When I asked how he came to this agreement with the director, Farhan told me:

I had heard about it [the school] from a work colleague, whose son was enrolled in this private school. She told me, "Maybe if you went to meet the director, he could do something for you; maybe you could make a deal". But I think that the other thing that worked in my favour was that he was of foreign origin too. Even though he had arrived in Europe as a kid, he was of Iranian origin. And I think he had some kind of interest in philanthropy, so I explained my situation to him, and he said [OK]. [Biographical interview, Switzerland, recorded]

At least two elements are relevant in Farhan's access to the *maturité*. First, his involvement in the labour market resulted in the development of weak ties, in particular with colleagues who could inform him about opportunities he, as a newcomer, might not have direct access to. Second, the relationship with the school's director, which Farhan characterises as partially based on a commonality – the migration experience – helped him.

From the beginning, Farhan worked either full-time (saving money) or part-time, investing his wages in language courses, the private school to obtain his *maturité* and then university. His Swiss diploma and his experience in local companies allowed him to accumulate institutionalised cultural capital, but also embodied cultural capital, in the form of fluency in French and familiarity with the norms of his work setting and the local labour market in general. He mentions having simultaneously created local relationships based on his professional and associational activities, as well as a small network of friends who had arrived from Somalia at the same time as him.

#### *4.2.2 The Beginning of Penduling*

While he was studying, Farhan met a Somali woman living in London, to whom he got married and with whom he has since had four children. Neither of them was interested in moving to the other's country of residence: Farhan wanted to capitalise on the effort he had made to acquire educational and work experience in Switzerland, while his wife (according to her husband's account) had kin and friend networks in London she did not want to leave. In this situation, they decided that their best option was, at least for a while, for him to move back and forth between the two places. That is how Farhan started penduling: studying and working in Switzerland, and spending time with his family in London. This gendered arrangement allowed Farhan to become the primary economic provider of the transnational unit, and to acquire the cultural and social capital needed to do so in the best context for him (i.e. Switzerland). At the same time, it provided the most favourable environment for his wife to assume the unit's domestic and educational responsibilities, since she and their children were located in London.

Before he moved to London, he perceived the advantages that the city offered mostly in terms of his children's upbringing. The kind of education that Farhan wants his children to have is based on strict educational principles and control (for instance regarding who they socialise with), on their learning about their parents' place of origin (in terms of language, religion and culture), and on access to a good education. The couple found that London offered better opportunities in this regard than Switzerland. This vision of London was also shaped by the fact that Farhan's wife has lived there for a long time and has developed connections that make her life comfortable, at least regarding her mothering responsibilities. Farhan acknowledges that his wife and children navigate mostly within "Somali circles" when it comes to kin and friendship ties (which could be considered strong ties). Yet he also explained that she manages better than he the relationships with local authorities and administrations. She has thus acquired (limited) informal cultural capital and social capital, which allow her to obtain the necessary information for the family's local anchorage. Furthermore, these resources, although relevant in the London context, would have little value in another place, for instance Switzerland.

This situation has motivated the sedentarity of Farhan's wife and children and justified his own moving back and forth. Furthermore, Farhan places a strong emphasis on his children's academic education. In this regard too, London offers much better opportunities in his eyes. During an interview in Switzerland, he compared the situation in London with what can be found in Switzerland:

I want to enrol my eldest son [10 years old] in a school that is… not private, but it is a public school that selects its pupils according to their IQ, at least that is what they say. And this school is very focused on academics. They said that 1,500 people want to enrol, but they take only 180, you see. […] So we went to the open-house days, and I could see all the people who were there, the parents, the pupils, you could see all races. So it gives you the courage to try to do it, [because you see that] there is an opportunity to give them a good education. And when we visited all the different sections – sciences, chemistry, physics – and we could see all the children of all ages, but also of different origins, Asians, Africans… at least Blacks, Europeans. [J: And you feel that this would not be possible in Switzerland?] I could not say that, but I think it would be less possible in Switzerland. […] The problem is that here, you are penalised from the start. Because [there are] those who have middleclass parents who know how to support their kids with school, how to help them with homework, at least to give them a structure through their education. Here, it's difficult for the parents who don't have that, who are migrants, or who aren't middle class. But there, you have, not private schools, but extra classes [*cours d'appui*]. It's an industry; it's not just a university student giving an hour here or there. There, after school hours, it's not compulsory, but you can take your kids there for an hour or two to do some arithmetic. [Biographical interview, Switzerland, recorded]

Farhan sees better academic opportunities in Britain's neoliberal meritocratic educational system than in Switzerland's state-managed system. He is explicit that he is a migrant, but one who has high academic expectations for his children, and that he is prepared to make the best of all opportunities offered to people in his situation. He believes people who are lower class in Europe and are willing to work hard are better rewarded in Britain than in Switzerland. This view relates to his own cultural capital (maybe also his wife's), and the investment he is willing to make, in particular in terms of time and money, to transmit what he has accumulated to the next generation (Bourdieu 1979b), and to compensate for what he has lost through migration. His family's choices regarding settlement and mobility are made taking into account the possibilities for social mobility. Farhan, who came from a middleclass family, experienced a strong devaluation of his (institutionalised) cultural capital, as well as his economic and social capital, when he fled Somalia. The couple's choices regarding their settlement and mobility practices are intended to improve their socioeconomic situation, primarily by building their cultural capital. These strategies appear to be highly dependent on their classed and ethnicised position within particular contexts.

What is central here is that Farhan's investment in his children's academic education in Britain is partly based on resources that are acquired in another nation-state, namely Switzerland. Nowicka (2013) demonstrates that economic capital earned by migrants in the destination country is sometimes transformed into cultural capital by being invested in the next generation's education in the country of origin. Farhan's biography shows that other mobility strategies, such as his back and forth movements, may have similar goals. Cultural, social and economic capital are transnationalised by being accumulated in Switzerland and (partially) reinvested in Britain.

Farhan's regular mobility practices are thus a central piece in this gendered arrangement and his mobility practices would be meaningless without his wife's sedentary lifestyle. The two spouses have accumulated different types of capital, which are invested in their children's education. Both spouses participate in developing the conditions for improving their socioeconomic status, both in Europe and possibly in their country of origin. However, the localised resources that Farhan's wife has accumulated have limited potential in comparison to the more transferable, transnationalisable assets that Farhan himself has acquired. As he put it, he is the "mobile element of this unit": this situation results in a crystallisation of the unequal division of their mobility capital, since the capital that Farhan has accumulated cannot be transferred to his wife.

Farhan moved back and forth between Switzerland and Britain for 8 years. His mobility became easier when he finished his studies and could start working fulltime as a qualified employee in his field, and later when he became a Swiss citizen. His socioeconomic and legal situation stabilised, which gave him more flexibility to travel back and forth. In contrast to his colleagues, he viewed the irregular working hours demanded by his employer positively: he would work long hours, including night shifts, during some periods, and benefit from several consecutive days off, during which he would spend time with his family in London.

#### *4.2.3 From Switzerland to Britain: A Secondary Move*

In 2008, Farhan's mobility strategy took a new turn, as he decided to move to London and settle there with his family. The decision was taken for family reasons, but also because Farhan hoped he would be able to complete a master's degree in his field and improve his qualifications. In terms of work and educational prospects,

however, his expectations were disappointed: although he found a job, he was never satisfied with the working conditions in London and could not find a master's that fulfilled his ambitions. Farhan interpreted this situation as resulting from his lack of preparation before his move:

The travelling was taking me a lot of time, the constant trips between Switzerland and London. If I had had more information, I would have taken shortcuts. When I arrived here in London, I immediately found a job. But I had been looking for a year before I came. And I didn't take the time to prepare myself, for instance by learning English, which would have allowed me to start studying straight away. My main idea when I came here was to do a master's. As well as becoming closer to my family, of course. But the courses are too expensive. I'd thought I could find an employer who would be ready to pay for part of my studies, but that proved difficult. [Semi-structured interview, UK, recorded]

Constant mobility involves difficulties and costs: it takes time and means that some activities cannot be undertaken, as Farhan observes. But being part of a transnational family also results in emotional costs that may include love, fear, anxiety and sacrifice, and that – despite a lack of attention to them in the literature – also touch migrant men (for exceptions, see Montes 2013; Ryan 2010). Farhan told me of the emotional pain associated with being separated from his family; their decision to stop the back and forth movements was an attempt to mitigate the emotional costs of being a transnational family. For several years, he and his wife had seen penduling as the best way to capitalise on the assets they had accumulated. But then they thought they could try to settle in one place and mobilise their resources mainly in London. Work, study and family life would mostly take place there, although transnational connections to other places remained alive.

London offered another advantage: access to a master's degree in his field of education. His motivation to obtain a British master's relates to economic criteria (although expensive, it costs him less than in Switzerland), the quality of the education and his perception that it is a more "transnationalisable" degree:

In fact, another reason [apart from the economic one] is that Britain is more advanced than Switzerland when it comes to higher degrees. There are many universities in London where you can do a master's in my field, and I reckon that it would be a new experience for me, an additional degree. And if one day I decide to leave and go to Africa, or to Geneva [referring to the international organisations located there], or to Switzerland…. Or to find a job at an NGO or at the United Nations, I don't know. [Semi-structured interview, UK, recorded]

This quotation demonstrates particularly well the central role that mobility plays in Farhan's projections. His career builds on gathering resources that may be valued in more than one setting: Switzerland, Britain, Africa, but also the transnational world of NGOs and international organisations. When thinking about accumulating additional institutionalised cultural capital by acquiring another degree, he strategically opts for a setting that might have greater value at the transnational level. Britain can be considered an "economic and cultural hegemonic" nation-state from which location-specific cultural capital (i.e. a British master's and the English language) can be transnationalised (Weiss 2005). A British master's degree has better academic recognition, but it would also "force" him to improve his English, which appears to be an important lack in his portfolio of skills.

The move from Switzerland to London, however, did not meet Farhan's expectations. His disappointment was related to his difficulties in enrolling at a British university and paying the fees, but also to the job he was able to obtain. Lacking the necessary information, he had imagined that his qualification and professional experience would be sufficient for him to obtain an interesting position in Britain, with opportunities for further education and career advancement. He sees this unsatisfying outcome as resulting from his lack of preparation before he undertook the move to Britain; at the same time, he mentions having looked for a job for a year before he actually decided to move. The dilemma he faced demonstrates the difficulties involved in planning something in one place while being physically in another. Farhan finally found a job after his move to London, although not the kind of job he had hoped for. He described his job as "not rewarding" and referred to it as "assembly-line work", comparing it with his previous employment in Switzerland, where he had time to learn things and grow, personally and professionally. This contrast has to do with differences between the two countries. But more importantly, it is related to Farhan's own position, based on his endowment with different types of capital and their differentiated valuation in the two contexts. His institutionalised capital may be "transnationalisable": his Swiss diploma is recognised in the British labour market. Furthermore, Farhan has accumulated embodied cultural capital valued in a European context: he is perfectly aware of the cultural norms of the European labour market and recruitment processes, and he dresses, behaves and speaks accordingly.

But he lacks other types of capital, in particular specific forms of informal cultural capital and social capital. The informal cultural capital that Farhan lacks consists of knowledge of implicit institutional rules, the "rules of the game" in this particular social field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Because he needed to start earning a salary quickly, he could not wait to accumulate these resources and obtain the kind of job he had hoped for. Knowledge of English is another kind of cultural capital that Farhan lacks. He repeatedly mentioned his limited proficiency in this language as a major constraint in the labour and educational markets in Britain.

The issue of social capital is also relevant to understanding Farhan's difficulty in accessing the labour market. He is aware that if he had had the right information, he "would have taken shortcuts". Information is one of the main resources that circulate within social networks. The social networks Farhan is able to mobilise in this specific social field, however, are located in Switzerland and cannot be activated to obtain information elsewhere. During his years of penduling, Farhan has developed some relationships in London, mostly based on his wife's relatives and neighbourhood connections: these bonds, however, cannot be transformed into social capital, at least in his field of qualification. His temporary stays in Britain have not allowed him to develop the kinds of ties, in particular weak ones, that he could have used to obtain the kind of information he needed. The capital endowment that Farhan could count on, and its valuation in this specific context, further relates to his position as a migrant, a Swiss man of Somali origin and a person whose social trajectory tends towards upward mobility. Although his social networks in Switzerland are quite diverse, those he has developed in Britain are mostly based on kin and neighbourhood bonds; they are also characterised by ethnic and social homogeneity and cannot be mobilised for employment in his field. The "bridging" potential of these connections is thus limited. These limitations are related to his wife's migration trajectory, the local context's favouring of ethnically homogeneous areas and his years of penduling, which have prevented him from creating other kinds of relationships in London.1 Farhan's story illuminates that, although mobility can often be a resource, being constantly on the move may also limit opportunities to develop sustainable relationships (as well as other types of resources).

For all these different reasons, Farhan never obtained the kind of employment he had hoped for in London. The difficulties he experienced in trying to transfer his cultural capital to Britain demonstrate the relative precariousness of his classed positioning in Switzerland. Although, to adopt Weiss's (2005) terminology, he moved from one centre state to another, and despite the bilateral agreements between the two European countries that permit the free circulation of people and the recognition of foreign credentials, he could not fully validate his assets in the new context. Farhan does not belong to the "transnational upper class" described by Weiss in her study: his situation is not that of an expatriate whose mobility is related to an employer (although he would like it to be one day), but of an individual highly skilled mobile European. Moreover, his trajectory as a migrant has limited the amount and quality of the resources he has been able to acquire in Switzerland: although his trajectory has been successful (in comparison to that of other Somali migrants), his institutionalised and embodied cultural capital and his social capital are ultimately limited. If he had grown up in Switzerland in a middle-class family like the one he came from, he might have been able to learn English as a teenager (at school or through student exchanges), or he could have counted on weak ties from parents or relatives who could have connected him with people and institutions in London. Moreover, although he is a Swiss citizen, his national and religious background has positioned him as a Somali Muslim man in the British context, which may have contributed to the difficulties he faced in obtaining the job he was hoping for. For these different reasons, Farhan's classed position in Britain is more ambiguous than it is in Switzerland.

When he realised that it would be difficult and time-consuming to gather the necessary resources, he decided to once again mobilise his connections in Switzerland, and to again undertake back and forth movements (see next section). However, during the couple of years he lived in London, he created new relationships with a group of Somali intellectual men, which became important in his life.

<sup>1</sup>His ability to validate his capital in the British context may also have been limited due to discriminatory practices and racist attitudes. Farhan has never mentioned having had such experiences, but other studies point to practices that exclude migrants from the labour market by employers, but also by colleagues and customers (Fangen and Paasche 2013; Raghuram et al. 2010; Bauder 2003). Subtle discrimination practices tend to push even highly qualified migrants into less desirable positions, for instance in the case of migrant doctors in Britain (Raghuram et al. 2010). Employers' evaluation of potential employees is further influenced by cultural judgements, which are partially based on ethnicised or racialised representations: how one looks, dresses, speaks or even smells might play a part in the valuation of one's skills, demonstrating how embodied cultural capital interacts with institutionalised cultural capital (Bauder 2005).

#### *4.2.4 "Closer to Somalia"*

In the last interview I had with Farhan, he reflected on why he had moved to London. He mentioned that it was also part of a project to "get closer to Somalia". Intrigued, I asked more, and I learnt that Farhan had found a resource in London he had not expected – a specific network that was highly homogenous in terms of national origin, gender and level of education. Joining this small group of Somali intellectual men who live in London has been a way for him to reactivate a transnational "way of belonging" (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004) and identify more closely with other Somalis, although not all Somalis:

Because I have been thinking in terms of the long run. But also, for me it would be more interesting to stay there [in London] if I want to have contacts with Somalia. Because I also like to be close to, not all Somalis, but some of them, and to be in touch with what is happening in Somalia. Because when I am here [in Switzerland], I feel isolated, because I don't listen to the Somali media, their websites or their radios, because, I don't know, I don't find them useful. They only report on facts, there isn't any reflection, there aren't any in-depth analyses; it is merely people reacting to events, but nothing more. But what I have been finding in London, for some time now, is that I have met a few people and we send articles to each other, not only about Somalia, but about everything that concerns politics, and the state of the world. And that allows me to have exchanges that are richer intellectually, if I may say so. [Biographical interview, Switzerland, recorded]

Farhan makes a clear distinction between the two places ("here" and "there") in terms of the intellectual stimulation he can find through specific networks. He has found an adequate informal group of people who meet his expectations in London: a friend introduced him to the other men who participate in these discussions. Farhan mentioned them for the first time in London, as he had just started to spend time with them and was hoping their encounters would evolve in a satisfying way. While he considered them at that time to be "acquaintances" rather than friends, the other men in the group had known each other for much longer, sometimes from before their arrival in Britain. They had all arrived in Britain as students. In Farhan's eyes, their bonds are based on common interests, openness and the pursuit of knowledge. The group meets regularly in coffee shops in the city centre, since the men who participate live in different areas of London. A year later, when I met Farhan again, he was still meeting the group regularly, about once a month, sometimes even initiating the encounters himself. Although some of the exchanges take place virtually (they send articles or YouTube links to each other), they set up more formal meetings to discuss and analyse the material they have circulated. Physical presence in London is thus required to benefit from participating in this group. Moving to Britain and settling there for some time allowed Farhan to develop ties other than those related to his family: when he was penduling, his time in London was limited and mostly devoted to his family. Once he started spending most of his time there, he could diversify his connections.

Farhan draws clear boundaries between this group of men and other Somalis, whether they are in Switzerland, London or Somalia. The lines he draws are multifaceted, but they are always based on different endowments of cultural capital. In the excerpt above, the emphasis is on the kind of intellectual exchanges that take place in those different networks (the group of Somali men vs. transnational Somali media). The distinction is made on the type of information that flows: based on analysis in his new circle in London, and based on factual accounts in the (Somali) media he can access in Switzerland. Farhan further distinguishes between the men he meets in coffee shops in the city and the other Somalis he meets "every day in [his] neighbourhood, mostly at the mosque or at the local café". Once again, the difference is based on the issues that are discussed with those relevant others: political, philosophical, intellectual exchanges in the first case, more down-to-earth and practical conversations (children's education and appropriate religious behaviour, for instance) in the second. Although Farhan regularly mixes with Somalis in his area, he draws a line between himself and (most of) them, based on a distinction between "Europeanised" and "traditional" Somalis. This dichotomy came up regularly in the discussions I had with Farhan (and other respondents): he partially relates it to his trajectory of mobility within Europe. Farhan associates himself with the "Europeanised" side and relates it to the time he has spent in Switzerland. Comparing Somali migrants in the British and the Swiss contexts, he emphasises that the former have limited contacts with the majority population (Somalis live among themselves), while the latter have more opportunities to mix with people of different origins:

Of the Somalis who arrived in London, some of them came directly from Africa and were parachuted into London, where they live in neighbourhoods – I don't want to call them ghettos, but at least in places where there are fewer opportunities to mix with other cultures, at least European. So there is an obstacle to integration, to learning civic behaviour, how to handle things, manage a budget, pay the bills, have time for oneself but also for others. So I would say some of these people would be less organised than others who came from Europe. [Biographical interview, Switzerland, recorded]

In his trajectory, Farhan has been confronted with systems other than the British one, which has forced him to incorporate some of the norms associated with living in Europe, here (almost a stereotyped version of) Switzerland. His description of those who move from mainland Europe to Britain is similar to that of other respondents, who recurrently stated that having lived in another nation-state has prepared them to do well in Britain, even better than those Somalis who have been established there for a long time (see also Van Liempt 2011). Settlement in Europe, together with mobility (secondary movements), has equipped these migrants with skills to navigate both Somali-based networks and more ethnically diverse networks in Britain. In particular, it has allowed them to acquire some of the "habitus" associated with the European labour market (Bauder 2005). In comparison, those who went straight to London are seen as not having had the chance to mix with many non-Somali people or familiarise themselves with the majority society and institutions. It is worth noting, however, that those Somali migrants who settled in Britain a long time ago are also weary of these newcomers from Europe. Farhan himself mentioned that he has been criticised by other Somalis for being "too European", echoing the findings of another study, according to which secondary movers in Sheffield are sometimes not identified as "proper Somalis" (Valentine and Sporton 2009).

Yet Farhan draws a further distinction that operates at the transnational level and in reference to Somalia. The discussions in the group of men do not exclusively relate to Somalia: they talk about religious, political or ethical issues that often have to do with Islam and Somalia, but which also take a larger philosophical perspective, reflecting on "what it means to be human, to live in this world, in relation with others". However, when I asked him whether concrete projects could emerge from the group, his answer clarified his wish to "get close to Somalia":

Not for the moment. […] But it is something that I have in mind. Not with all of them, but with one or two of them, I think it would be possible to think in the long run whether we can have a common activity, or a common project. [J: Of what kind?] I don't know, but I feel it would be possible to do something… to contribute to the reconstruction of the country, and also of the people. But things become more complex. Because I have already been away from Somalia for 20 years, while they have more regular contacts. I am not thinking of the family level, but rather of the Somali context, the political level. They are people who have been part of a network for some time, so they have more contacts with what is happening, and they also know the leading political figures. So in this way, I am also doing my apprenticeship; I am learning who is who, and who thinks what, and who would be…. [Biographical interview, Switzerland, recorded]

The cosmopolitan motivation (to think about "what it means to be human") is not in contradiction with a wish to act in one's country of origin: Farhan's perspective shows similarities with the kind of "diasporic cosmopolitanism" described by Darieva as "a kind of simultaneity of ethnic and cultural parochial closure as well as openness to the world and global issues" (Darieva 2011; see also Glick Schiller et al. 2011). For some migrants, mobility may be a way through which cosmopolitan aspirations and a historically anchored relationship with a place of origin can be reconciled.

The group to which Farhan belongs, however, has a specific significance in terms of concrete projects located in Farhan's country of origin. Farhan differentiates between various types of connections with or in Somalia. While he is himself in very regular contact (at least twice a week) with his sister and other members of his family in Somalia, he has no connections with people active at the political level there. In this specific transnational social field, the men he has met in London become important resources, since they allow him to catch up with the Somali political context. According to Farhan, the men in the group arrived in Britain less than 10 years ago, and with sufficient economic and cultural capital to undergo academic studies: this indicates that they most probably belonged to privileged social classes in Somalia, since only a minority of the population has been able to receive an undisturbed education there since the beginning of the 1990s. Through this classed network, Farhan might be able to obtain part of the cultural and social capital that he could mobilise in the future, in a potential project in Somalia.

I conducted a spatial interview with Farhan during one of our encounters in London: to the question of where he situates himself on a geographical map, he answered "somewhere between Somalia and Switzerland, but not in London". London, where he had settled at the time of this interview, has never been a place he identifies with, although his wife and children, some of his friends and acquaintances, his job and his future education are all located there. While he has faced difficulties in accessing dominant institutions and the dominant population in London, in particular in regard to the labour market, neither does he identify with the majority of the local population of Somali origin. Through his trajectory of migration and post-migration mobility, the ties he has created, maintained and consolidated are those that link him with his country of origin and his first migration country. That is where he can best value the different types of economic, cultural and social capital he has accumulated over the years in different places, including London, in the present, but also possibly in the future. The way he positions himself on the world map could not illustrate the concept of "spatial autonomy" (Weiss 2005) more clearly: he situates himself in the places where he can best valorise his resources.

#### *4.2.5 A Return to Penduling*

About 2 years after his move to London, Farhan changed his strategy again and decided to return to pendular mobility between Britain and Switzerland. This new turn was motivated primarily by his unsatisfying working conditions in Britain. Farhan thus contacted his previous employer in Switzerland and started working at the same department as before. The advantages of working in Switzerland pertain to the interest of the job, better wages and work schedules that are set early enough for him to organise his life. Although he acknowledged that the working conditions had become more stressful in Switzerland as well, he expressed his happiness at "having a job in which [he is] respected", in contrast to his position in Britain.

During his first penduling period, Farhan spent most of his time in Switzerland, but now he has been able to organise things differently, spending about half of his time in each place, working long shifts in Switzerland, compensating with five to ten consecutive days off, moving back and forth twice a month. When I met him last, he had just started the new arrangement, but he was satisfied with the situation: not only did he enjoy his job more, but he also believed that the quality of his family and social life in London had improved.

It is easier, more manageable. For work and for my family. When I am there, I can offer the time I have to my wife and children. […] [J: So you live differently in London?] I live London differently. I handle my social life quite well, if you want. I can plan things ahead, the people I want to see, I text them, and ask them whether we can meet on such or such day, and if they answer fast enough, then it's OK. So it's true that there is a fatigue that comes from travelling, but apart from that, the quality of my life is better, I find. [Biographical interview, Switzerland, recorded]

Pendular mobility, once again, is the pivotal element in his strategy of transnationalising capital: apart from satisfying and respectful working conditions, Switzerland offers Farhan the opportunity to accumulate economic capital that is mostly reinvested in Britain. Part of it is transformed into cultural capital for Farhan's children, but also for himself. When he is in Switzerland, he benefits from days off between shifts, which he makes good use of by studying for the academic English test he plans on passing. This, in turn, would open the doors to the master's programme he wants to enrol in in Britain. This arrangement also gives him more flexibility to manage his social life in Britain, and to take care of his family relationship, but also of other kinds of relationships.

The time he spent exclusively in London has been beneficial, in the sense that his long-term physical presence there allowed him to build and consolidate specific social networks, in particular the one involving the group of Somali intellectual men. His new pendular mobility does not jeopardise these bonds, since they seem sufficiently strong, and since he spends half his time in London.

His account of this new stage of his life demonstrates how he has gained control over his cross-border movements over the years and through experiences of different types of mobility. Farhan feels not only that he masters his mobility better, but also that he is able to control the activities that he undertakes in each of the relevant places in his system of mobility. He finds himself in a situation in which he can capitalise on his mobility practices quite well.

#### *4.2.6 Concluding Remarks*

Farhan is aware that different places offer different resources, and that nurturing his connections with the relevant places in his trajectory can be an asset. Depending on the circumstances and the development of his own projects, he might favour one place over another and build on the links he has maintained with this place (see also Walker 2011). Mobility is thus an important way through which these connections are sustained and nourished. It contributes to a solidification of the territories and networks he has appropriated during his life trajectory (see also Fournier 2008). But mobility is also a central strategy in capitalising on these links, because it makes it possible for him to transnationalise the resources he has gathered in the different places. This process can be summarised as follows: cultural capital is acquired in Switzerland and partially mobilised, through conversion and border crossing, in London; this in turn might allow Farhan to obtain a privileged position not only locally (for instance by improving his, or his children's, socioeconomic status), but also possibly in Somalia, as a member of an elite diaspora, thanks to the relationships and knowledge he has acquired over time in London. However, he has tried different mobility practices, with uneven success, demonstrating that transnationalising resources, even for someone endowed with economic, social and cultural capital, is not a simple matter.

But the transnationalisation of capital does not only take place through the crossborder transfer of resources from one geographical place to another. Farhan's incorporation into specific social fields and his (divergent) social positions within them also need to be understood.

On the one hand, he has been able to regain a relatively good social status (in comparison to most other Somali migrants) in Switzerland, in particular thanks to his inclusion in the labour market and the development of weak (possibly vertical) ties with people who are not necessarily of Somali origin. On the other hand, this status did not transfer to Britain as easily as he would have thought. Simultaneously, Farhan is striving to acquire a favourable social position within a Somali-oriented transnational social field located in London. These efforts combine with a drawing of (classed) boundaries between himself and the local, marginalised, Somali population, based on a class-related dimension.

Mobility practices, processes of the transnationalisation of capital and the simultaneous embedding in multiple networks and hierarchies, both local and transnational, blur neat class distinctions and social positionings. They constitute a challenge to Bourdieu's (and others sociologists') assumption that individuals have a unique and consistent class position (see also Nieswand 2011; Nowicka 2013). Resources are valued differently in different places, in particular the country of origin and the country of immigration, as a great deal of research has demonstrated (Nieswand 2011; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Goldring 1998). Farhan's situation shows that more national contexts may be included – in his case two countries in Europe – on top of his country of origin; it also points to the inconsistencies that may emerge in a single location, depending on the social networks and related hierarchies in which social status is evaluated.

Furthermore, ethnicity emerges in some contexts as an important modality of commonality or differentiation. Being Somali, although an important aspect in Farhan's self-description from the first interview ("I am Somali deep down, but I am not only Somali"), has become more salient since he arrived in London. The gendered arrangement he has made with his wife, with her raising their children in London, has meant that she has settled in an area with many other Somali migrants. This situation has also influenced the kind of network that the family, and Farhan individually, could forge in London, and it has contributed to reinforcing the ethnic component of his social environment. But Farhan has also been increasingly mobilising some of his various types of capital into networks characterised by ethnonational commonality, through his involvement in the group of intellectual men. Farhan might not have been actively pursuing such a goal, but his search for intellectual stimulation in a context with limited contacts in this regard caused him to engage in a group that happened to be partially constructed around a common national background. As a result, opportunities related to an (ethnicised) transnational social field and to the Somali territory have appeared in his "realm of the possible". Being Somali has taken on a new meaning in Farhan's practices: its reactivation in the particular context of London has made it possible for him to position himself favourably at the transnational level. His new practices and identification enact, at least in this context, a renewed transnational "way of belonging" (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004) based on an explicit recognition of the ethnic component of actions and groupings.

#### **4.3 Safia: Secondary Movements and the Construction of a Transnational Future**

Safia is a woman in her early 40s and a divorced mother of two who lived in Britain when I met her in 2010. She had first arrived in France in the late 1980s, where she spent 5 years before moving to the Netherlands, attracted by rumours of a better life for Somalis there. After more than a decade in the Netherlands, of which she became a citizen, she decided to move again and settle in Britain: she had been living in London for 4 years at the time of the interviews.

I met Safia three times, once during a quite informal but long group interview with her and two other women, another time during a brief and unexpected encounter in a shop owned by a Somali woman in the neighbourhood where she lives and a third time for a planned interview. From the start, Safia was very open to discussing many issues with me, including issues I had come to consider as sensitive, such as the migration trajectory or relatives' whereabouts. Our encounters all took place in a context marked by a certain degree of informality: even the planned interview took place in a restaurant, which meant a few interruptions by people coming to talk to us, sometimes even participating in part of the interview. Her story illustrates particularly well how resources can be deliberately gathered in order to be mobilised in another place in the future (here the country/region of origin). Safia is furthermore quite conscious that this strategy is a good way to obtain a desirable social status in a transnational social field.

#### *4.3.1 The Migration Trajectory: A Multi-step Journey*

Before she left her country of origin in her late teens, Safia lived a comfortable life with her family. When the war broke out in Somaliland, Safia was living in a Middle Eastern Arabic country. Advised not to go back to her country of origin, she joined a group of refugees and arrived in France without having specifically chosen this destination. Her class background appears in the description she gives of her arrival in France.

I was about 20 years old. It was so difficult. They sent me to a small village where people had never seen a Black person. And I had only an underskirt and a t-shirt. And I was alone with 50 men from Asia. I wanted to cook, but I could only cook cakes. Back home, we had servants, so I had never cooked before. My mum had only taught me to cook cakes [laughs]. [Semi-structured interview, notes]

The description of her life in her country of origin, with servants, stands in sharp contrast to her situation in Europe as the only African woman amongst refugee men and white locals, stripped of everything, even most of her clothes. At the refugee centre, as the only woman among many men, she felt the gendered necessity to cook, but she was unable to do so because of her class background. In a context of

class privilege, women would cook (her mother – not her father – taught her), but as a leisure activity rather than out of necessity, which resulted in her only being able to bake cakes. In a European refugee centre, cakes seem quite inappropriate when confronted with a gendered demand to feed 50 hungry men, probably with minimal means. Gendered expectations here closely interact with Safia's diverging classed positioning in different contexts.

Later, Safia got married, got divorced and eventually decided to follow other Somali refugees who left France for the Netherlands, where conditions for Somali refugees were known to be better. She acknowledges having felt better in the Netherlands: she was able to meet other Somalis more easily and had the opportunity to receive an education "in [her] own language and culture", as well as in the field of intercultural mediation. During the 12 years she lived there, she married a Somali man, had a daughter and a son and got divorced again. She was also a founding member of an association, based in the Netherlands, whose transnational activities focus on rebuilding in Somaliland (more below). Thanks to local funding, the association has been able to complete projects including the building of sanitation and a school in Somaliland.

Safia was able to partially transfer her education and experiences from the Netherlands to Britain once she moved to London with her teenage children. Despite only having been in London 4 years, she told me that she finally felt "at home" in the suburban town where she had settled. She has simultaneously retained strong connections with the Netherlands (much less with France), regularly going back to reactivate various ties and visit her daughter, who did not adapt to the British context and went back to her previous country of residence, where she got married. The last time I saw Safia, she was eagerly waiting to become the grandmother of a baby to be born in the Netherlands.

Her trajectory has thus consisted of multiple movements and successive settlements in countries on different continents. After her naturalisation, she also lived in the UAE for 6 months, following a cousin's invitation, as well as in Somaliland for another 6 months, when she was hired by an international humanitarian organisation.

Safia identifies with the suburban town where she lives rather than with London. After her arrival in Britain, she worked for a year as a cleaner but gave up for health reasons. Later, she became involved in various counselling and interpreting activities, working in particular in a local community centre as well as for health-service providers in different parts of London. At the time of our meetings Safia was quite well anchored in her place of residence in Britain, the one she pragmatically calls "home". However good she feels there, however, her socioeconomic situation remains unstable, based on voluntary activities as well as precarious and low-waged work. Furthermore, she lives in an economically deprived area of Greater London, where "ethnic minorities" are a majority, including a large Somali community.

Simultaneously to her localised activities, as the following sections will show, past, present and future mobility practices are important aspects of her life, which allow her to transnationalise varied kinds of resources.

#### *4.3.2 Associational Involvement*

After a few years in the Netherlands, Safia participated in the founding of an NGO that has a strong transnational orientation: the funding came from Dutch sources, but its purpose was to rebuild facilities (such as schools, hospitals, wells) in Somaliland. Safia's involvement in the association also led her to travel to her region of origin to supervise the projects on at least one occasion. Soon after she had moved to Britain, Safia founded what she called the "UK branch" of her organisation, using the same name for it.

I relocated. But I kept asking for funding in Holland, because it is much easier to get money for these projects [in Somaliland] there than in Britain. Here, there is much more paperwork, and it takes time. I will regularly go back to the Netherlands to look for funding, probably every year. [Group interview, notes]

The projects in Somaliland have apparently been put on hold over the last couple of years, but Safia expressed her intention to reactivate them. However, she acknowledges that funding mechanisms for such projects are different in the Netherlands than in Britain. It may also be that her access to such funding is different: she might have better knowledge of those mechanisms in the country where she lived for a long time and has already done it, and she may have social connections there she can capitalise on. Safia has transferred important knowledge related to her associational activities to Britain, which constitute cultural capital when it comes to establishing and running a new organisation in her new place of residence. However, this capital is limited, as the quotation above illustrates, in particular when it comes to finding funding. Awa, another woman who moved from the Netherlands to Britain and is heavily involved in transnational associational activities, mentioned similar strategies: she regularly returns to the Netherlands, where she has good access to funding networks to keep her projects in Somaliland alive (see Chap. 2).

However, Safia's organisation in London has reoriented its activities: rather than attempting to improve the situation in Somaliland more broadly, it mostly addresses the needs of Somalilander residents in her local town, in particular through discussions on health issues with women. The association in London is thus much more locally oriented than the Dutch one is. Safia also provides counselling and support services for Somalis through her involvement in one of the local community centres.

Somaliland, rather than Somalia, is an important component of Safia's identification and activities. For instance, she has been involved in concrete activities for the recognition of Somaliland as an independent state, mostly at the local level. During the group discussion with two other women, she explained that she was part of an initiative to officially register the Somalilanders who live in the town. Safia explained that the aim of the action was to advocate for the recognition of Somalilanders as a distinct minority, and to obtain separate funding from the local authorities, in particular for the community centre's activities.

When developing and trying to fund a project in Somaliland, it may be rather easy to legitimate the restriction of beneficiaries to Somalilanders, because of the convergence of the population and the territory. A project needs to be anchored in a geographically circumscribed place. It is another thing to justify the provision of services and associational activities only to Somalilanders who live in Europe when Somaliland is still officially considered part of Somalia. Since British policies to support activities by minority groups and migrants are, like elsewhere in Europe, still often based on the national or religious origin of organised groups, legitimacy comes from political recognition on the part of their country of residence.

When she moved to Britain, Safia therefore started to mobilise part of the cultural and social capital she had developed in her associational activities in the Netherlands. She built on the experiences and knowledge, as well as on the funding networks and mechanisms, she acquired there to set up and continue her activities in London. During her successive moves, however, Safia added new resources to her portfolio and constantly adapted the ways she mobilises her different types of capital to the local context. The fact that she was able to set up a new branch of her organisation shortly after her arrival and settlement in her new environment shows that mobility is not necessarily an obstacle to her activities, as she is able to adapt and add to the resources she needs in order to attain her goals.

Safia deploys what Erel calls "migration-specific cultural capital": she finds ways to validate her cultural capital (gathered in different places) in her new place of residence, at the same time building on dominant institutions and migrants' networks (Erel 2010). Safia's strategies consist of circulating and constantly building up her cultural assets, finding the right environments to best valorise them. Erel argues that the conversion of capital "depends on [the] socio-political ability of actors to define the boundaries and content of the field of migration-specific cultural capital" (Erel 2010). This ability regards individuals' position vis-à-vis other relevant actors with whom they interact, both locally and transnationally, both migrants and non-migrants. In Safia's case, her secondary move to Britain as a Dutch citizen may have helped her secure a favourable position in her new town of residence, in particular within hierarchies based on the local population originally from Somaliland. Like other secondary movers who live in Britain (see, for instance, Farhan in the previous section), Safia makes a distinction between Somalis who arrived directly in the UK as refugees and people like her who arrived for other reasons, have lived in other places in Europe and arrived ready to mobilise and valorise their assets in their new settings. Formal and informal cultural capital (together with legal capital) obtained in the Netherlands (or in other countries in continental Northern Europe) has a certain value, at least in the eyes of its owners, but possibly also in the eyes of the local authorities and institutions and other migrants with the same ethnic or national background who are related to them through associational or other activities. The fact that Safia had already founded an association in the Netherlands, and not in Somaliland or in other poor regions, was an asset when she undertook to set up the new branch in London. Despite being a newcomer, she was given credit and legitimation to become a representative of the Somaliland population in her town, develop activities to address their needs, counsel them and translate for them when needed. Erel (2009, 2010) argues that differences related to gender, class, urban-rural background and identification with specific segments of the ethnic or national group shape opportunities and constraints in one's attempt to validate one's migration-specific cultural capital. Safia's trajectory demonstrates that past experiences of mobility are another line along which these internal hierarchies are built. However, this fairly good social position within a local, ethnically defined population, does not translate into advantages in relation to the wider British context and its labour market, for instance, where her socioeconomic status remains low. In this situation, she considers other – transnational – options to improve her living conditions.

#### *4.3.3 A Transnational Future*

Although her associational and professional activities are rather localised, Safia is simultaneously building a future that crosses the borders of Britain. Similarly to Farhan (and other respondents), Safia finds opportunities in London to gather cultural resources that can be later mobilised in other places, specifically in her country/region of origin. These resources pertain in particular to education and the acquisition of an internationally recognised language, English. The following excerpt demonstrates how she consciously aims to transnationalise her cultural capital:

J. Do you see yourself in London in the future?

S. Yes but I also want to go back to Somaliland. I worked there for six months in 2007, and it's so different. Here, work and education take you so much time; you do it for so many hours. There, you work for only two hours; people are lazy. And there are servants to help you. So I first want to improve my English, especially writing, and then go back.

J. You want to improve your English to go back?

S. Yes, because there, they have a very good education, and I want to be better than them. Because I was a refugee, I lost some time. So I want to go back with more and more education. You know IOM [the International Organization for Migration]? They employ a lot of Somali people, but they have high requirements; I looked at that.

J. But would you work for them there permanently?

S. No, for a year or two. But then I could find another job there. Or you know World Vision [a Christian humanitarian organisation that works with children]? I applied in 2007, when I lived there for six months. They took me, but I first wanted to come back to England to take English classes. [Spatial interview, notes]

Safia envisages "going back" to her country of origin, but not under any circumstances, and not permanently. She sees her future in London and at the same time in Somaliland, which demonstrates the almost taken-for-granted role of mobility in her projects. A form of pendular mobility is more likely, which would allow Safia to enjoy the advantages offered by both locations and maintain her multi-local connections and assets.

She has already undertaken a couple of trips to Somaliland, staying there for a few months on two occasions, once for a project with her own association, and once employed by an international humanitarian NGO.

Her past trips to Somaliland have helped her familiarise herself with the local context there and imagine the social position she may be able to obtain there as a returning migrant with a European education. But they have also given her a clear vision of the capital she needs to accumulate in order to reach the privileged position she imagines in this particular social context. And these (mostly cultural) resources, in particular a Western education and command of the English language, need to be gathered in a place that is most highly transnationally valued, London. Thanks to the time she has spent in Somaliland, Safia has been able to obtain a (more or less) realistic picture of the profile of the people she would be competing against if she wanted to acquire a comfortable socioeconomic position there. In a case study on Afghan migrants, Oeppen (2013) describes these return visits as "reality checks", demonstrating the importance of physical mobility in contrast to imaginative or virtual mobility. By travelling there, Safia has learnt something she did not know: people there have a very good education. If she wants to make a difference ("be better than them"), she needs to accumulate more cultural capital that can be validated there. Past mobility practices to Somaliland have thus allowed Safia to gather the necessary knowledge (and possibly contacts) about the social, cultural and economic environment in Somaliland, and to bring them back with her. Sagmo (2015) similarly describes how Burundian migrants established in Norway use return visits to their country of origin to explore the possibility of converting the capital they have obtained abroad. Thanks to her experiences, Safia is able to decide where to devote her energy. She gathers the additional cultural capital she needs in a place where the resources she already has (her legal, economic, social and cultural capital) give her access to further education. Several times during our interviews, Safia mentioned wanting to improve her English and pursue a higher education.

What is fundamental, therefore, is that these cultural assets, although they may also improve her situation in the London context, are perceived as being valuable when transnationalised and mobilised in the future in her region of origin. Safia wants to "improve [her] English and go back": the kind of return she envisages implicitly involves professional environments with international staff, where English is the common communication language. On several occasions, she mentioned international governmental or non-governmental organisations active in Somaliland, such as Care International, World Vision, the IOM and the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). Working for such employers would have many advantages – in economic terms, but also in terms of mobility, since temporary contracts would allow her to move back and forth more easily than a permanent job there would. Relocating (permanently or temporarily) in a country with less economic power is a common way for Somalis to capitalise on their Western citizenship and achieve a higher-class status (see Al-Sharmani 2006 for the case of Egypt). However, working for international institutions does not guarantee Safia or other Somali migrants access to a secure, stable and well-paid job.

Earning institutionalised cultural capital in the West and mastering English are complementary to another cultural asset: her Somali background. Safia mentions that the international institutions she referred to employ Somali people in their fieldwork in this region of the world: a Somali-related national, ethnic and linguistic

background is a requirement for at least some of the positions in these specific work environments. A shared ethnicity with the beneficiaries and partners on the field becomes an asset that not all employees in those international institutions can claim.2 However, not just any "Somali" person is likely to be hired by these institutions that have "high requirements" regarding the level of education of their staff. Returning migrants who have had the opportunity to settle in the West are in a particularly good position to obtain those kinds of jobs, thanks to a combination of "local and diasporic capital" (Hansen 2007), or rather a set of resources that have been gathered in different places but that, combined in this context, can be mobilised as real capital. One's migration experience and post-migration mobility practices are pivotal to valuing those assets in a place where they can be most beneficial.

Safia's past experiences and future projects in relation to Somaliland show similarities with the status paradox described by Nieswand (2011). Her experience of forced migration entailed a substantial loss of status; however, thanks to her constant connection with and regular travel to Somaliland, she is able to envisage regaining a privileged position there. In Safia's case, this position would not depend on a (low-skilled) job based in the country of immigration, but on employment in a specific social field, that of international governmental or non-governmental organisations. Thanks to the cultural, social and legal capital she has obtained and validated in Europe, as well as her ethnic background, she may be able to obtain a job in this context. International institutions constitute a (transnational) social field with their own rules, stakes and types of competition (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). By definition, they are grounded in and have effects on more than one place, navigating between different states with unequal power. For Safia (as well as other migrants), these very characteristics create opportunities for them to validate their different types of capital in a particularly favourable context. These institutions need to hire people with linguistic and cultural knowledge that allow them to work in the countries in which they operate, but who also possess sufficient Western-validated cultural capital.

Furthermore, in contrast to the Ghanaian migrants described by Nieswand (2011), Safia's status paradox does not emerge from her being part of transnational kinship networks in which migrants are a minority. The migrants in Nieswand's study are caught in this paradox because their social status – and the status of their family in their country of origin – depends on their living and working in a wealthier country. The majority of Safia's kin members have emigrated themselves and now live in different parts of the world. Although her (highly) transnational kin network is most likely not free from solidarities, reciprocity and social obligations, Safia's social position in Britain does not directly influence the social status of family members in Somaliland. However, she is clear about the place in which she wants to achieve a privileged status: she wants to "be better than" other people in Somaliland,

<sup>2</sup>Unfortunately, the relationship between ethnicity and the position one can obtain in those international environments cannot be explored here. Neither can issues of power related to the involvement of migrants in international organisations (see Horst 2013 for a critical discussion).

thanks to her high education, which may allow her to obtain a job with an international institution. Pendular mobility will be a core part of her strategy to come to terms with this paradox: while her social status in Britain might not improve as a result of her temporary employment by international institutions, such an employment will allow her to obtain an advantaged position during her stays in Somaliland.3 Permanent return does not seem to be an option for her, indicating that Britain offers opportunities that she still wants to count on.

In sum, Safia is actively accumulating capital in Britain that might help her realise a brighter future in a transnational social field. In the quotation above, she refers to a life that she would like for herself, one with a lot of free time and domestic servants. It is not a coincidence that she chose the same referent, servants, as when she described her childhood before the war. Her goal is to regain the social status she once had, and with the same symbols of privilege, in her country of origin. She explains her loss of social status through her experience of forced migration ("I was a refugee"), and now plans to regain a high status by using the resources that this migration experience, after all these years, has allowed her to gather.

#### *4.3.4 Concluding Remarks*

Of all the respondents I have met, Safia is probably the one who shows the biggest variation in terms of mobility practices and places visited. During an informal discussion, she told me: "I've had my passport since 2000, and I've been in 31 countries since! I am like a journalist!" Of course, she knew that I was interested in travels and cross-border movements and was aware that such a statement would capture my attention, pointing to the performative character of interviews on mobility (for a similar discussion on networks interviews, see Ryan et al. 2014). Although I would have liked to learn more about many of the stages in her trajectory, the information I have been able to gather is sufficient to demonstrate the ways in which she has accumulated and built on her mobility capital.

Thanks to the legal, cultural, social and economic capital she has gathered over the years in different places, Safia has been able to access mobility, develop the necessary skills and take advantage of opportunities to transform her mobility practices into further resources (Flamm and Kaufmann 2006; Kaufmann et al. 2004). She undertook secondary movements within Europe in search of better opportunities in more favourable environments. However, these movements have also enabled her to gather resources in the different places she has been that, once put together, are more varied than if she had stayed in one place. In fact, by maintaining links with her previous countries of residence in Europe (in particular the Netherlands) and further developing her connection to both London and Somaliland, Safia

<sup>3</sup>However, the possibility of Safia sending back "reverse remittances", i.e. improving her social status in Europe thanks to the money earned in Africa, cannot be excluded (see Oeppen 2013 for an interesting case study).

actively develops her portfolio of appropriated places and networks (Lévy and Lussault 2003; Fournier 2008).

Safia's mobility practices are the basis on which she transnationalises part of her capital, but her resources are simultaneously transferred from one "frame of reference" to another. Safia is involved in transnational associational and professional activities, which sometimes mingle, in both London and Somaliland. There is a common characteristic to those activities: they mostly address the needs of marginalised Somalis, whether they are underprivileged migrants in London or very poor people in Somaliland. Safia's shared ethnicity with the beneficiaries of her actions is fundamental to her activities, a "commodity" that gives her access to the labour market, even if only to restricted segments of it (Lutz 1993). Her strategy to overcome these restrictions is to make an asset of her ethnic background and to take advantage of the (limited) options that are offered to her in different contexts. The fields in which she can rationally value her cultural resources (including her education) are set up, funded and led by Western actors and institutions but provide for the needs of disadvantaged people with the same ethnic background as herself.

The ethnic component is not necessarily relevant when it comes to the institutional settings in which Safia is active, but it is relevant in terms of the population that she caters to within those institutions. The community centres in London and the international NGO for which she worked in Somaliland employed her because she is able to communicate and deal with their Somali customers/beneficiaries. Her involvement in voluntary work is more directly characterised by the boundary of common ethnicity, yet it is also influenced by dominant institutions and policies. Funding and recognition for associational work is more easily available for groups who define themselves along the lines of common ethnicity or nationality (Moret and Dahinden 2009). Safia and others' struggle for the recognition of a Somalilander minority demonstrates both the salience and the constructed nature of ethnic belonging (see also Baumann 1996). In sum, funding, recognition and/or access to the labour market come from heterogeneous institutions and actors, but only in the frame of actions regarding a population with which Safia can claim a similar ethnic background. This situation, common among migrants active in social work and social services, cannot be seen as resulting solely from migrants' desire or ability to help only other members of their "community", but also to employers' and institutions' channelling of their involvement in this direction (Lutz 1993). But Safia's account of her activities in both Europe and Somaliland illustrates that migrants may also benefit from this situation, and that they may be able to use ethnicity strategically as a resource to obtain a better socioeconomic position (Anthias and Cederberg 2009). Her involvement in associational, counselling, support and interpreting activities build on her common ethnicity with the beneficiaries, but also on internal differentiation between herself and the people she serves, in terms of migrant trajectory (including secondary movements), legal status, social class and age. Her endowment of legal, cultural, social and economic capital are invested in networks and hierarchies where ethnicity is relevant, but also where she can differentiate herself from other people with the same ethnic background. Helping others in a relatively formalised setting may involve solidarity, but it is also based on

unequal relationships and thus on boundaries and hierarchies. While Safia's socioeconomic position in London may remain rather low in the British context, she might be able to build on those boundaries in Somaliland and eventually "be better than them".

#### **4.4 Fatuma: Star-Shaped Mobility Practices and the Intertwining Effects of Formal and Informal Business Activities**

Fatuma is a woman in her 40s who lives in a German-speaking city in Switzerland. She is married and has four children who were between 10 and 20 years old when I met with her. Her diverse professional activities all relate to independent business enterprises, both formal and informal, both localised and transnational. It was very difficult to convince her to participate in this study, but she finally conceded to an interview. I met her once informally after that first interview, but I did not have the chance to conduct a second formal interview with her. During repeated but brief contacts, however, I could observe her regular travel, the busy character of her life and her reluctance, despite her cordiality, to talk to a researcher about her experiences and activities.

Her story illustrates particularly well how processes of transnational mobility and local anchorage in the country of residence are intertwined with and influence each other. It also illustrates how social locations are gendered, classed and ethnicised, as well as their interplay with the valuation of economic, social and cultural capital in different places and in different hierarchies and social fields.

#### *4.4.1 Local and Transnational Independent Economic Activities*

Fatuma arrived in Switzerland in the early 1990s with her husband and two eldest children. Her husband, an accountant in Somalia, took a job as a cleaner while she was responsible for most domestic duties. In parallel, she started small-scale independent economic activities, preparing Somali dishes for parties or for sale at a small convenience store in her neighbourhood (the same shop that she would later buy from its owner). This division of labour between her and her husband reflects gendered opportunities: Fatuma, as a young mother, carried out, apart from domestic duties, economic activities she was able to organise flexibly and from home; her husband was responsible for being the primary economic provider for the family, despite the strong deskilling he had experienced.

When she obtained documents that allowed her to cross national borders, Fatuma started to practice typical "star-shaped" mobility: she has travelled regularly to different places in the world importing objects she then sells to other Somalis who live in Switzerland. For obvious reasons, Fatuma was not very forthcoming about her informal economic activities with me. However, I can rely on information from other such businesswomen (who were also discreet regarding their activities) and from other respondents who told me about such women, to have a sufficiently clear idea about what they consisted of.4 The kind of trade in which Fatuma is involved responds to gendered constraints, opportunities and representations. What appears as a mostly women's activity has often been described to me by both male and female respondents in the following way: some women take advantage of the trips they make to different places to bring back a few things they then sell to other women, which mostly "pays for the plane ticket". This last expression is a recurring theme in discussions about informal business. It can be understood as an attempt to minimise those activities, in particular when addressing a researcher, partially because they are not declared at customs. Furthermore, the expression gives priority to other motivations for making such trips, making business appear as a secondary, less important activity. In this light, the reasons for these women's travels are social rather than economic, which corresponds to gendered representations about women's mobility. The devaluation of women's economic activities, in particular those that pertain to cross-border business, was common in interviews with respondents of both sexes, including by the women directly involved in these activities.

In developing her mobility practices, Fatuma counts on mobility skills based on knowledge about how to find cheap flights, as well as business partners and housing opportunities in the places she travels to, and on strategic plans regarding how to transport back what she buys.

I go to Dubai two or three times a year. When I go, I look at the deals to find a cheap flight; I usually find tickets for 400 or 500 Swiss francs [around 300-380 Euros], and then I go and I do my shopping. I take my little one with me, so I am allowed 20 more kilos of luggage. I bring back things that I then sell to others; this pays for my ticket". [J: And when you are in Dubai, where do you stay? Do you use those hotels run by Somalis that I have heard about?] Yes, there are lots of them; we know them. There are [Somali-run] travel agencies, restaurants, hotels, everything, just like in London. And since I don't speak Arabic, it makes it easier. [Semi-structured interview, notes]

Fatuma's *savoir-circuler*, in particular her knowledge of how to organise her travel and navigate between different social, cultural and legal contexts, is especially important (Tarrius 2002; Schmoll 2005; Morokvasic and Catarino 2010). Socialisation in families where mobility skills are widespread also counts (Fournier 2008), as Fatuma pointed out: her father was a businessman, and although she had never worked with him, she had always seen him do it; her brother is also a businessman based in Cairo who travels to Kenya, Somalia and other places. Furthermore,

<sup>4</sup> Informal trade – defined as such because it is undeclared, not subject to state taxes and to varying degrees on the margins of domestic and international laws – is not the central topic of this research, and it would need an in-depth, ideally ethnographic, investigation to be fully understood in all its complexity (see for instance Ellis and MacGaffey 1996; MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000). However, it emerged as a relevant activity within cross-border mobility practices, which justifies its being described here, although the information is incomplete.

the excerpt above shows that travelling with kids is not necessarily, contrary to what might be expected, a constraint.

Fatuma's stays in Dubai thus partially build on Somali networks of migrants who are settled there and offer services to those who spend a few days on business. Another respondent told me that an entire parallel economy has developed in Dubai, a major economic and business hub between Europe, Asia and Africa. According to this respondent, this economic niche exists within mostly Somali networks: for instance, there are apartments that men share when staying in the city, while women who live in different flats cook meals for them that younger men then deliver by bike. This parallel economy thus seems to be organised and differentiated along the lines of gender, age, legal status and social class. The Somali-based networks located in Dubai facilitate travellers' shopping and access to opportunities, in terms of accommodation and food, local transportation, meeting with business partners and so on. Fatuma makes explicit her recourse to Somali intermediaries to facilitate contact and communication with Arabic speakers, emphasising that her business networks in Dubai include people with different origins and languages. As another businesswoman based in London told me when I asked her who she bought her goods from in Dubai:

It depends. Some of them are Asians; there are some Arabs. It depends on the quality and the price. I don't mind, I don't care whether they're Somali or not; it's business. If I'm going to get a lower price from another person, I'll get a lower price. But if I know I'm going to get the same price, then I'll go to a Somali shop. [Aziza, Semi-structured interview, recorded]

While Somalis involved in transnational business may favour Somali partners, economic criteria are more important. Fatuma, like other businesswomen (and men), travels to places that offer them many advantages for their activities: support networks composed of people with the same national and linguistic background and commercial opportunities for products corresponding to a (culturally and socially constructed) demand from parts of the migrant population in Europe. While other places also appear to be important for business, Dubai is a central economic hub that was mentioned very often by the respondent. Besides its obvious business advantages, Dubai's geographic location at the crossroads between Africa, Asia and Europe is perceived as a further asset. Some of the respondents (including those involved in transnational business) consider the UAE in general, and Dubai in particular, a good place to meet family members who live in different places. On such occasions, business trips may also turn into family gatherings, or vice versa.

The objects that Fatuma imports into Switzerland are chosen with regard to the value they will gain there, once again within specific networks. As in Aman's case (Chap. 2), they correspond to demand by some Somali migrants who live in Switzerland for products that can be difficult to find otherwise. These may be everyday or festive clothing (for instance for weddings), jewellery, decorative objects, curtains, furniture or food. But these informal channels can also make available products such as electronic devices or computer games at a lower price. Tarrius and his colleagues (2013) have meticulously documented what they have called the "poor-to-poor" economy: constantly mobile transmigrants circulate recent lowrange products and sell them to sedentary migrants who would not be able to buy them through official distribution channels. These horizontal business networks develop in underground economic niches and build on few intermediaries, which is why they are able to offer these products cheaply (Tarrius et al. 2013). Fatuma's business activities, although less cosmopolitan than those described by these authors, build on similar characteristics. It is difficult to assess how lucrative this business is for her, but what is fundamental here is that mobility is an intrinsic part of those trade strategies, in at least two different ways.

On the one hand, these products gain value because they circulate: Fatuma needs to travel to the particular places where they are available and find the business networks in which she can buy them for competitive prices. Once they are imported into Switzerland or other European countries, they gain value either because of their rarity or because they are cheaper than those offered through official channels. That she carries those goods herself without declaring them constitutes an asset: the circulation of objects is directly related to the kind of circulation Fatuma herself undertakes.

On the other hand, products are imported by mobile migrants for more sedentary groups of the migrant population. The advantages associated with traders' mobility is directly related to their customers' immobility: business emerges from this line of differentiation. This specific population's demands are linked as much to their trajectory as migrants – and their desire for products that link them to their place of origin – as to their classed position (Tarrius' "poor"). Their demand for products they like and can afford creates a market based on alternative channels of distribution that mobile women like Fatuma are able to take advantage of.

#### *4.4.2 Social Differentiation Within Local Gendered and Ethnicised Hierarchies*

Tarrius et al. (2013) insist that the networks through which objects circulate in the poor-to-poor economy are non-hierarchical, but these processes do, in my view, involve social differentiation, based on gender, social class, generation, legal status and ethnicity. Social hierarchies appear very clearly when the networks in which Fatuma sells her imported products are analysed.

Respondents seem to concur in the description of the profile of transnational businesswomen who are settled in Europe. These businesswomen are generally at least in their 40s, left Somalia at the beginning of the civil war and belonged to the economic elite there. They have secured their legal status by obtaining European citizenship. Most of the products that Fatuma sells in Switzerland meet a gendered demand: her clientele consists predominantly of women who buy objects for their bodies (clothing, jewellery, beauty products) or for the home (curtains, decorative objects, food items). This clientele is also defined by its nationality, Somali women. While the networks in which this kind of business takes places are homogeneous in terms of gender and ethnicity, differentiation appears along the lines of age, time of

arrival in Europe and legal status. Fatuma's customers are women who do not have the means to cross borders and get the products they want on their own. They may have arrived more recently, not yet possess a secure legal status, be relatively poor or lack the motivation to travel.

Moreover, I was told repeatedly in the interviews that women active in informal business are also often involved in organising and managing rotating savings and credit groups: these are called "ayuto" or "hagbad" and are very popular among Somali women (Summerfield 1996).5 These informal groups of 10 or 15 women pool a fixed amount of money each month that goes to one of the participants, allowing them to have access to a larger sum of money at one time than they may be able to save on their own. Women who manage those groups are generally trustworthy, established women (Summerfield 1996). A male respondent described women who are active in informal business and who manage hagbad groups as wellconnected, capable of making friends easily, not afraid of calling people late in the night, independent and able to use their influence and networks to help someone find a loan or support for personal matters.

Many Somali women participate in those groups, but those who need to do so the most are usually the poorest, and they have often arrived more recently and/or have not obtained a residence permit or Swiss passport. Anissa, a female respondent who lives in the same city as Fatuma, told me:

There are many families that receive assistance who have very limited means. For them, ayuto is necessary. If they want to buy furniture or curtains, for instance, they cannot do anything with 100 or 200 francs, so they do ayuto. They could also go to a bank, but then they couldn't take [the money out] when they wanted. And it's better with our system: we talk to each other, we listen, we are really like a family. [Semi-structured interview, notes]

Transnational businesswomen such as Fatuma and Aman partially use these groups to make sure the products they sell on credit will be paid for: the same women are often simultaneously their clients and participants in the groups they manage. Anissa, in the quotation above, implicitly makes this link: curtains are often mentioned as the main type of product Somali women buy through this informal market. It thus seems fair to assume that those women for whom ayuto is "necessary" buy their curtains from Somali businesswomen. In sum, informal traders bring back the kinds of clothing, furniture and jewellery that those who cannot travel cannot otherwise access and give them a way to pay for them by offering them credit, but also by setting up the hagbad groups that further bond their clients to them.

Collecting the money is also a time- and energy-consuming activity, since it is often necessary to "chase" participants to gather the sums they owe. Fatuma compares what she calls the "boutique" (her informal business) and the convenience store she runs (see next section):

When I go to Dubai, I bring back some small things. But the problem is that people don't pay, and then they have debts, and I don't like that. It is not the same with the convenience

<sup>5</sup>These systems are not specific to Somali women: so-called "tontines" are widely known among women in many places in Africa, and they are often related to business activities (see for instance Sengel 2000).

store. I prefer doing what I know, I sell food and people pay cash, and it's all easier to manage. The store is international, it's for everyone. The boutique is not the same; I don't really like it. [Semi-structured interview, notes]

Although Fatuma might have intentionally minimised her informal business activities in her discussions with me, this excerpt demonstrates the difficulties inherent in the kind of business she carries out. Her business activities are small scale, especially in economic terms. Yet it appears that these activities, as well as the rotating saving and credit groups, take place within relatively intimate networks based on national origin and gender. Summerfield (1996) describes hagbad groups as places where trust is expressed and bonds of friendship are created: this emerges very vividly in Anissa's account (quotation above) on how these groups are places where women can talk and listen to each other. But they are also networks based on unequal power relationships in which social status is acquired and maintained. The relationships between the women involved in these processes are complex: they are based on solidarity (as many of my respondents emphasised), but they also depend on and reinforce tensions and power inequalities within local Somali networks. Women like Fatuma are thus strongly anchored within these local ethnically homogeneous networks, and their mobility practices are one element through which they gain privileged social positions within them. This position further constitutes a solid basis on which she is able to maintain and further expand her informal business activities.

#### *4.4.3 The Formal Local Business*

Fatuma's transnational business activities remain informal, take place in her own apartment and have a limited economic impact. However, they were important steppingstones for her opening a small convenience store a few years ago that she runs with the help of her husband and older children. The store is located in a relatively deprived neighbourhood of her city. It offers cigarettes, chocolate bars, phone cards and chewing gum, as well as daily essential food items such as pasta, milk, soft drinks and canned food. While Fatuma cooks sambussas and pastries, her husband prepares sandwiches every day. The shop window announces, among other things, "Somali specialities", which refers primarily to the sambussas and cakes. The shop is open 7 days a week, from 9 a.m. to midnight, and there are no employees outside of the family. When I asked her how she came about the project of opening the grocery store, she answered:

It used to belong to an Afghan or Indian man. And I used to prepare sambussas for him often. And I would tell him: "I need to open a shop; this is really my dream". And then one day, the man called me and told me he was going to leave the shop. He told me: "Listen, you are a good woman, you know how to run a business, and your husband works hard. I want to give the shop to you". And he sold it to us. He even helped my husband with the money from the second pillar.6 But that money was not enough. So we asked my husband's brother in Canada, who lent us some money, and then a (female) friend who also lent us 3,000 Swiss francs. That is how we found the money, in different places, thank God. [Semistructured interview, notes]

Different types of relationships were mobilised to set up the business. The first was with the previous owner, who used to be a business partner, and with whom Fatuma (and her husband) created bonds of trust and respect. Her preparing sambussas for the shop and proving her business abilities, as well as her husband's work ethic, contributed to their being given the opportunity to take over the shop. Through their activities in different economic spheres, the couple thus displayed sufficient skills and motivation for this social relationship to be transformed into social capital. The previous owner called her specifically to offer her what she considered an important resource. Through her previous star-shaped mobility practices and related informal business activities, she had acquired specific skills and knowledge related to travelling, dealing with commercial and social realities in distant places and doing business. Her business skills and experiences motivated the man to sell her the shop. Fatuma transferred this cultural capital, acquired in a transnational social field, to the Swiss context and mobilised it to develop economic activities in her main place of residence.

Furthermore, she mentions that the man also helped them with administrative and financial matters, which demonstrates that their relationship was sufficiently strong for him to support them in other ways. Knowledge and information are other types of resources that circulated between them. He seems to be a migrant himself, but his origin is not important enough for Fatuma to remember. Since the store is located in the area where Fatuma lives, neighbourhood connections may have played a role. Other localised network connections that are not based on nationality were also involved, although in less direct ways: Fatuma's husband's incorporation into the local, formal labour market, despite the deskilling it entailed for him, had a major influence. Not only did it indicate his reliability for the previous owner, but it was also a way to accumulate some kind of "forced" savings: his pension money constituted a good share of the economic capital used to buy the business.

Second, Fatuma and her husband mobilised their transnational network, constituted of kin members and friends, to gather the necessary funds to buy the shop. This transnational economic support was hardly sufficient, however, in the face of the economic difficulties Fatuma faced 2 years later. A study on Somali entrepreneurs in Britain found that transnational social capital based on kin and ethnic ties is a fundamental asset on which local retail businesses build, supplying economic and moral support, as well as sharing skills and experiences (Jones et al. 2010; Ram et al. 2008). Yet the authors also find that most such enterprises do not fare very well, mainly due to the structural contexts and the high competition.

<sup>6</sup>The second pillar is part of the compulsory pension scheme in Switzerland: employees contribute to it through deductions taken from their paycheque. Under certain conditions, these savings can be used to buy real estate or set up a private business. The regulations regarding social insurance in general, and the second pillar in particular, are relatively difficult to understand.

The customers and suppliers of Fatuma's convenience store are characterised more by the fact that they are locally based than by their specific national background. Fatuma buys her goods from wholesalers, or in the case of more exotic food items, "local Indians". In an earlier quotation, Fatuma emphasises the "international" character of the clientele. Despite the diversity of their origins, most of her customers share the distinctive feature of "living in the area". Fatuma also mentioned that Somalis are a minority of her clientele.

However, she has not dropped the sambussa business: she continues to prepare them for Somali caterers. According to another respondent who knows Fatuma well, these (forced) intermediaries "exploit her", as they sell her dishes at three times the price they buy them from her. Despite the major efforts made by the whole family to run the shop, Fatuma complains about the difficulties in earning enough, due to the lack of customers, high taxes and strict regulations regarding what she is allowed to cook and sell in her shop. She told me about her project to move the store to other premises that would include an industrial kitchen: this would allow her to expand the catering part of her business and meet large orders of sambussas. This project is made difficult by the tight real-estate market. Each time I talked to Fatuma, she asked me whether I could help her find better premises for her business, demonstrating her attempt to mobilise any potentially fruitful relationship (unsuccessfully in this case).

#### *4.4.4 Concluding Remarks*

In her many activities, Fatuma circulates different types of resources from other parts of the world to Switzerland, where most of her life is organised. She chooses the specific objects she imports informally on the basis of the value they might gain in (specific networks in) Switzerland, and she plans her business activities accordingly. Her own physical mobility allows her to benefit from the differences in value of the products she purchases "there" and sells "here" in the informal market. If she did not travel herself, she would have to rely on intermediaries and lose out on this arbitrage opportunity. In sum, Fatuma has been able to accumulate even more of various types of capital in the transnational social field thanks to her mobility practices. In this sense, her regular border crossings cannot be seen as mundane practices: they really amount to mobility capital. She has developed sophisticated star-shaped mobility practices based on transnationalised skills and networks that, once transferred to Switzerland, are partially converted into advantages.

The description of Fatuma's formal and informal business activities is striking because of the differences between the two types of activities. The products she sells, the distribution channels, the clientele and the place where business happens in her informal and formal businesses have little to do with one another. Fatuma herself compared the types of clientele she has in each, contrasting the convenience store's "international character" with the "boutique", which is not "for everyone" (see quotation above). Interestingly, the categories she uses refer to the customers'

origins rather than their present geographic location, which is why they became clients of this particular shop. By describing the convenience store as "international" and "for everyone", she implies that the other, undeclared activities take place within more homogeneous networks in terms of the national origin of the people involved.

Her commercial activities take place not only in different geographical places, but also within differentiated contexts and networks. This shift in the frame of reference is clearest in her informal activities, since the goods she sells are acquired in diverse contexts but reinvested and "cashed in" in local, gendered and highly ethnicised networks in the form of economic, social and symbolic capital.

However, her case also indicates that relationships based on local networks that are not characterised by shared ethnicity or nationality are often also important. The bonds she created with the previous owner of the shop and her husband's long-term involvement in the formal Swiss labour market compensated for her lack of institutionalised cultural capital validated in Europe and made it possible for her to purchase her shop. Furthermore, the convenience store's clientele is micro-local and "international", i.e. not defined by a shared ethnic or national background.

Yet it is interesting that the part of her formal business she wants to expand is the sambussa business – that is, the one related more directly to the local ethnicised networks in which she navigates. In her evaluation of her situation, the best results, in economic terms, can be obtained by investing her skills in Somali networks. That may be because her embodied and informal cultural capital, as well as her social capital, can be best valued and mobilised in these specific ethnicised social networks, rather than in the majority society, where she struggles to find a favourable socioeconomic position.

The analysis of Fatuma's involvement in both formal and informal businesses – one being at first sight fully local, from the suppliers to the customers, the other being based on transnational and mobility practices – demonstrates the complex ways in which different places and networks are articulated. It also shows how being incorporated in both a transnational social field and one's place of residence results in developing complementary resources that, together, are transformed into various types of capital. It appears that, had she pursued only one business without the other, the outcome would have been quite different.

#### **4.5 Conclusions**

The three biographies illustrate that gender and family situations, the European country or countries in which people settled and their relationship to the formal and informal labour market have all influenced the constraints and opportunities they face. The diachronic presentation of each of their trajectories further demonstrates the changes that occur at different life stages (for instance, children's education might become important and influence mobility strategies at one stage), but also the changes that might occur in one's situation as a migrant (for instance, becoming a citizen of one's country of residence may open up new opportunities for mobility) or in one's country of origin (for instance, changes in the political or economic situation there may prompt migrants to invest there at some stage).

The case studies also reveal different types of mobility practices (see Chap. 2 for the full typology). Farhan's pendular mobility practices (type 2) allow him to draw resources in one place and invest them in another. The secondary move (type 3) he undertook from Switzerland to Britain allowed him to obtain some assets in London (social capital, improvement of his English) on which he may be able to capitalise later at the transnational level. Safia, after having undertaken multiple onward movements (type 3), also partially mobilises resources gathered in previous countries of residence in London. Thanks to a few return visits (type 4), she is also actively acquiring new types of capital with the intention of investing them in her country of origin in the future. Fatuma has actively developed a star-shaped mobility system (type 1): her frequent travels to different parts of the world for business purposes have concrete effects in her everyday life in Switzerland because they help improve her economic and social life. At moments in their lives, all three have experienced some kind of immobility (type 5). These individuals have accumulated and expanded their mobility capital, which allows them to obtain resources in places other than those in which they invest them. Mobility is part of a wider set of strategies to improve their socioeconomic situation and that of their children. Physical mobility becomes a fundamental resource that can be transformed into social mobility.

The analysis above focuses on the mobile aspects of these respondents' lives, but it also points to the many ways in which people are anchored in the places in which they settle. They learn the local language, find jobs, study, develop connections with neighbours and colleagues, interact with their children's schools and other local institutions, make new friends and become involved in or even set up voluntary associations, in parallel to developing mobility practices. Being mobile requires a high degree of investment and may involve losses and disappointments, but it is not contradictory with settlement and local anchorage. In fact, the two types of processes may affect one another positively.

The case studies have been chosen because they demonstrate particularly well the processes through which physical cross-border mobility can contribute to migrants' ability to improve their living conditions. While the people in this chapter, and in this study in general, have not experienced tremendous social mobility in their country or countries of residence, they have all benefited from their mobility practices in one way or another. In other words, their accumulated experiences of cross-border movements have given them opportunities they may not otherwise have had. In many cases, they have been able to transform them into advantages for themselves and/or their families.

I have focused my analysis on the different ways in which border crossings allow people to strategically transnationalise their assets. As discussed in this chapter's theoretical introduction, two closely intertwined processes take place: one relates to a geographical shift, the other to a shift in the frame of reference in which resources are valued. For both, the main theoretical argument is that social actors benefit from a favourable exchange rate of capital: the contextual shift allows them to take advantage of the difference in the valorisation of their assets. In the next few paragraphs, I will discuss each of these processes separately, yet it is important to bear in mind that they are not independent from one another in people's lives and experiences.

#### *4.5.1 The Geographical Shift*

The mobile migrants I have discussed in this chapter are embedded in transnational social fields (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). By maintaining connections with those various fields at the same time, they are able to mobilise the resources inherent to them at different times and different places. Physical mobility is the cornerstone of this process, as the case studies have illustrated.

What can be witnessed is not simply an accumulation of resources through a diversification of the places in which they are gathered or invested: advantages result from the strategic circulation of assets between those places, and the difference in the value of those assets in those different places (Savage et al. 2005; Bourdieu 1979a). Assets are valued differently depending on the social field, but also the geographic location in which they are evaluated.

Migrants who live in richer countries are sometimes able to take better advantage of the resources they have gathered there by mobilising them in their country of origin. Financial remittances are the clearest example of this process: low salaries in their country of immigration sometimes allow migrants to support many people in their country of origin, buy land and build properties, which would not have been possible if they had invested their economic resources where they were obtained. The stories of Farhan and Safia show that cultural capital earned in Europe is also better invested in their country of origin than in Britain, Switzerland or the Netherlands. The "transnationality" of cultural capital validated in more powerful countries is increased, thanks to these states' economic and cultural hegemony (Weiss 2005). Both institutionalised and embodied cultural capital that has been validated in a European context may circulate advantageously in this direction, and can include educational credentials, mastery of English, professional and associational experiences and bodily understanding of appropriate behaviours and attitudes in a European work context. Farhan and Safia have both invested time and money, and strategically planned their mobility practices, in order to obtain an education, learn English and develop adequate social networks, and they hope to use all of these assets in their region of origin in the future. Having accumulated some kind of "spatial autonomy" (Weiss 2005), they find themselves in a position of (partially) being able to choose the environment best suited to the resources they already possess or to develop specific resources that they know they will be able to mobilise in other parts of the world. Being part of a small group of intellectual Somali men or mastering English and obtaining a degree may not be sufficient to improve one's socioeconomic position in London. They may help do so, however, when they are coupled with mobility strategies and mobilised in the right context (and in adequate social fields), where they can become symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1986, 1987).

It emerges from this study that the transnationalisation of capital does not occur only through this directional geographic shift. Post-migration mobility practices open opportunities to benefit from favourable exchange rates between countries other than the country of origin and country of residence. Safia's secondary movements have allowed her to capitalise on experiences and social connections acquired in the Netherlands in London. Likewise, Farhan's constant movement between two European states allows his family to invest economic capital earned in Switzerland in a context perceived as more favourable, London. Fatuma also benefits from a differential in the valuation of the material resources she obtains in different regions (in particular Dubai) and circulates informally in Switzerland. Her profit results from the circulation of carefully chosen products that meet a demand located in Switzerland: the added value comes from the scarcity of these products in this context and from the alternative they offer to products imported through more formal channels of distribution. The transnationalisation of capital is a multi-faceted process that does not only consist of having resources flow from migrants' country of residence to their country of origin, contrary to the focus in much of the literature. Some migrants are able to extend their "patrimony of places, territories and appropriated networks" (Lévy and Lussault 2003) and draw resources from them. In some instances, it may even be that resources gathered in one's country of origin are reinvested in Europe (see Oeppen 2013).

Whatever the countries involved and the direction of the flow of resources, the transnationalisation of capital takes place at the crossroads of two power differentials that determine the value of capital in different places. On the one hand, nationstates occupy different positions in the "global exercise of power" (Glick Schiller 2010), which affects their ability to influence whether resources earned in one place can be valued in another (see also Nieswand 2011). One illustration of this phenomenon lies in the fact that migrants from Somalia find it almost impossible to validate their cultural capital (in particular their educational credentials and work experience) in Europe, while the education they receive in their country of immigration creates opportunities for them to obtain highly valued jobs in Somalia upon their return (see also Weiss 2005 on that topic). On the other hand, their position as migrants from a poor country to a wealthier country in this configuration of unequal power between nation-states has important effects. "Imbalance of power both shapes the circumstances that compel people to migrate and simultaneously constitutes the conditions under which migrants attempt to settle and develop transnational social fields" (Glick Schiller 2010). In other words, migrants have become migrants partly because of wealth differentials and geopolitical relations at the global level, but the transnational and mobility practices they develop as migrants are also shaped by these unequal relations and their own relative social position in the different places involved. Farhan, Safia and Fatuma have accumulated specific types of capital (economic, cultural, legal and social capital) that give them access to different resources and a higher social status depending on where they convert them. Their mobility capital is a fundamental asset that enables them to "play" between different yet interrelated social positions in varied social, economic and political contexts.

#### *4.5.2 The Shift in the Frame of Reference*

This geographical shift, carried out in order to benefit from a favourable exchange rate between two different nation-states, is one of the processes involved, but it would be insufficient to stop the analysis there. Resources, whatever they are, are not evaluated uniformly within one nation-state or even one city or one neighbourhood. The relevance of the global context should not overshadow the importance of other social contexts. Individuals' positions are linked to the ways in which they are able to value their assets in specific social fields, which depends on the rules of the game specific to each of those social fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). The wider interpretation I have adopted refers not only to social fields in the strict sense implied by Bourdieu's definition, but also to less bounded social environments and less stable, less formal social networks crossed by specific internal hierarchies (see Chap. 1).

Farhan, Safia and Fatuma all participate in the various social fields in which they are embedded. They gather a significant part of the resources they mobilise to secure or improve their socioeconomic status within networks linked to the dominant society in their country of residence. Studying, working, participating in associational activities and maintaining contacts with schools and neighbours are all ways to accumulate economic, cultural, social and legal capital in institutions and networks that are locally based and heterogeneous in terms of the ethnic background of the people involved. The life stories I have described in this chapter have shown that the capital these individuals have accumulated in these ways has allowed them to improve their socioeconomic status to a greater or lesser degree since they arrived in Europe, but it has not allowed any of them to regain the kind of status they had before migration. For instance, in their formal employment, they are economically precarious as self-employed workers (Fatuma), cobble together odd jobs for different institutions in different places (Safia) or have a job in the skilled-labour market, yet in lower positions (Farhan). Most other respondents are in similar situations: they are not able to valorise highly the resources they obtain at the lower and most precarious end of the labour market.

In this situation, transferring resources from one place to another is also a way for mobile migrants to select optimal environments (not only in geographical terms) in which their assets can best be valorised. These processes do not necessarily require border crossings; however, mobility, as the case studies have shown, widens the number of opportunities and thus increases the social contexts in which assets can be mobilised. A major result to emerge from this chapter is that many of the activities intended to transnationalise resources address the needs of people who are originally from Somalia, whatever their actual current location.

Fatuma's informal business activities and her project to expand her formal business to catering activities for local Somali parties address a clientele composed exclusively of local Somali migrants. Likewise, Safia mobilises the education, linguistic skills, work and associational experience she has acquired in different countries in Europe to cater to deprived and marginalised Somali migrants who live in London. Both these women valorise their assets in "migration-specific" social environments (Erel 2010). Furthermore, Farhan's desire to one day mobilise his newly acquired social networks and cultural capital in Somalia is aimed at improving the situation of the local population there, through either political or developmental activities. Safia has already started to carry out such projects by temporarily returning to Somaliland and working in the "development industry" (Hansen 2007), and she hopes to keep capitalising on her cultural capital this way. The context of postconflict political, economic and social reconstruction opens up opportunities for educated migrants to support those processes while obtaining high-status jobs (see also Oeppen 2013; Sagmo 2015). International institutions such as intergovernmental agencies or NGOs constitute specific transnational social fields in which returning migrants are able to valorise their assets, i.e. cultural capital acquired in Western countries together with localised cultural capital in the form of linguistic and cultural skills related to the country of fieldwork.

If all these activities are (partially) based on the transnationalisation of resources, they are also all directed at a population with a similar ethnic background as the mobile migrants who undertake them. Whether the targeted population consists of customers in a Swiss city, socioeconomically disadvantaged migrants in London or residents in Somalia who have been suffering from the conflict and its consequences, these "beneficiaries" are all originally from Somalia. Ethnicity is thus a salient component of many of the social environments in which respondents reinvest the assets they have accumulated in varied contexts. Being able to claim this identity themselves ("being from Somalia"), they are also able to mobilise the cultural assets that go with it (speaking the language, knowing the "culture") in specific social contexts that grant them value. "Ethnic business" markets, social services that cater to migrant communities and employ professionals with a similar background, international institutions that work in the countries of origin and hire employees from the diaspora and Western funding partners for development or humanitarian projects all attach meaning to the ethnic background of the people involved (see also Lutz 1993; Anthias and Cederberg 2009; Erel 2009). In these specific environments, ethnicity itself becomes a resource that (classed and gendered) migrants can mobilise to pursue social advantage (Anthias 2007). Ethnic or national origin is not a resource per se, but it may become one when, on the one hand, migrants are in a position to build on internal differences within the ethnic group and, on the other, institutions from the wider society find interest in valuing it as an asset.

In sum, the second shift that can be seen is one in which migrants draw resources from social fields and networks in which ethnicity is not relevant and reinvest them in social fields where it is salient. Mobility not only enables social actors to circulate resources from one geographic place to another; it also widens the types of social fields in which they can valorise and convert them most favourably.

#### *4.5.3 Status Inconsistencies in Local and Transnational Fields*

The mobility practices and the strategies of transnationalising capital described in this chapter build on the (often conflicting) social position of migrants in different places and within different social fields. The people described in this chapter all experienced strong downward social mobility upon their arrival in Europe as refugees. Though they came from families that were part of the political or economic elite in Somalia, they were not able to transfer most of their capital to Europe: economic capital was lost in the conflict or spent for the migration journey; social capital became transnational and of little use at that time; and the cultural capital validated in that part of the world obtained little recognition in Europe.

However, these assets were not completely lost in the migration process, and they have played an important role in the strategies these migrants have developed in the years and decades following their settlement in Europe. Farhan, Safia and Fatuma first benefited from their privileged status by being among the first Somali refugees to be able to reach Europe, at a time when states and the European Union had not yet restricted their legislation as much as they would later. This is not to say that those first waves of Somalis were welcomed with open arms; but it would no longer be possible to undertake irregular secondary movements within Europe today, it is more difficult to obtain a European passport and the political environment in general is marked by increased xenophobia and anti-refugee and anti-Muslim sentiments. Furthermore, although none of these respondents have been able to regain a status similar to the one they had in Somalia, they have been able to valorise and convert their initial assets – in particular their cultural capital, but also later their transnational social capital. Their early arrival in Europe and the amount of time they have been here have also enabled them to obtain a stable legal status, an undisputable asset when it comes to mobility, as Chap. 2 discusses.

These different aspects of their capital endowment influence their social position. Their education level, their participation in the labour market and the type of area in which they live (populated by people who are lower class, migrants or minorities) point to a positioning in their main country of residence that, although not marginalised, is quite low. Simultaneously, their particular migration history has allowed them to develop relationships with the wider society and its institutions, secure some weak ties with non-Somali people and acquire cultural resources that, although limited, position them favourably in comparison to most other Somali migrants who live in Switzerland and Britain.

In fact, in comparison with the other Somali migrants with whom they interact, their social position is a privileged one. Farhan regularly meets with his Somali neighbours, even while he simultaneously distances himself from them, working hard to differentiate himself through his investment in his children's schooling, through his own education achievements and through his links to an intellectual diasporic elite. Safia's professional and associational involvement in London leads her to create daily relationships with people she helps and supports, in exchange for a salary and/or for social recognition. Fatuma stands in an unequal relationship with the clients of her informal business and the women who participate in the rotating saving groups she established. In both cases, these women have generally arrived more recently and have a precarious economic and legal situation. All three interviewees (along with most other respondents in this study) actively participate in social networks constituted of other local Somali migrants. Their life stories demonstrate, however, that they benefit from a privileged position within these networks: differentiation and hierarchies exist in terms of their migration trajectory; legal status; education; skills and professional experience that can be valued locally; development of local networks, including weak ties to the majority society; and, last but not least, (im)mobility practices.

In sum, the migrants in this study who have been able to capitalise on their mobility practices experience a contradiction in their local statuses depending on the social environment in which they are evaluated: while they belong to a less privileged socioeconomic strata of the local population, they can – and often explicitly do – claim an advantageous status with regard to the other Somali migrants with whom they are in contact. This status is in most instances reinforced by their constant interactions with these other people: they benefit from these unequal relationships. In other words, inconsistencies between different social positions occur within the same nation-state, depending on whether the resources in question are evaluated with regard to the majority society or the other Somali migrants to whom they are closely and daily connected.

Mobility and embeddedness in a transnational social field, however, are crucial aspects of these inconsistencies. On the one hand, mobility capital constitutes a fundamental asset in these migrants' ability to obtain a favourable social status within these networks. Transnational resources and skills may further be converted in contexts and networks related to the majority society, as the example of Fatuma's informal and formal businesses has demonstrated. In her case, as in others, mobility capital is mobilised both to improve one's social position within networks of Somali migrants and to attempt to become socially mobile within the wider society.

On the other hand, in many instances these inconsistencies extend transnationally: some respondents are more or less explicit about how they aim to use their mobility strategies to (re)gain a privileged position vis-à-vis the Somali population in their region of origin. Farhan hopes to use the social networks he has developed in London to obtain access to the political elite in Somalia, while the kin networks with which he is in close contact there cannot offer him such access. The local and transnational position inconsistencies intertwine in this case. But migrants also mobilise the cultural and social capital they have acquired in Europe to improve their social status in their region of origin: while their capital endowment is not sufficient for them to obtain privileged positions in Europe, it becomes a favourable marker of differentiation with regard to the local population in Somalia. This resembles the "status paradox" described for Ghanaian migrants (Nieswand 2011), as well as for other migrants who invest in alternative power hierarchies in their place of origin (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Goldring 1998). Safia's case has made clear that international institutions constitute a specific transnational social field in which the status paradox emerges: while migrants' capital is often poorly valued in the European context, it can be converted favourably in the region of origin – by working for institutions funded and managed by Western actors. In turn, this transnational capital allows those migrants to obtain a privileged status in Somalia, thanks to good wages and positively valued positions.

#### **References**


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# **Chapter 5 Conclusion**

This book is about the lives and experiences of European Somali women and men. By reconstructing part of their stories, it illuminates the relevance of cross-border mobility practices in their strategies to improve their living conditions. It also strives to integrate those stories within larger structures, contextualising their practices with regard to local institutions and hierarchies, as well as within transnational social fields. The local, national and transnational environments in which these individuals navigate need to be understood in the context of the (often conflicting) social positions that actors occupy. This concluding chapter outlines the main results of the study and contextualises them within wider theoretical and empirical debates in migration, integration, transnational and mobilities studies.

As I have emphasised throughout, the respondents in this study are representative of neither the migrant population in general nor all first-generation Somali migrants in Britain or in Switzerland in the early twenty-first century. I developed the sample to specifically include respondents who mostly belong to the first waves of refugees to arrive in Europe from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. The context in which they left their country of origin, as well as the conditions they encountered upon their arrival in Europe, distinguished them from other Somali migrants, in particular those who had been settled in Britain for a few generations, on the one hand, and those who have applied for asylum in Europe more recently, on the other. Further differentiations exist between generations (the study includes only firstgeneration migrants) as well as – in the British context – between those who arrived directly from Somalia and those who are citizens of a first European country of settlement (the study includes people of both types). The focus on mobility practices also influenced the construction of the sample: my attempt to look for mobile respondents in particular led me to encounter people who were involved in "visible" activities, for instance through participation in voluntary associations or NGOs. This bias is mitigated, however, by the fact that I also actively sought participants who were not affiliated in one way or another with visible Somali activities or networks.

The specificities of my sample raise questions regarding the generalisability of the results. A qualitative study such as this has no ambition to describe the reality of all migrants or all Somali migrants. I do not claim that only the Somali migrants of this specific migration wave are able to accumulate mobility capital, or that the processes described here are particular to migrants from Somalia. The wide literature on migrants' transnational and mobile practices shows that secondary movements or return visits to the place of origin, for instance, are common among many groups.

Yet the conditions under which most Somali migrants left their country of origin and the situation there in the decades afterwards have surely exerted some influence on their trajectories and strategies. A significant number of people of Somali origin now live outside of the borders of their country of origin: the on-going conflict and the uncertain routes to a safe place have led to a wide dispersal of this refugee population. Most of the people I met belong to families that had the resources to reach industrialised states, but in many cases their families' trajectories were quite diverse, and they are now spread around many parts of the world. These wide transnational connections constitute a solid basis for the development of transnational and mobile activities. Besides, the recent economic and political development of Somaliland and – to a lesser extent – other parts of Somalia has had some effect on those who live in Europe, North America and other industrialised countries. The resources they have been able to accumulate, in terms of cultural capital in particular, give them some advantages in the reconstruction process. Simultaneously, the relative stability of some regions of the country has allowed an increasing number of people to return to and visit their place of origin, shaping new aspirations for some of them.

I do not want to suggest that cross-border mobility is the only avenue to success for marginalised migrants, that mobility is always experienced positively by those who undertake it or even that mobility is intrinsically a good thing. My aim, rather, is to illuminate, through the detailed accounts of a selected number of respondents, some of the (underexplored) processes that take place in the lives of some marginalised yet settled migrants, the strategies – based on cross-border practices – that some people are able to devise and the conditions under which these strategies are possible.

I have also chosen to focus on migrants' strategies, a choice that partially obscures the structural conditions in which social actors' practices take place. My interest is in the ways in which individuals engage with their environments in their everyday actions and decisions. For this reason, I have discussed their strategies for dealing with difficult conditions, but also for taking advantage of opportunities. This decision may lead to a reading of their situation that is either overly instrumental or exceedingly romanticised, one that ignores the material and symbolic frameworks that constrain actors' agency. My focus on social actors has stemmed from the desire to take seriously some aspects of migrants' lives that are rarely discussed in either academic or policy debates. This study's aim is not to tell what may look like the "success stories" of a small number of people, but to show that, even in difficult circumstances, some migrants are able to build on perhaps unexpected resources located in different places, and to develop alternative strategies to those that are generally studied. For this reason, this book is built on data from migrants who have accumulated some mobility capital and have been able draw some benefits from their mobility practices. In many places, however, it has also examined how cross-border mobility is framed by structuring elements, in particular states' immigration policies, international relations, local and international economic contexts, international institutions and even large transnational family relations. It has also examined other factors that influence migrants' options and actions, such as chance encounters (or bad encounters), unexpected opportunities, love and friendship.

#### **5.1 A Typology of Cross-Border Post-Migration Mobility Practices**

This book describes and discusses different types of cross-border movements undertaken after an initial migration to and settlement in a country of immigration. While many of these movements have already been analysed, by transnational scholars in particular, they have almost always been investigated individually, as single objects of research (but see Jeffery and Murison 2011; Hugo 2013). In contrast, my typology of post-migration mobility practices, which has emerged out of the empirical data, constitutes an attempt to analyse all the possible relevant cross-border mobility practices undertaken by respondents within a single framework.

Based on recent conceptual debates in the field of mobilities studies, I have been able to narrow down my definition of "relevant" cross-border movements. Through their focus on mobility as movement infused with meaning and embedded in specific power relations, scholars in this area argue that mobility has the potential to cause change in people's lives (Kaufmann 2009; Cresswell 2010a). In line with this argument, I define "post-migration mobility practices" as any type of cross-border movement undertaken by settled migrants that is significant enough to create some kind of change in their lives. This definition justifies the methodological focus on respondents' biographies rather than a snapshot of a particular moment in their lives. Reconstructing their stories illuminates the changes that have occurred along the way, with particular attention here on the ways in which mobility practices are intertwined with other aspects of their lives.

Migrants' cross-border movements thus participate in the development of specific mobility systems. These systems include not only all the places one visits or has visited (Stock and Duhamel 2005), but also the ways in which these places are visited, i.e. the regularity of the visits, the length of these stays, the activities undertaken there and the type of relationship created with those places. It is useful to note that the typology developed here focuses on the practices of cross-border mobility, and not on the types of people who engage in them.

The typology contains six ideal types (see Fig. 2.2 in Chap. 2 for a visual summary). *Star-shaped mobility* (type 1) occurs when migrants travel regularly to different places, always coming back to their place of residence after a short time away. The destinations (i.e. the tips of the star) are multiple and may change over time, but the main place of residence (the centre of the star) remains the same. These regular cross-border movements thus take place alongside a rather strong anchorage in the place of residence.

*Pendular mobility* (type 2) is based on systematic to-and-fro movements between two places in which the person is anchored. Although each of those places offers distinct advantages, both of them are considered places of residence. The country of origin may or may not be included in this type of mobility.

*Secondary migration* (type 3) takes place when migrants leave the place where they have lived for some years and settle in another country. Such single moves constitute a change in the main place of residence, yet in many cases migrants retain important connections with their previous country of residence. In the European context, the majority of these movements are undertaken by migrants who are naturalised citizens of a continental European country and attracted by what they consider better opportunities in Britain.

*Temporary visits to the place of origin* (type 4) consist of a series of trips to what people have come to consider as "where they come from". This study illuminates how this place to which people return may be reconstructed (some people "return" to places where they have never actually lived) and reinvested with meaning over the years and depending on personal or contextual circumstances. In all cases, these temporary visits to the place of origin are followed by a return to the main country of residence. When migrants decide not to come back, they undertake a *definitive return* (type 5), which entails a change in the main place of residence. Given the geographical framework of the study, no respondent corresponds to this ideal type in this book.

Finally, *immobility* (type 6) concerns those migrants for whom cross-border movements are of no interest, or for whom they constitute a hassle, a negatively connoted experience or a practice that causes more difficulties than rewards, and which they therefore prefer to avoid. This last type reminds us that, while most migrants in this study have developed one or more mobility practices, low levels of mobility are probably more common among (Somali) migrants established in Europe.

Table 5.1 summarises the characteristics that distinguish the six ideal types.

The typology underscores that, while migrants – in particular those from poorer countries – are generally considered to be incorporated into their new country of residence, they may also physically circulate in transnational social fields. The different case studies presented in this book demonstrate that local anchorage and cross-border mobility occur simultaneously.

Furthermore, the study establishes a direct link between migration and mobility that is particularly explicit in the core concept of "post-migration mobility practices". It contributes to an understanding of migrants' lives that takes both migration and mobility into account within a single analytical framework. It takes seriously the fact that the people under study have operated, at one stage in their lives, an important cross-border movement followed by settlement in a (new) country of


**Table 5.1** Distinctive features of the ideal types

residence (which is what "migration" is typically understood to mean), and it takes equally seriously the possibility that they may later cross borders in ways that have a significant impact on their current and future lives. The added value of combining notions of migration and mobility is discussed in the next section.

#### **5.2 Challenging Taken-for-Granted Distinctions Between Migration and Mobility**

This description and analysis of migrants' post-migration mobility practices contributes to recent academic debates regarding the linkages between migration and mobility. While these linkages have gained visibility in the recent literature, the two concepts are not always clearly defined, and they are often used dichotomously, with "migration" standing for poor people who want to settle in a new country, and "mobility" referring to more highly qualified persons with no clear intention to settle permanently. This dichotomy tends to reflect, sometimes uncritically, states' legal categories, for instance EU distinctions between "mobile people", EU citizens who move between member states, and "migrants" who come from outside the EU to settle within its borders (Martiniello and Rea 2014). Crucially, such categorisations carry strong connotations: mobility is perceived positively, and even promoted, while migration is a subject of concern, framed in terms of integration and social cohesion, and as something that needs to be controlled and limited (Pellerin 2011; Favell 2007; Faist 2013; Verstraete 2003; Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013). This dichotomy builds on boundaries based on nationality, ethnicity/race, level of education and gender to evaluate cross-border movements. In turn, it leads (receiving) states to legitimise certain movements while disapproving of others, and to design differentiated policies and legislation accordingly. In this sense, the discursive juxtaposition of these two categories "is an outcome of upholding and reproducing social inequalities on a national and global scale" (Faist 2013).

This book has addressed the relationships between mobility and migration at the theoretical level by building on the recent field of mobility studies, where mobility is used as a heuristic device rather than a descriptive term (see for instance Cresswell 2010b; Kaufmann et al. 2004). Such a perspective encompasses many different types of movements and goes beyond understanding mobility as only a practice: rather, it is "a system of potential movements that can be more or less actualised" (Lévy 2000, personal translation).

Perhaps surprisingly, given their interest in people moving across borders, migration scholars have shown a "somewhat muted enthusiasm for mobilities research" (Hui 2016). Yet this book has shown that a mobility perspective makes it possible to go beyond an exclusive focus on international migration, which is often assumed to be the most important event in migrants' biographies and mostly a unique and unidirectional movement. Such a focus uncritically reflects the logic and categories of nation-states, in particular those for which border control and the management of migration have become increasingly important (Dahinden 2016; Hui 2016).

An epistemological implication is that the event of migration becomes one movement among others in a migrant's social and spatial trajectory. Martiniello and Rea (2014) use the idea of "migratory career" to address the diachronic construction of a migrant's biography, which can include multiple and multi-directional movements. At the theoretical level, this perspective has led some scholars to contend that international migration could be perceived as one type of mobility among others (Favell 2007; Amelina and Vasilache 2014), an argument subject to contestation (see for instance Skeldon 2015). I have treated the migratory move to Europe as the starting point for my analysis not because it is these migrants' only or most significant border crossing, but because of the critical impact of that migration on their lives. They have been labelled as migrants by states. But they are not just any kind of migrants: they are Black, Muslim, African migrants who came mostly through asylum channels from a country with very little international clout. Focusing on a significant segment of their social and geographic trajectories is a way to illuminate how this important migratory move to Europe articulates with other types of mobility at different moments in their biographies (see also Schapendonk and Steel 2014).

In other words, rather than opposing migration to mobility, I strive to examine their dynamic interconnections. How does the fact of having migrated and settled in one place affect subsequent opportunities and constraints in undertaking other types of cross-border movement? Also, to what extent do these "post-migration mobility practices" modify the lives of these migrants in their country of residence? While I analytically differentiate the processes at stake on the basis of their temporality (migration comes before mobility) and their outcomes, I do not attribute them to different types of people. I thus operate a decoupling of processes and people. Migrants may be people on the move. Mobile people may be former migrants. In short, migrants and mobile persons are not necessarily two different types of people.

Linking both types of processes has allowed me to explore practices that are generally excluded from studies on migrants. I have demonstrated that circulation and other types of temporary movements do not necessarily involve the country of origin. There is strand of literature, mostly by French scholars, that analyses transnational circulation *from the place of origin* as a possible alternative to settlement migration: it is a strategy that allows people to overcome limited opportunities "at home" without having to change their place of residence (Morokvasic 1999; Schmoll 2005). The present study demonstrates that similar strategies may take place not *instead* of settlement migration, but *following* settlement migration (see also Schmoll and Semi 2013; Tarrius et al. 2013). The migration experience constitutes the basis on which some migrants can, under certain conditions, develop favourable cross-border mobility practices. Similarly to those people who circulate from their country of origin, their capacity to move and cross borders becomes a fundamental resource that allows them to access opportunities in different places and acquire other resources. In this regard, I follow Dahinden's (2010) call for more academic attention to the relationships between mobility and sedentarity, circulation and settlement. Far from being mutually exclusive or incompatible, the two are dynamically intertwined in the lives of some established migrants.

This study has thus demonstrated that migrants – who are often considered by policymakers, but also by researchers, as sedentary – may well also circulate transnationally and benefit, like other people on the move, from their cross-border movements. It has uncovered processes that are similar to those generally associated with highly skilled migrants who navigate a globalised world and economy. Many studies focusing on "mobility" concentrate on economically and socially advantaged groups: they show how, through their cross-border movements, they become some kind of cosmopolitan elite (see for instance Fournier 2008; Ong 2003; Weiss 2005; Dahinden 2009a, 2013; Bilecen and Van Mol 2017). These scholars show how highly skilled and/or economically privileged people may build on their assets to develop and benefit from highly mobile lifestyles. Among these assets is their legal ability to engage in cross-border mobility, which is related to their being particularly well positioned in global power relations (Glick Schiller 2010; Weiss 2005).1 Their mobility and entry into, and even settlement in, other nation-states is rarely limited, which grants them a high level of spatial autonomy (Weiss 2005). This "global elite" (Dahinden 2009a) is highly transnational, and it has a cosmopolitan orientation.

The present study has revealed how, despite the structural obstacles they have encountered in their trajectory and their weak position within both their country of residence and global power relations, people who are not part of a "transnational upper class" (Weiss 2005) are also able to develop highly mobile lifestyles. Although they possess limited amounts of various types of capital (or possess capital that receives little international recognition), some migrants become "artistes of the border" (Beck 2007) who actively capitalise on their mobility practices to create better living conditions for themselves. Furthermore, the kind of cosmopolitan attitude

<sup>1</sup>The fact that they are generally not labeled "migrants" is one indication of their elite status.

often attributed to highly skilled, global migrants is in many cases denied to "sedentary migrants": scholars (and policymakers) have focused on the "diasporic" character of these migrants' identifications and networks, neglecting other possible orientations (Glick Schiller et al. 2011). The migrants in this study demonstrate that it is possible to develop relationships based on ethnic ties and an openness to the world simultaneously, which can be defined as a cosmopolitan orientation (see also Darieva 2011; Glick Schiller et al. 2011). Paul (2015) describes the mobile Filipino labour migrants she studied as "working-class cosmopolitans", a term that could apply to many people in this study.

In sum, by comprehensively examining different post-migration mobility practices, this study challenges commonly accepted dichotomies between poorly qualified migrants or refugees who supposedly settle and mobile highly skilled workers who keep circulating; between transnational migrants allegedly attached to their "ethnic group" and a cosmopolitan elite perceived as open to the world.

#### **5.3 Differentiated Forms of Transnationality**

This study also contributes to debates in the field of transnational studies by refining or nuancing some assumptions about transnational practices. In this study, transnational practices and identifications have been examined neither through the lens of one particular movement (for instance, return or onward migration), nor through a focus on one particular activity (for instance, remittances or political involvement in the country of origin). Instead, transnational social fields constitute a framework within which various types of cross-border mobility practices and activities may develop. Starting from the specific point of view of post-migration mobility practices makes it possible to shed new light on migrants' transnationality at three different levels.

First, countries other than the country of origin may be included in migrants' transnational fields. The logic of nation-states, which sometimes pervades migration studies, has mostly limited the perspective of researchers who have not imagined that other places may also be relevant in migrants' practices and identifications (but see Levitt 2012; Sperling 2014). The findings of this study go beyond this limitation and show that migrants may navigate in multi-focal transnational social fields (see also Gowricharn 2009). The mobility practices described in this book involve travel to various places on different continents: the respondents visit friends and family members who have settled in other countries, they participate in political meetings and social gatherings, they activate institutional or professional networks in previous places of residence and they carry out business activities in cities where they can buy goods they want to sell elsewhere. In short, they are influenced by, but also concretely move in and further expand, transnational social fields that include more than two countries. These "other places" they travel to are significant enough to influence their lives and future projects. In this sense, they cannot be ignored in transnational analyses.

Second, and relatedly, this study has shown that migrants' transnational social networks are not exclusively characterised by relationships or ties with people from the same national or ethnic background, contrary to what some scholars have implicitly assumed. While earlier studies on migrant's social networks have focused on their relationships with people with a "shared community origin" (Massey et al. 1993), some scholars have started to apply what Dahinden (2013) has called a "post-ethnic approach", which attempts to examine all types of connections as they emerge from the empirical data. For example, the literature on cross-border circulation practiced by suitcase traders or those who act as intermediaries for them (Schmoll and Semi 2013; Schmoll 2005; Peraldi 2001), cabaret dancers (Dahinden 2009b, 2010) and mobile doctors (Tarrius et al. 2013) has shed light on alternative forms of transnationality based on cosmopolitan ties. While the transnational networks within which the migrants in this study navigate and that they actively mobilise are largely based on ties with kin or other Somalis, they also include significant connections with people with other national or ethnic backgrounds. People organise their business activities according to economic criteria rather than solely on the basis of the national origin of the partners; secondary movers often maintain professional, associational or friendship connections, not all of which are "Somali-based", in their previous country of residence; involvement in the country of origin sometimes takes place through the mediation or with the support of institutions not characterised by an exclusive "Somali orientation". These heterogeneous transnational networks are essential in the development of respondents' mobility practices and are mobilised to obtain new resources or capitalise on those they already have.

Those who adopt a restrictive definition of transnationalism would reject the appropriateness of including ties that connect migrants outside of the "country of residence – country of origin" dyad in the field of transnational studies. They would also reject, perhaps even more vigorously, the inclusion of ties that link migrants to people who do not originally come from the same country. However, we run a danger of "groupism" (Brubaker 2004, 2005) when we assume that migrants' activities can only be considered significantly "transnational" when they are oriented towards migrants' homeland and co-ethnics. As argued in the Introduction to this book, I do not consider "the transnational" according to pre-defined characteristics, but as a theoretical and methodological lens that allows researchers to acknowledge migrants' practices without restricting their analysis to the migrants' country of residence (see also Dahinden 2017). This study demonstrates that the transnational social fields in which mobile Somali migrants navigate consist of complex, dynamic and interwoven connections that link them to multiple places and to people with various ethno-national backgrounds. Amelina and Faist (2012) argue for the need for transnational studies to "avoid the non-reflexive use of ethnic categories when defining the unit of analysis" (1711) and to be aware of their constructed character. Isolating the links that connect migrants to their country of origin and co-ethnics from more heterogeneous links is legitimate only when it is part of an analytical endeavour that aims to understand the processes underlying the distinction. Following from my initial theoretical commitment not to consider ethnicity as an explanatory variable, I also do not want to define transnationality through the exclusive prism of links with the country of origin and its "people".

Third, this study adopts a perspective that attempts to account for the dynamic character of migrants' social ties (see for instance Boyd 1989; Brettell 2000). It conceptualises (migrants') social networks as changeable entities, relational efforts and social accomplishments (Schapendonk 2015). Networks evolve and develop in different directions; some relationships are maintained while others lose importance and sometimes dissolve; new relationships are created while old ones are reactivated (see also Ryan 2010; Cederberg 2012). Transnational networks themselves are not stable and change over time, depending on external circumstances and changes in the lives of the migrants. While some relationships may become less important over time, others may be reactivated. Some relationships may be "dormant": they remain relevant in people's lives because they can be reactivated, remobilised, "awoken" in specific circumstances, and thereby guarantee access to resources that may not be available otherwise (Anthias 2007; Dahinden 2005). These possibilities exist when people are part of (transnational) social fields even if they do not themselves concretely participate in transnational mobility or even identify with transnational networks: being in contact with those who do so may be sufficient to mobilise some of the social relationships that are part of the social field (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004).

The mobility practices described here showcase the dynamic character of transnational social networks. Transnational scholars, in particular in the US, have often focused on the stable networks that migrants may keep alive after having migrated, in particular those that connect them to those "left behind" (see for instance Glick Schiller et al. 1995; Goldring 1998; Mahler 2001; Portes et al. 2002; Waldinger 2008). The present study shows that transnational networks, even those that are related to kin or the homeland, are not simply exported and sustained over time, but also expanded and "awoken" depending on the circumstances. It further demonstrates that cross-border mobility is a fundamental aspect of the evolving character of respondents' networks. While new communication technologies may facilitate contacts across borders, physical presence in many cases is an asset that makes it possible to establish new connections and secure a favourable social position within newly accessed networks. The cross-border movements of many respondents have led them to new, almost chance, encounters significant enough to become new connections that could eventually also be mobilised. Transnational weddings may constitute opportunities to meet new, potentially interesting, people who live elsewhere. Being introduced to local networks while visiting family or friends is another way through which some people may expand their transnational connections. However, social connections are not "out there", waiting to be activated once they become useful: some work is needed to create and maintain them if they are to be considered social capital (Pathirage and Collyer 2011). This study shows that some respondents have actively sought, at some moment in their lives, to recreate connections with family members who live elsewhere, sometimes securing these connections through common projects oriented towards their country of origin. Some people have even strategically attempted to expand their networks according to specific needs at a specific time. Some projects – for instance, related to cross-border business or to political or development activities in the region of origin – necessitate entry points to localised networks. Some respondents are in a position to mobilise the transnational connections they already have to make new ones and thereby obtain the (localised) resources they need.

Some of these newly created connections may be considered instrumental, (Morokvasic 1999), but this in no way excludes the possibility that they serve other purposes as well (for instance, to meet emotional needs). Nor is their instrumentality a sufficient reason to exclude them from migrants' social networks, since they may become relevant links in people's lives, or they may also become "dormant" but remain "mobilisable" in the future. In this sense, they are an important aspect of migrant's mobility capital: connections are (re)activated with the purpose of transforming simple mobility practices into a type of capital.

The focus on the cross-border mobility practices migrants undertake from their country of residence thus sheds lights on specific dimensions of transnationality that have sometimes been glossed over. It constitutes a new starting point in analysing migrants' transnational practices, connections and identifications: as such, it opens fresh avenues to think about transnationality. Because it builds on complementary theoretical frameworks, in particular those inspired by the field of mobilities studies as well as studies on circulation, this study challenges taken-for-granted definitions of transnationalism. It presents empirical and theoretical evidence in favour of acknowledging that migrants may develop long-term, stable connections not only with people and institutions in their country of origin, but also in more diversified types of transnational social fields. These fields may involve people and institutions with whom they do not share a common national or ethnic background. They may also involve practices and connections in places other than the place of origin. Finally, they can change, expand and retract, depending on the individual's life stage, projects and needs.

#### **5.4 Mobility Capital and the State**

I have opted to examine Somali migrants' cross-border mobility practices through a specific theoretical lens. Access to, and the potential for, movement is unequally distributed among social actors: accordingly, mobility is a resource that can be mobilised and transformed into social and economic advantages under certain circumstances; it is thus a source of social differentiation (Kaufmann et al. 2004; Cresswell 2010b). As Beck (2007) points out, the sociology of class "overlooks the fact that the resource and capacity of 'border use', that is: to cross nation state boundaries or to instrumentalize them for accumulation of life chances, has become a key variable of social inequality in a globalized world" (695–6) (see also Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013).

I have argued that mobility is a practice or a strategy that many people "do", but it is also, for some people under certain conditions, a type of capital, i.e. something

that they "possess" (see also Moret 2017). Having accumulated diverse mobility experiences and skills, migrants can capitalise on them by converting their crossborder practices into other types of capital, and vice versa (Kaufmann et al. 2004). This study demonstrates how respondents build on their other assets (economic, cultural, social and legal capital) to develop "productive" mobility practices. In turn, it shows how motility (a synonym for mobility capital) is activated to obtain various types of resources in different places, transfer them and convert them to their advantage. This definition of mobility as a type of capital is further supported by empirical evidence showing the need for migrants to acquire all three aspects of motility as defined by Kaufmann and his colleagues (Kaufmann 2009; Kaufmann et al. 2004; Flamm and Kaufmann 2006): technical access to mobility (in particular through a secure legal status), specific skills related to a *savoir-circuler* and the cognitive ability to take advantage of the opportunities that arise from cross-border movements. This last aspect is best illustrated by the moves undertaken by some respondents in order to acquire specific resources (a diploma, knowledge of English, connections to particular people or institutions) they already know they will use elsewhere. Previous cross-border movements have allowed some of the respondents to take stock of the opportunities located in one place, but also of the assets they are lacking in order to be able to fully take advantage of those opportunities. An intermediary step involving one or more moves is necessary to complete their portfolio and fruitfully implement further mobility practices. I thus argue that unequal access to mobility capital is an important axis of social hierarchies among my respondents, in interaction with other lines of social differentiation, such as gender, class, age and legal status.

The literature on migration has explored the idea of "migration capital", mostly referring to the different abilities and resources that migrants mobilise or acquire during their migration trajectory or which relate to their migration experience (see for instance Suter 2012; Paul 2015; Kõu and Bailey 2014; Ryan et al. 2015; Massey 1990). The concept of mobility capital developed here goes beyond the idea of migration-specific forms of capital: besides acknowledging the relevance of early experiences of mobility in shaping further (im)mobility decisions, it includes a second, closely related, facet. Mobility capital is not only about past experiences, but also about the potential for future movements – in other words, the unequally shared ability to be mobile again when it appears worthwhile to be so (Moret 2017). Drawing on mobilities studies has been very helpful in illuminating this particular aspect of mobility capital. "Potential" implies that people are able cross borders should they want or need to do so, but also, and crucially, that they have the option of not moving as well.

The significance of capital in general has been defined with regard to the level of control social actors are able to exercise over their resources (Morawska 2001). Mobility, like other types of resources, is transformed into capital through its use in pursuing social advantages, but also through the control gained over it. Massey (1994), for instance, contrasts the control that Western academics and journalists exercise over their mobility, and which allows them to use that mobility and turn it into an advantage, with refugees and undocumented migrants who may move a lot

but do not have as much control over their mobility. Franquesa (2011) convincingly argues that "power is not so much located in the pole of mobility, as an intrinsic attribute of it, but rather in the capacity to manage the relation between mobility and immobility" (1028). Being in a position to decide for oneself – and for others – whether to move or not, and under what conditions, is a determining factor.

Having gained some degree of control over one's mobility does not equate, however, with being constantly on the move. While this study focuses on the mobility practices of some migrants, it also shows that the lives of these migrants are also characterised by incorporation, in the sense of being anchored in one place and spending time and energy to develop activities and connections there. By considering mobility a type of capital, it is possible to investigate the ways in which social actors may be in a position to articulate and benefit simultaneously from local anchorage and mobility practices. These balancing acts may include a high degree of mobility at some stage, very few cross-border movements at a later one and a more mobile lifestyle again later. What is important is not whether people move a lot (and in fact moving a lot may constitute a burden and create disadvantages), but whether they are able to mobilise the experiences, knowledge, economic means and social networks they have accumulated.

States strongly shape social actors' control over their mobility, through both external and internal policies. In a world organised according to a logic of nationstates, states (but also international organisations) manage, name and classify those who move across borders and their practices (Favell 2007; Söderström et al. 2013; Crawley and Skleparis 2017) and develop tools to "discipline" those who move in ways that are considered illegitimate (Pécoud 2013). States have the power to facilitate or restrict the mobility of individuals on the basis of their nationality, ethnicity or race, gender and educational level. States shape the mobility practices of those who come and settle in their territory by having the power to grant or deny them a stable legal status, and to determine whether they can become citizens of the country in question. Excluding them from legal capital mostly excludes them from opportunities at the transnational level that others are able, sometimes even prompted, to take advantage of. Faist (2013) has called for migration and mobility scholars to explore the social mechanisms through which specific types of mobility are legitimated and others are not. He argues that the differentiated valuation (and thus hierarchisation) of people's mobilities contributes to the reproduction of social inequalities at the national and global levels (ibid). Those with less capital are given fewer opportunities to accumulate resources by being excluded from the opportunities that mobility would grant them. They further need to comply with the rules set by states, for instance regarding the countries they are allowed to travel to, how long they are permitted to stay and the types of jobs they are permitted to hold.

Western states' border control and migration regimes thus have an impact on social actors' control over their mobility. The Somali migrants I have met arrived in Europe uninvited but were (partially) protected by international conventions. They were confronted by such regimes and initially had little control over their mobility. Most of them crossed some borders in irregular ways at some point; some were offered some kind of legal status but were (temporarily) forbidden to cross more

borders; and others were forced to move again (for instance through the Dublin Regulation). Once they had entered a European state, other national policies, in particular those related to asylum, immigration and settlement (in a wide sense), shaped their ability to obtain a stable legal status, further influencing the degree of control they had over their mobility. Despite their (sometimes provisional) right to settle in their new country of residence, these migrants were confronted with specific criteria framing their access to long-term residency rights and naturalisation.

Mobility capital is not shaped by all states of the world equally, however. States occupy different positions within global power hierarchies (Glick Schiller 2010): the political status of migrants' country of origin in this international system is particularly important in determining how much freedom of mobility those migrants possess (Beck 2007). In other words, depending on "where they come from", migrants experience different obstacles or incentives to their cross-border mobility. "The position of (national) spaces in which an actor is situated structures the opportunities he/she is offered" (Weiss 2005: 713).

The migrants in this study who attempt to accumulate mobility capital need to deal with legal regulations and external or internal policies reflecting othering processes based on ethnicity, nationality, race, religion, gender and class. Exclusionary practices in their countries of settlement may also act as incentives for them to develop cross-border mobility. This book demonstrates how mobility practices are a way for migrants who are mostly marginalised and stigmatised in Europe to negotiate their living conditions by expanding the geographical and social environment in which they are involved. A shortage of opportunities, even after having obtained a secure legal status in their country of residence, certainly has an impact on people's attempt to activate assets located and/or better valued elsewhere.

Some of the Somalis I have met find themselves in a position to benefit from their mobility practices, and to develop mobile lifestyles similar to those generally discussed with regard to a circulating elite. However, their stories show the extent to which the control they exercise over their mobility is framed, at all stages of their biographies, by the states in which they have established themselves. It is true that transnational institutions and agreements (in particular those pertaining to the rights of refugees and to human rights) partially impinge on these states' sovereignty, most obviously because most Somali migrants would not have been allowed to settle in Europe without them. But in a world organised in nation-states, countries with a better political status have the power to influence the mobility of individuals, in particular when it comes to people from countries that do not exert "cultural and economic hegemony" (Weiss 2005). In this sense, arguments regarding "postnational citizenship" (Soysal 1994) are compromised by unequal global relations between states and the continuing importance of influential states on migrants' control over their own mobility (see also Benhabib 2005, 2007).

#### **5.5 From Diversified Contexts to Somali-Oriented Social Fields**

This book also has also explored the mechanisms through which some migrants concretely activate their mobility capital: the processes through which capital is transnationalised stand at the heart of migrants' cross-border mobility practices. Migrants' strategic circulation of assets builds on inconsistencies in their social position in different contexts and on differentials in the valuation of their assets. Transnationalisation of capital appears as a strategic way for migrants with little negotiating power to "play" with those inconsistencies to their advantage (Moret 2016). The life stories in this book show that these processes take place through a geographical shift: respondents invest resources in places other than those in which they acquired them, benefiting from a favourable symbolic exchange rate between the different places.

But this study has added a layer to our understanding of the ways in which capital is transnationalised. It has demonstrated that transferring resources from one geographical place to another is not the end of the story. A close analysis of the social fields, networks and hierarchies through which those processes take place reveals another shift as well, one that I have referred to as a shift in the frame of reference – that is, a change in the social fields in which resources are gathered and/ or reinvested.

I have opted for a broad reading of Bourdieu's concept of "social fields" and included all possible "frames of reference", the configurations in which power struggles between agents take place (Lahire 2001). Migrants occupy different social positions vis-à-vis not only the country they are in, but also the specific hierarchies to which they relate. Decisions regarding the ways in which resources are transferred from one place to another involve an assessment of the social contexts in which these resources are acquired and especially the contexts in which they are mobilised and converted.

One striking finding of this study is that the respondents often favour frames of reference characterised by some kind of "Somali orientation" when deciding to invest the resources they transnationalise. While the respondents are embedded in relatively diverse social fields from which they draw some of their economic, social and cultural capital, they mostly reinvest their (transnationalised) assets in fields that are Somali-based or homeland oriented, i.e. where ethnicity is highly relevant. It appears that most activities performed through mobility *in fine* either address (more disadvantaged) Somali migrants' needs in Europe or fulfil aspirations in contexts directly related to the country of origin (Moret 2016).

Neither the research process nor the analysis of the data was conducted with ethnicity as an *a priori* relevant category. However, the findings reveal the ethnicity does indeed emerge as a relevant category when it comes to understanding the transnational contexts in which the mobility of the respondents is grounded. This study has thus revealed complex processes related to ethnicity: rather than interpreting this shift as a natural preference for those who are considered similar, I understand

it as the outcome of wider processes, including external categorisations as much as identification with specific groups (Jenkins 1997). Given the generally marginalised social position of most Somalis in Europe, the tendency of the migrants in this study to reinvest their resources in social fields where ethnicity matters can be understood as a strategic way to build on hierarchies *within* the "ethnic group". These migrants are faced with difficulties in validating their assets in more dominant hierarchies in their country of residence; but they can find it advantageous to build on other "sets of unequal social relations" (Walby et al. 2012) based on gender, age, family situation, education and legal status. Businesswomen are able to benefit from their crossborder informal trade because of the differences that separate them, as older, established women, from other Somali women who have more limited access to mobility. Similarly, access to higher education in Britain allows migrants there to build on hierarchies related to this asset (based on the level of education, but also on the place where education has been acquired): these boundaries distinguish them from Somalis in their region of origin.

Mobile migrants' strategies are the result of diverging social positions within different interacting sets of social relations. They avoid entering into "symbolic struggles" (in the sense of Bourdieu 1987) they have a good chance of losing, largely because of their ethnicised and racialised position, and compensate for their lack of access to a "contextually validated national symbolic capital" (Hage 1998) through other strategies. They have opted to have their assets valued within other social fields where they have a better chance of converting them into further capital. In other words, while their capital endowment is low in more diversified networks, it may be given credit and legitimation in environments where "Somaliness" is an asset, whether in Europe or in Africa. Furthermore, while mobility is not the only means to these ends, it is an important factor in making these strategies effective. Ethnicity comes to be seen as a resource (see also Anthias 2007; Anthias and Cederberg 2009) in the sense that the "ethnic group" becomes a field in which social differentiation occurs and some are able to achieve a higher status, rather than as (only) a comforting, supportive and rallying community of belonging and identification.

This study has also demonstrated the role played by (mainstream) local and transnational institutions in these processes. In a study about migrant women active in intercultural mediation, Lutz (1993) demonstrated that hierarchies are the result of internal, but also external forces: building on internal differences, in particular those pertaining to education, women are hired to cater specifically to (less privileged) migrants with the same ethnic background (see also Erel 2009). Similar processes can be seen when Somali migrants mobilise their ethnic background as a resource they couple with a European citizenship and education in order to work for international organisations or NGOs in their country of origin.

Migrants transnationalise their capital within particular contexts, and partially in response to institutions' expectations, which tend to channel migrants into specific niches where their ethnic background is valued as much as their other assets, if not more. The risks of these strategies are that they allow little space to challenge existing hierarchies. While people are able to build on differences *within* the ethnic

group, the question remains as to whether this ability can improve their social position within more general hierarchies – within the institutions they work for and the wider society as a whole.

This book therefore challenges common-sense interpretations of the salience of ethnic networks in migrants' strategies, particularly those that involve cross-border mobility practices. While this study does not assume that migrants naturally stick to their own ethnic networks, it has allowed the possibility to emerge from the data, while examining the contexts in which these networks become relevant in specific ways, and treats ethnicity as one category of difference among others.

#### **5.6 Towards a Transnational Understanding of Incorporation**

This study contributes to academic debates on the transnationalisation of social inequalities because of its comprehensive analysis of varied types of mobility practices and focus on the multi-directional flows of resources. Until now, most research has focused on the ways in which some migrants are able to enhance their and their family's social position in their country of origin through transfers of resources from their country of residence, thanks to wealth differentials between the two contexts (Nieswand 2011; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Salih 2003; Goldring 1998; Sagmo 2015). Taking into account mobility practices that do not necessarily include only the country of origin and the country of settlement makes it possible to attain a wider understanding of those processes. Some respondents are able to gather or invest differentiated resources in previous countries of settlement, in places where they have ("mobilisable") relatives and in places where they have developed functional networks and skills in relation to particular activities.

Migrants' gendered, ethnicised/racialised and classed positions vary depending on where their resources are valued. Anthias (2016) argues that "belonging has become a term that can no longer be linked to a fixed place or location but to a range of different locales in different ways. […] People might occupy different and contradictory positions and have different belongings globally" (183). This is why it becomes possible, for instance, to live in London and mobilise high-level Dutch politicians met before undertaking a secondary move in order to set up projects in Somaliland. Inconsistencies in social positions and differentiated access to resources also influence the strategy of earning money in Switzerland in a satisfying work environment while investing it in in education in London (for oneself or for one's children), and to simultaneously consolidate specific networks in Britain that might become useful in Somalia in the future.

The migrants in this study do not simply "move" or "travel a lot". It's not just "exercise", as Awa stated in the quotation that opened this book. Thanks to their mobility practices, they try to find the best ways to benefit from the complex, multiple and often inconsistent social positions they occupy in different places. Their migration trajectories and subsequent cross-border mobility practices have led them to navigate in complex transnational social fields: this study has demonstrated that some migrants are able to "play" with their access to resources that are valued differently in different contexts.

These results challenge contemporary Western states' policies and expectations regarding "their" migrants. Classical pathways of integration have always focused on incorporation into the local society: following these premises, migrants are expected to become sedentary and use their resources as well as develop new ones within the boundaries of their nation-state of residence. According to this perspective, transnational ties, activities and identifications are at best impediments to integration and a threat to social cohesion, and at worst a danger for the security of the states of residence.

The connections between transnationalism and incorporation into the country of residence have been the object of intense scholarly debates. While some scholars argue that transnationalism can only be a temporary phenomenon and will naturally give way to incorporation (Waldinger 2015; Kivisto 2001), many others explore how the two processes interrelate. Empirical studies reveal the many ways in which transnational practices and local anchorage may co-exist and combine in migrants' lives (see among others Bilgili 2015; Mazzucato 2008). Going a step further, Bivand Erdal and Oeppen (2013) argue that under some circumstances transnational lifestyles can be synergistic with processes of local incorporation, rather than simply additive or even antagonistic to them.

Similarly, the present study has revealed the complex ways in which transnationality and incorporation intertwine in the lives of some settled migrants. But it has also examined the equally important relationships between mobility and sedentarity and how they mutually influence each other as migrants' biographies unfold.

First, local anchorage and periods of sedentarity are important steppingstones in becoming mobile. Most of the respondents are locally active in the labour market in one way or another. They have obtained a stable legal status. They join pension schemes, create associations, become politically active, build relationships in their neighbourhoods, manage the schooling and religious education of their children and pursue continuing education for themselves. Yet this study has demonstrated that migrants' local and national anchorage in their main place of residence is crucial in shaping their post-migration mobility practices. Building up mobility capital paradoxically involves the need to "sedentarise" (Dahinden 2010; Tarrius et al. 2013). Moments of sedentarity, sometimes lasting for years, and processes of incorporation are necessary for the development of mobility practices because it is during those moments that migrants acquire the necessary capital: legal capital primarily, but also – as this study has shown – economic, cultural and social capital located in the country of residence.

Second, however, local mooring is in many cases associated with experiences of exclusion and discrimination based on migrants' national, ethnic, racial and, increasingly, religious background, which may push some migrants to pursue different aspects of their integration in different places (see also Ahrens et al. 2014). Some authors refer to the transnational practices and identifications prompted by

migrants' experiences of discrimination or racism in their place of residence as "reactive transnationalism" (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005; Snel et al. 2016). Similarly, my study has shown that migrants' (perceived or real) lack of opportunities and the feeling that they are not accepted as full members of their place of residence have a strong impact. Migrants become the "ethnic others" when they first cross European borders to settle (Beck 2007); they later negotiate these othering practices and their consequences by employing assets located elsewhere and developing transnational mobility practices to profit from them. In this sense, mobility takes on a "reactive" character in some instances (Moret 2017).

Third, this study has provided evidence that cross-border mobility may have beneficial effects on migrants' local incorporation. Since its beginnings in the 1990s, much of the literature on the connections between integration and transnationalism has focused on the ways in which the former may positively influence the later. Less evidence exists on the reverse process, when the "synergy" of transnational activities increases chances and opportunities in the country of residence (but see for instance Mazzucato 2011 on "reverse remittances"; Oeppen 2013). Being able to go to different places, to settle or come back – in other words, retaining some control over one's mobility and immobility – increase opportunities to accumulate resources that are not accessible locally. Once circulated, these resources can be reinvested, including in the (European) country of residence, a process that contributes to improving one's local living conditions. Examples of such synergetic processes include developing transnational businesses but catering to local populations and transferring economic capital earned elsewhere to the education of one's children in one's country of residence.

In other words, migrants do not necessarily conform to the rules and logic of nation-states regarding how and where they should integrate (Tarrius 1993). By becoming "artistes of the border" (Beck 2007) and transforming mobility practices into a type of capital, they can extend the boundaries of the territory in which they exert their agency beyond the nation-state. The transnational lens challenges current understandings of local integration, considering it instead "a contingent and partial process, which takes place in the interaction of different socio-spatial units of reference" (Nieswand 2011). So does an empirical and theoretical focus on postmigration mobility practices, which reveals that some migrants are able to design original strategies, partially based on cross-border mobility, to pursue upward social mobility even in their country of residence, if not for themselves, at least for the next generation.

Unfortunately, European policymakers are far from acknowledging the reality and impact of many migrants' simultaneous and inconsistent social positions in different places (Anthias 2016; Nowicka 2013). It goes against states' concerns and political agenda to admit that migrants' relevant social networks often transcend national borders. Yet formal and informal social protection occurs across borders rather than solely through state-led (or supra-state) mechanisms (Faist and Bilecen 2015). This study has shown that transnationality sometimes implies mobility: the mobility capital that migrants may accumulate helps increase their social and economic wellbeing. Without access to multiple localities and the ability to circulate assets between them, their options remain limited. Yet the fact that mobility practices are integral to some people's life strategies contradicts nationstates' sedentarist logic.

Interestingly, European states recognise the potentially positive effect of transnational anchorage and mobility for selected groups of people. The mobility of (highly-skilled) citizens stands at the heart of the European Union's vision and is believed to be an important aspect of economic competitiveness and identity building (Favell 2008). Similarly, transnational mobility has become a condition for a successful academic career and is seen to benefit universities (Schaer et al. 2017). Things are different, however, when it comes to migrants who were considered unwanted when they first arrived and have since become citizens who struggle to belong fully. States privilege the movements of some and forbid or stigmatise those of others, a phenomenon that Glick Schiller and Salazar (2013) refer to as "regimes of mobility". For poor, racialised migrants, recent trends in European immigration and integration policies have increased expectations of exclusive loyalty and decreased an acknowledgment of the potential benefits of activities that take place across borders. Forcing such assimilationist models of integration on migrants who could obtain resources in varied places and transnationalise them thanks to their acquired mobility capital causes migrants to miss out on opportunities that could benefit them, but it may also have the same effect on their new countries of residence. Changing this approach would require European policymakers to change their perspective radically, and to start acknowledging the creative strategies that migrants implement, the mobile dimension of some of these strategies and the transnational resources they draw on.

#### **References**


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